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Chief Political Section

CAS

24 October 1963
P-4/63

Freedom Movement of Iran Trials

REFERENCES: NIT 6260, 3 August 1963
NIT-6282, 22 August 1963
NIT-6295, 9 September 1963

The following is for your information and whatever use you wish to make of it within the security limitations designated. Any reporting by you of this information need not cite CAS the source.

1. The government will attempt to sentence the Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI) defendants in the trial from ten to fifteen years in jail. This is said to be at the Shah's wish. (This is from an Iranian intelligence officer (C) with access to reports concerning internal security matters. We consider the information to be reliable. Date of information is 22 October 1963.)

2. The FMI in Tehran would like to stage demonstrations against the trials of the FMI leaders but they are uncertain whether it would be wise to demonstrate since such action might result in the defendants' receiving a stiffer sentence. Thus, the FMI, in coordination with the National Front students abroad, will demonstrate against the trials abroad in order to bring world attention to bear on the trial. (This is from a usually reliable source, from a central council member of the FMI. Date of information is 23 October 1963.)

3. a. The FMI is concerned that the National Front in Iran has washed its hands of the FMI trials. The FMI leaders on trial have asked those on the outside whether they should put up a stiff defense or not. The FMI on the outside is undecided what it should do.

b. Jafar Sharif-Emami has asked the Shah to pardon Mehdi Bazargan. Sharif-Emami asked this as head of the Engineers Association, of which Bazargan is also a leading member. The Shah told Sharif-Emami that the case against Bazargan was rather grave. Sharif-Emami said, "But your Majesty's compassion is greater." The Shah said he was very busy with foreign visitors at the time but that he would look into the matter. The Shah sent word to Bazargan in prison that he must come and see the Shah and beg the Shah's pardon. Bazargan refused, since this

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would discredit him and the FMI with the people of Iran. For his intercession, Sharif-Amami got some credit with the opposition. General Zamani (fnu), head of the Military Court in the FMI trials, apologized to Bazargan and said he was sympathetic with him but that he had to do his duty. Bazargan's mother died about three weeks ago and hundreds of advertisements expressing sympathy have appeared in the local press.

c. Haj Aqa Reza Zanjani, a mullah tied in with the FMI and probably with the Fedayan Islam, is being watched closely. During the current trials, there is surveillance in depth on the streets around his home.

d. (The information in paragraph 3 is from a usually reliable source from a founder of the FMI. Date of information is 23 October 1963.)

4. Bazargan is highly respected as a university professor and also for his piety. Strange as it may seem, he is still being talked about for head of the Technical Faculty at the University of Tehran. As a matter of fact, the Technical Faculty met with Chancellor Jahanshah Saleh on 20 October. Saleh was defeated because even those he wanted to stand for dean of the faculty refused. The meeting broke up with no one being elected or appointed. (This is from a university student (C) who is a National Front student leader.)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mohammad Tavakoli, Civil Engineer
John D. Stempel, U.S. Embassy

DATE & PLACE: May 8, 1978 - El Chico Restaurant

SUBJECT : The Iranian National Liberation Front

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, OR, NEA/IRN, IRN/RNA

E O. 11652 : XGDS-4

Tavakoli and Stempel met at the El Chico restaurant where they were introduced by a friend. Tavakoli had been billed to Stempel as someone who had contacts with liberation movement elements and might, in fact, himself be an important liberation movement figure. The individual who introduced Stempel and Tavakoli remained for about 15 minutes of light conversation on Stempel's background. It was clear throughout the evening that there was a substantial suspicion by Tavakoli that Stempel was either a "SAVAK fink" or CIA agent.

Conversation developed slowly; during which time, it emerged that the third party who was called Bahram had studied civil engineering in England, political science in the U.S. and had taught for a few years at the University of Dayton. Tavakoli was reluctant to provide his full name, but did so upon direct question. Tavakoli who appeared to be in his early to mid-40's, said he had studied engineering in Germany.

After some verbal prodding, Tavakoli asked Stempel what he thought Iran's problems were. Stempel discussed the problem of balancing political development with economic development and said he was interested in learning more about Iranian society. Tavakoli then asked what Stempel thought Iranians felt about the U.S. Stempel replied there were many views held by Iranians--some thought the U.S. was not sufficiently vigorous in defense of the "free world", while others disliked substantial American presence on all counts. Many others admire American technology, but dislike many aspects of American society. Many Iranians, Stempel noted, used Americans as scapegoats for suburban ills which would exist with or without the American presence. Tavakoli said there were "several thousand" American military present in Iran. Stempel countered by noting that it was numbered in the 100's rather than the 1,000's. Most were involved in technical training; many Iranians thought there were more military than there actually were because many civilians who work here

have had a military background. Tavakoli then opened up a bit for the first time and said he guessed slightly under half of the people in Iran distrusted and disliked Americans because of their support for the Shah and the government. Stempel replied he was aware of this feeling though he might quibble with the numbers.

At this point Tavakoli abruptly asked Stempel if he thought it was safe to talk in a public place because "they were always present". Stempel noted the good location of the table and said of course some conversations would be inappropriate but general conversation such as we were having were no problem for him. Tavakoli then lowered his voice and said he knew the top leadership of the National Liberation Front very well, but said many of those whom he knew were suspicious of American motives for wanting to talk about the movement (Comment: including Tavakoli). Just what were our reasons for wanting discussions with the liberation movement? Stempel replied in general terms saying that the U.S. was always interested in political and economic movements. It was important to know a great deal more than we did about all cultures, especially those as complex as Iran, if American policy was to faithfully represent American interests. Tavakoli said he felt there was a great gap between American's interests and the policy of their government. Stempel replied that this was not always so and a discussion of the influence of "American interests" on foreign policy followed.

Tavakoli then asked if Stempel knew Professor Richard Cottam. Stempel indicated he had never met the man but was aware of his State Department background and his reputation as a scholar. Tavakoli urged Stempel to reread Cottam's book, Nationalism in Iran. It is a good history of the events which led to the creation of the Liberation Front first in the early 50s and finally as presently organized during the 1962 National Front riots. Tavakoli then asked if Stempel had some way of proving he was a State Department officer and whether he would mind his name being checked with Professor Cottam. Stempel readily agreed to any check that Tavakoli wanted to make and suggested that he or his friends could begin with the State Department Register. Tavakoli pressed further asking if there was some way that the Embassy could directly confirm to Engineer Mehdi Bazargan that Stempel was an Embassy employee. Stempel replied that any of Tavakoli's academic friends could call the Embassy and confirm this, but Stempel knew of no other way and inquired as to what Tavakoli meant by this. (Comment: Tavakoli may have been probed for some kind of intelligence connection.) Tavakoli then asked if the Embassy would be interested in discussions or meetings with National Front Leaders. Stempel replied that the Embassy was interested in the general subject but perhaps things should proceed more slowly. Stempel expressed his own

doubts that Tavakoli was who he said he was (Stempel did this at several points in the conversation when Tavakoli expressed suspicions of him.). Tavakoli said that if Stempel checked out all right he would be prepared to arrange a meeting with Stempel with people he described as National Liberation Front leaders, including Bazargan. When Stempel asked how he would know it was Barzagan, Tavakoli replied "you Americans have your sources". Stempel indicated he had met, socially at least, one or two of the National Fronters (he did not identify which ones) and would be willing to attend such a meeting. Tavakoli indicated he would call Stempel at home after a suitable interval, "if everything is ok".

COMMENT: The meeting was a curious one filled with expressed suspicion on both sides but also a willingness to continue the dialogue. Stempel suggested that discussions should be seen as part of a process. Tavakoli expressed suspicion of U.S. motives and returned several times to the question of what the U.S. hoped to gain. The reply was always some variety of the basic theme: better understanding and appreciation of the movement. At one point, Stempel had to assure Tavakoli point blank that he was not working for any intelligence service and hoped Tavakoli could say the same. This elicited a wry smile.

Tavakoli handled himself very carefully and was at first unwilling to see his companion leave. After the third individual left, however, Tavakoli warmed up slightly and despite his suspicions of motives, talked in terms of a meeting. The accompanying individual "Bahram" seemed much more Americanized and perhaps was sent along to establish Stempel's bonafides. After a little fast sword play on Ohio State faculty members whom both knew, Stempel felt Bahram believed Stempel had been honest about his background.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Eng. Mehdi Bazargan, National Liberation Front
Dr. Yadollah Sahabi, National Liberation Front
Mohammad Tavakoli, Civil Engineer, National Liberation Front
John D. Stempel, U.S. Embassy, Tehran

DATE & PLACE: May 25, 1978 - Private home in Darrous

SUBJECT : Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI) - Views on Politics in Iran

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, OR, NEA/IRN

E.O. 11652 : XGDS-4

Tavakoli picked me up about 9:00 a.m. and took me to a private home about 15 minutes from my own house. There, I was introduced to Eng. Bazargan and Dr. Sahabi, a retired geology professor from Tehran University. Tavakoli had identified Bazargan as the leader of the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI) and Sahabi as a close associate (We believe he is one of Bazargan's top counselors.). We exchanged pleasantries and began discussing politics in Iran very gingerly. It was obvious that the two Front leaders (Tavakoli played the role of translator but contributed substantively to the discussion in a way which indicated that he, too, is a member of the inner circle.) wanted to exchange analyses and were prepared to talk frankly. In the course of discussion they set forth LMI views of the present situation of the Liberation Movement of Iran (offical English title) in Iran and quizzed me on President Carter's Human Rights program. At the conclusion of the evening, Bazargan handed me a letter which he had delivered to the Shah requesting a television interview between the Shah and LMI leaders.

The conversation, which lasted just over two hours is described below by major subheadings as it evolved.

U.S. Human Rights Policy

The LMI leaders began by asking me what I thought President Carter's Human Rights policy was. Drawing on various briefing material, I described the Administration's human rights policy as one of seeking to strengthen the values relating to personal and social freedom. The LMI leaders asked about the drop in President Carter's popularity, questioning whether this was attributable to his human rights policy itself or his failure to prosecute it more vigorously. I replied that there were many factors involved relating to presidential popularity and thought that the human rights policy had only minor effect on his popularity. As in other cases, there was criticism of the Administration's human rights efforts on both sides--doing too much and doing too little. I pointed out the fact that American Congressional interest in human rights did predate the present administration; there was support for various elements of America's human rights posture on both sides of the political fence.

Liberation Movement of Iran's View of History

At this point, Bazargan broke in to describe his movement's view of politics in Iran over the past 25 years, firmly insisting that the CIA had put the Shah back on his throne. (He maintained this posture despite my denial and we agreed to disagree, he accepting the possibility of other factors and my allowing that American influence was certainly strong at that time.) Bazargan portrayed a picture of steadily diminishing political liberties in Iran from 1953 to the end of 1976. I took issue with this, noting that there seemed to be an ebb and flow, with more political activity and freedom at some times and less at others. Bazargan maintained that the overall trend was downward.

Present Developments

Beginning in early 1977, some political liberalization was allowed, according to Bazargan. The LMI over the spring and summer of 1977 began to test how many speeches could be given and to what size audiences. The group's major effort was a Bazargan speech to 14,000 at one of Tehran's major mosques in April 1977.

All three Liberation Front leaders insisted that the Shah must have been forced to liberalize and they attributed this wholly to President Carter's human rights policy. I suggested that President Carter's human rights policy was merely one factor, that events within Iran had urged many others to press the Shah to liberalize. Discussion of this point indicated that LMI leaders are firmly convinced the Shah would never have liberalized unless he was forced to by external forces. Conceding that SAVAK was not involved in internal dissidence as much as before, Bazargan said that as long as the potential fo operations against oppositionists exist, such anti-dissident movement as the "Underground Committee for Vengeance" were still possible. He acknowledged that activities by this committee against known LMI members had tapered off over the past ten days. He attributed no significance to this.

Returning to the liberalization which took place in 1977, Bazargan said that following the Shah's visit to Washington, repression again seemed the order of the day and that this continued and intensified until President Carter's visit to Iran on New Year's day. After that, said Bazargan, it seemed to the LMI that the government resorted to brute force. A spirited discussion followed I suggested the government had reversed its heavy hand sometime in early December before the Carter visit. Bazargan uncomfortably conceded this but noted it was in preparation for the President's visit. I suggested that the post-January 1 period seemed rather a period of administrative ineptness with untrained police responsible for the Qom incident on January 9 and administrative incompetence a major (and admitted by GOI) cause of the Tabriz riots in February. SAVAK had not seemed to play a significant role, perhaps that was why things had gone so poorly. Bazargan and Tavakoli leaped into the discussion, insisting SAVAK had been orchestrating all these events. I replied that my own personal reading of them would not support such a statement: SAVAK seemed

as confused as everybody else. We continued discussing events down to the present with the LMI leaders beginning to consider among themselves the possibility that there was less organization behind the government's response than they had at first thought. There was no attempt to convince me that I was wrong, and there appeared a sincere appreciation of my willingness to talk frankly.

Bazargan then continued by presenting the case for believing that the violence of the past six weeks was a government plot to show that people are not really ready for freedom. He and Sahabi expressed heated disapproval of government attempts to intimidate the dissident movement and while they could not or would not present any difinitive evidence of government involvement, they were so firmly convinced that officialdom was behind the attacks, that I assume they must have what they feel is reliable information to that effect.

Projection for the Future

At this point Bazargan said the hour was growing late (both Bazargan and Sahabi are well along in years), and we agreed to continue the discussion on May 30, before my vacation. I expressed a desire to know more about the LMI and they wished to go into future prospects at greater length. Bazargan made the point three times that this is a critical period for democracy in Iran. There must be some form of dissidence allowed and this opportunity cannot be lost. Following the meeting, Tavakoli added that the LMI's failure to find a role in Iranian life would undoubtedly leave fertile breeding ground for terrorists (a standard theme since 1953). He hinted that six months ago terrorists had begun insisting that it was hopeless to think of non-violent change and that there would be growing pressure on the LMI. I asked him how he knew this--did the Movement have any contacts with terrorists? He became vague, indicating the LMI had learned this from "friends." I did not press the point.

We briefly discussed the relationship of the LMI to the Islamic movement and Bazargan and Tavakoli said that the Islamic movement was basically pro-Western. It would be a pity if the Shah drove it into the hands of other hostile forces.

Bazargan and Sahabi (who did not talk much) are both alert, intelligent individuals, though they have a particular bias and present their ideological case well, It is possible to have an honest and spirited discussion and they are willing to accept other points of view. They were obviously pleased with the meeting and expressed positive interest in others. Bazargan stated he looked forward to a dialog with the American Embassy and was quite pleased with the initial talk. He then handed me a copy of his letter to the Shah, which called for the Shah to meet on television with himself and other opposition leaders to discuss the following subjects: 1) the monarchial order and constitutional law; 2) the breadth and depth of the opposition in Iran; 3) legal

freedoms and police violence; and 4) services and achievements of the White (Shah-People) Revolution. He asked me point-blank if I thought the Shah would accept. I replied I didn't know, but it seemed more likely to me that he would turn down a television show but might want something more private.

POL:JDStempel:lab:5-31-78

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Eng. Mehdi Bazargan, National Liberation Front
Mohammad Tavakoli, Civil Engineer, National Liberation Front
John D. Stempel, U.S. Embassy, Tehran

DATE & PLACE: May 30, 1978 - Private Home in Darrous

SUBJECT : Further Discussions with Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI) officials

DISTRIBUTION: AMB, DCM, OR, NEA/IRN, POL

E.O. 11652 : XGDS-4

I was greeted warmly by Tavakoli and Bazargan who apologized that Dr. Sahabi could not join us because of illness. After the usual pleasantries and very friendly "tarof", I asked if Bazargan had received an answer from his letter to the Shah suggesting a television interview between the Shah and opposition leaders (see May 25 Bazargan/Stempel memcon). Bazargan replied that there had been no answer, but that he was intrigued by Minister of Information Homayoun's press conference (reported by Tehran), which statedthat dissidents who expressed their loyalty to the country and monarchy would be allowed media time/space to present their case.

In response to my question as to the LMI's attitude towards this statement, Bazargan said that if the Shah can define what he means by monarchy, "we are prepared to say whether we believe in it." Historically, the Iranian monarchy has been a dictatorial, not a constitutional, institution. Then, choosing his words carefully, Bazargan said the LMI believes in the constitution. "If the Shah is ready to implement all provisions of the constitution, then we are prepared to accept the monarchy." Bazargan said there were two questions. On the theoretical side, will the Shah accept the constitution? On the political side, will he abide by it? Is he ready to relinquish some power to groups that may come forward? Tavakoli said that LMI believes he is not.

What about LMI?

At this point, I suggested it would be not only useful but necessary for us to know more about the LMI. Unless we knew something about the strength and depth of organization and had some understanding of the Movement's doctrine, it would be difficult to take it seriously. How did I know I was not listening to two gentlemen who were merely expressing the views of a few close friends?

Tavakoli broke in and said there was one question that must be clarified first: Does the Carter administration have a "separate channel" into the Embassy? In response to my probing, he said the LMI had heard that the Carter Administration has its "own"

sources within the Embassy. (Comment: At first I thought this might be a vague reference to illicit CIA connections. The subsequent discussion convinced me that someone told LMI leaders in the U.S. that there were separate entrees of some kind.)

I replied that as far as I knew there were no "separate channels." Individuals occassionally wrote informal letters to personal friends; perhaps someone had misinterpreted this sort of correspondence as an "official" channel. The Ambassador was the President's personal representative and approved messages to Washington. I then indicated to Bazargan that I discussed our talks only with the Ambassador, his deputy and the political counselor. The Ambassador, of course, had the final say on what was forwarded to Washington, where he could be certain it would be read by a politically responsible officer. I asked then how widely they had discussed our previous conversation. Tavakoli replied that they had not discussed it with "others". After a brief discussion with Bazargan, Tavakoli made a more forward statement. The LMI wished to be responsive to our wish to know more about the movement. They hoped to continue full and frank (he stressed the frank) exchanges but were even prepared to give us information unilaterally because the Movement believed it was in its interest to do so. He noted the Movement had supplied much information to Richard Cottam when he was a State Department officer and continued to do so. The Movement thought in that instance it had been very helpful. I indicated I would, if he and Bazargan wished, report any particularly sensitive information directly to the Ambassador. Both said that they saw no need for that kind of restriction and would be prepared to discuss the Movement in more detail at our next meeting, probably after my return from vacation (this would probably be the first week of July). This kind of new step, however, required consultation with other leaders.

Bazargan then asked about a contact that had been made by an Embassy officer through an Iranian friend before I began meeting with the group--should this go ahead? After some sparring, we determined that Political Counselor Lambrakis had made the request several weeks earlier through another dissident leader. Bazargan expressed the view that further contact was not necessary, but he would be glad to meet with Mr. Lambrakis if the latter desired. I replied that I would check with Mr. Lambrakis to see. (Comment: On the whole, Lambrakis and I believe occasional social contact between Bazargan and Lambrakis would be a good thing, since it would show watching GOI eyes where our "contact" was. Those leaders, including Tavakoli, who are thought not to be known to the police would not, of course want to meet with Lambrakis.)

Various Incidents

At this point the conversation became more informal as we had dessert. Tavakoli and Bazargan offered the following information on events in Iran over the past ten days.

The Shah's pressure on the dissident movement has definitely increased. Despite the prevailing quiet, there have been a number of incidents. The most important had been in Qom where there have been quite a few arrests of both mullahs and religious students up to May 29. Ayatollah Shariatmadari is under close SAVAK surveillance. One prominent mullah arrested is Mr. Nateq Nouri. Two other mullahs were arrested in Tehran on May 29, Fazlolah Mahalati and Jaafar Shojooni. The LMI professed not to know why they had been picked up. (Nateq and Mahalati were among those recommended for arrest by another contact who had talked with the Court Ministry. They, and presumably Shojooni, are both Khomeini men.)

Projected Demonstrations

SAVAK has contacted all mosques in the major cities and said there will be no ceremonies on June 5. Religious leaders and LMI leaders have called for people to stay inside, a form of general strike to show the government that the whole country is both unified and dissatisfied. The LMI believes that any political meeting will be met by army attacks on demonstrators. The Fifth of June date celebrates the moment at which the Shah ordered the army to shoot to kill in the 1963 National Front riots, which led to Ayatollah Khomeini's exile.

In response to my question, Bazargan said it was not clear there would be demonstrations on the 19th of June. This depended on what happened on the Fifth.

On Friday, May 26, commandos attacked thirty students who were mountain climbing northeast of Tehran. These commandos were riot police who brought along their own medical teams. The students were beaten badly, then taken to the village of Afjeh for medical aid. Veils (chadors) were pulled off the women who were insulted for a period which ranged from 4 to 5 hours. At least some of the group were released, but Bazargan did not know if any of the rest had been arrested or not. Tavakoli asked what my interpretation of this event was, and I replied it sounded like police overreaction.

The government has stopped the pay of Aryamehr University faculty members who had been striking against the University's proposed move to Isfahan. Bazargan said his sources believe the army wants to use the Aryamehr campus to establish its own engineering school. Bazargan reported that a low-level staff member at Tehran University said the Empress Farah had convened a trustees meeting to hear student representatives discuss their problems. At the conclusion, she indicated she would set up a meeting for the students with Prime Minister Amouzegar. At her direction the board of trustees reportedly approved a 15,000 rial housing allowance per month for faculty members.

COMMENT: LMI views of the incidents above, particularly the police attack on students, probably do not tell the whole story. They should be treated as having a kernel of truth covered by some exaggeration until modified or confirmed by other sources.

Tavakoli's Role

Tavakoli's behavior this evening clearly showed he is a respected member of the inner circle of the LMI. Bazargan deferred to him on two or three occasions, and he entered the conversation on his own, not just as an interpreter.

POL:JDStempel:lab:6-1-78

SECRET/LIMDIS

Tehran, Iran

June 6, 1978

Henry Precht, Esquire
NEA/IRN
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Henry:

Welcome to Command Central, NEA/IRN style. We are delighted to have you aboard, though perhaps not as much as Myles is. What we have for you today should give you something to get your teeth into early. The memcons enclosed with this letter are being very closely held as you see, and I wanted to forward them to you with a word for explanation and comment so they may be used to best advantage.

Mohammad Tavakoli, who is a ranking member (but who has thus far not admitted to it) of the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI) contolling board or executive committee, was introduced to John Stempel as a byproduct of another contact within the Mission. As you will see from the memcons, the relationship has developed slowly but, as we understand from our other contacts, very satisfactorily from the LMI point of view. Despite their suspicions, they appear to be on the verge of beginning meaningful discussions with John which could give us some real insights into and information about the LMI and various fringe groups, to supplement that from other POL and Embassy contacts.

The LMI will almost certainly at some point begin exhorting us to do different things. We know from the way the initial contact was arranged that they are quite eager to talk to us, but have the usual paranoia about CIA involvement. You and others might give us your thoughts in due course about the directions we might like this contact to go, the pressures we should be prepared to accept, and what aims of our own we might want to press at some future time. We think for the moment we should keep this specific business as quiet as possible.

As far as additional distribution is concerned, we will leave that to your discretion. Obviously, continued utility of this contact depends on extreme discretion by those who

know about it. We do not know the genesis of the LMI's belief that the Administration has a "separate channel" into the Embassy (see May 30 memcon), but we would hate to see our side billing this contact as that sort of thing. We are handling the matter here by simply saying generally that we are in touch with a whole range of people on various occasions and letting it go at that.

We find it fascinating that Richard Cottam, as several of us had thought, is still a principal contact for the LMI in the U.S. and that they were willing to confirm this, even in the early stages of discussion.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Naas
Minister-Counselor

Attachments:
as stated above

POL:JDStempel/bjh

SECRET/LIMDIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Eng. Mehdi Bazargan, National Liberation Front
Mohammad Tavakoli, Civil Engineer, National Liberation Front
Dr. Yadollah Sahabi, National Liberation Front
John D. Stempel, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy

DATE & PLACE: July 18, 1978 - Private home in Darrous, Tehran

SUBJECT: Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI)--Uncertainty Over Iranian Politics, Reticence in American Contact

DISTRIBUTION: CHARGE, OR, POL, NEA/IRN

SUMMARY AND COMMENT:
This meeting was in many ways my least satisfactory encounter with the Liberation Movement officials, because it represented the first regression in trust by the LMI and they appeared confused and lacking in political imagination. It was clear from the outset that all three LMI leaders were focusing upon the Iranian Society for the Defense of Liberty and Human Rights press interview of July 12 which catalogued alleged deviations of the government in the political rights area. In discussion regarding recent political developments--the projected demonstration laws, proposed electoral activities and religious leaders' views--the Front leaders spent most of their time criticizing the GOI's intentions and expressing disbelief that the government would carry through. They accurately reflected the confusion which the Shah has apparently successfully sewn among the oppositionists.

The leaders would not discuss projected Liberation Movement actions but wished to talk primarily about doctrine and ideology. They in effect retreated from their offer (made at our May 30 meeting) to discuss the Front more frankly. Probably the principal reason for this was their belief that news of our meeting had gotten out. Tavakoli said they had heard reports of our contact. He could not or would not be more specific, and I assured him that from our side there had been very restrictive discussion. They appeared to accept this but nevertheless remained suspicious. They would not agree at this time to a process whereby I could contact them and left the impression that they would call me again in a week or two.

Clearly, the Shah's recent moves have sewn confusion and suspicion. Their reluctance to go into detail about the purported leak of our talks raises the question of whether there has been some inadvertent discussion somewhere or whether they are merely using this as a means of pulling in their horns.

In addition to supplying a copy of the Iranian Society for the Defense of Liberty and H.R.'s handout, they informed me of a meeting to be held the evening of July 20 in a garden at a major intersection seven blocks from the Embassy (Takte Jamshid and Pahlavi). They do not expect difficulty but are alert to the possibility the police may try to limit or otherwise interfere with the meeting. Main points of discussion are given below. End Summary.

OPPOSITION HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENSIVE:
The Iranian Society for the defense of Liberty and Human Rights (SDLHR) press conference of July 12 catalogued a number of problems, all of which had been the subject of Embassy reporting. A copy of the group's statement is being transmitted separately. Bazargan and Tavakoli asked me what I thought of it. I replied that it was a useful collection and documentation of a number of problems and certainly deserved the attention it had gotten. Tavakoli, who increasingly took the lead this evening, interjected that this proves the Shah cannot be trusted and seemed to be trying to elicit an official U.S. response.

I asked whether there was any official connection between the LMI and the Society. Bazargan replied that the LMI supports the SDLHR but has no organizational ties to it. Movement members join the Society as individuals. The Society's constitution calls for it to be independent from politics. That is why it has felt safe in establishing an "office" here.

LEAKAGE REGARDING EMBASSY/LMI TALKS:
At this point, Tavakoli broke in and asked if I had told anyone about our talks. I reiterated, as I had six weeks earlier, that I had told only the Ambassador, his Deputy and my own boss. I asked why the question. He replied that word that the LMI was talking to the Embassy had gotten back to them from another source. I asked for particulars, and he indicated that the group did not know any details. I pressed him on this, but he could not (or would not) give me anything additional. I said many people made conjectures about Embassy contacts and gave him copies of two newspaper articles to show how these were occasionally erroneously treated. I asked him if there could have been someone guessing if we had contacted each other or someone within his own group. Bazargan said only three or four other members of the group knew of their contact with me. I expressed our concern that these contacts were made public but noted that it was USG policy to inform ourselves about and meet with various groups. Someone might have simply assumed we had met at parties or elsewhere. I pledged to do some searching from my side and urged them to do some more specific investigation. They indicated their readiness to proceed.

LMI AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION:
I asked what the Movement's view of the recent electoral bill and the projected demonstration law. I wondered whether this had affected LMI attitudes or strategy. Bazargan said the electoral law was interesting. The group was taking a step-by-step approach to the new law. However, all Iranians remained deeply suspicious of the Shah's intentions. How could a man who had ruled autocratically for 37 years suddenly be converted? The SDLHR had accurately documented recent violations and the LMI believed the Shah was not sincere.

Any demonstration law in Iran would simply be a tool to establish police control over oppositionist factions, unlike the U.S., where signing up for demonstrations gave protection. The government's intention was what was important. There was no reason to believe the government really wanted freedom. The government had kept stories about the Society's activities out of the press. The press refused to carry ads for a major religious/political meeting to be held the evening of July 20. Bazargan then gave me two handbills which announced this meeting under the names of about a hundred leading religious and political figures. Bazargan commented that the meeting was being held in response to Ayatollah Khomeini's call for a restrained observance of the 12th Imman's birthday. (COMMENT: It was clear from our discussion that the LMI political leaders are hand-in-glove with those mullahs who support Khomeini, not those who are personally loyal to Shariatmadari. Other leaders had not signed these handbills.) In response to my question, Bazargan assured me that the meeting would be open. Reporters and press attaches were welcome to come, and presumably anybody else could. He did not expect trouble but thought there might be police guards with a "potential" for interference.

FUTURE LMI STRATEGY:
In response to my prodding as to what strategy the Movement would take in dealing with the projected liberalization measures, the LMI leaders jockeyed back and forth decrying the government's intentions and finally saying that any efforts would be useless unless the GOI was "obliged" to change its attitudes. Speaking for the three, Tavakoli said grudgingly that the LMI would take part in any efforts--such as elections--but the LMI was not optimistic. I replied that the Embassy was taking a very objective, wait-and-see attitude as well. I then probed the LMI leaders on how the LMI functioned. They recounted the history of the Liberation Movement through its nine months of open existence in 1961, the sending of its leaders to jail for four to ten years, and its revival on a "semi-clandestine" basis in 1971. They carefully diminished the importance of the Union of National Front

Groups under Darious Foruhar. They stressed that the LMI had begun working in the late 70s to implant its ideological thrust in society. The Movement was political and closely tied to Islam--here Tavakoli broke in to state that the choice for Iran's youth was between Marxism and Mohammadism.

This led to the question as to how the LMI felt about supporting the mullahs' desire to have a veto, through the Council of Ulema, on all laws passed. Tavakoli said the Council has never really been established, the concept is weak and it needs clarifying. I wondered aloud whether the mullahs might not use it to take power and freeze out the more secular groups. Tavakoli said I did not understand that the Islamic experience was not similar to the Christian experience in the West. The Ulema would accept political leadership, and they merely wished to measure conformity of religious law with civil law. I expressed scepticism that this could be the case and we agreed to disagree. (COMMENT: The LMI leaders clearly believe that they will dominate any type of coalition with religious leaders. Their self-assurance is remarkable, but seems somewhat misplaced

Tavakoli then assured me that the masses of the Iranian people followed the LMI because it promised decisive action against the Shah, and behaved "realistically". There followed five minutes of ideology which pictured the LMI as the intellectual leadership of the Iranian "freedom movement". When I mildly suggested that Ayatollah Shariatmadari had said it was not necessary to overthrow the Shah, Tavakoli responded sharply that if Shariatmadari confirmed that view, he would be deserted by the mass of the people (COMMENT: very dubious). The LMI is clearly uneasy about the prospect that other opposition groups, especially religious ones, will come to a coherent ideological program that embraces the Shah. I got the definite impression that such a development would severely destabilize the LMI.

LMI ORGANIZATION:
When I probed further about the LMI's present organization, the leaders quickly drew back. I expressed the view that it would be helpful to know more about their organization since it helped to put them in perspective. They replied smoothly that they had thought I was only interested in background and doctrine. They were uneasy about giving me information on the Movement because of the security problems and the fact that the Movement had not yet become "open". I asked whether this was a backing off from what they had said six weeks earlier. Tavakoli and Bazargan carefully avoided either confirming or denying this, but in discussing future meetings, used the term "exchange of information" which had been the phrase which signalled more restrained contact. I suggested that some way be worked out to allow me to contact them other than calling Eng. Bazargan directly (which I have never done). After some internal discussion, Tavakoli said he would call me again "in a week or two" and we could arrange to meet again. The other

two leaders said it was all right for Tavakoli to meet me alone and they accepted the possiblity of eventually coming to my house. It was clear from the discussion that the recent events had increased their initial paranoia and I was left with the feeling "Don't call us, we'll call you.", which is exactly where matters stand at the moment. LMI seems to be going through some severe soul searching. Our contact will and should be somewhat more restrained in the immediate future.

POL:JDStempel:lab:7-20-78

E.O. 11652· XGDS-4

LIMI

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mohammad Tavakoli, Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI)
John D. Stempel, Political Officer, American Embassy, Tehran

DATE & PLACE: August 21, 1978 - North-side restaurant

SUBJECT : Iranian Political Situation

DISTRIBUTION: AMB, DCM, OR, POL, NEA/IRN

Tavakoli contacted me August 20 after a month's lapse since our last conversation. He met with me alone without the other LMI officials who had met with us previously. The purpose of the meeting from his point of view was to present LMI versions of various events of the past month.

The following major points emerged from the meeting: A) LMI has an entirely different perception of reality than most other opposition groups and certainly a totally different perspective than government. This difference is so marked at the present time as to make dialogue between the GOI and the LMI extremely difficult if not impossible. B) Tavakoli said that the nationalist movement in Iran lacks a popular base. The choice is between Islam and communism for the movement must have an ideology. C) The GOI has been consistently provocative with respect to police and military forces around the mosques. "The people" will undoubtedly continue to demonstrate and there may be additional violence. The LMI is predicting that there will be martial law in Tehran by August 23 or 24. (Comment: This seems unlikely).

Recent Events: Tavakoli described the aborted political meeting (reported in Tehran 7022). He indicated that a member of Iranian Committee for Human Rights and Freedom, Eng. Hashem Sabaghian who had arranged for the use of the property where the meeting was held, was picked up by SAVAK on July 22 and remains in the Komite prison in Iran. His family has visited him once and he is in good health. The International League for Human Rights has cabled the Prime Minister in protest of this arrest and the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights has protested police action in breaking up the meeting.

Tavakoli jumped on the Shah's August 17 press conference statement that liberty was costing so much as evidence that the Shah will not keep even a minimum promise about democratization. He reviewed recent disturbances in Isfahan and

Shiraz, arguing that they were government provocations. He said adoctor in Shiraz had reported 38 killed and 300 injured in the early August riots in Shiraz. I suggested that his figures were way in excess of what other sources had reported but he doggedly stayed with them and added that police had burned mosque rugs, bicycles and motorcycles and even attacked a woman in the mosque area. (Comment: This does not square with any other report of the Shiraz events or even other dissident comments heard here.) In Behbehan, Tavakoli claimed ten were killed in an attack on the mosque. In Tehran, Tavakoli reported activities at mosques in recent days and noted that police had been very active in breaking up meetings in the Lurzadeh, Imam Hossein and bazaar mosques. He noted that LMI officials, including Eng. Bazargan were speaking at various mosques, but the Kanoon-eh-Tohit mosque in Kennedy square was closed August 20, the night Bazargan was to talk. In the Qoba mosque five blocks from the Pars American club, Tavakoli said crowds had reached 20,000 for the evening prayer service over the past few days. (Comment: We drove by the area following our meeting and Tavakoli walked with me through the area around the mosque. This old crowd guesser from Berkley would say that not more than six or seven thousand people were present both inside and outside the mosque. The speeches were anti-government but we did not stay long. Eight trucks of government troops were drawn up in three locations but behavior of both troops and crowd was unexceptional during the 15 minutes we were present.

Abadan Theatre Disaster: Tavakoli outlined the LMI's view of Abadan, stressing inconsistencies in the various stories. He was particularly concerned to note that the Abadan Police Chief is Brig. Razmi who was Chief of Police in Qom during the January riots. Tavakoli claimed that figures were falsifie in the early news reporting and that SAVAK officers at at least one local paper stopped initial news reports. He was critical of the Abadan fire department for not coming to the scene more quickly and criticized the government for saying that terrorists or guerrillas were responsible since "they never attack the people". I took sharp issue with this latter statement and asked if he were suggesting government collusion or responsibility. He backed off any direct conclusion but said the LMI was conducting its own investigation and noted that the French Press Agency man in Iran and other reporters had gone to Abadan.

Responsibility for Unrest--Foreign or Domestic? Tavakoli bore down heavily on police responsibility for provoking unrest and suggested that there were two ways people could be provoked: A) by constant prodding by police officials around the mosques and B) external agents. In response to a question as to who these agents were, Tavakoli suggested

some may be government people but "others may be from outside." We talked this point at some length and he admitted apparently somewhat reluctantly that LMI leadership suspects there may be "others" not under full movement control. He did not go as far as to suggest they had foreign backing but listened with renewed attention when I detailed some of the reasons we suspect there might be foreign elements involved. He did not demur and suggested that LMI's influence on the religious movement was not as complete as they would like it to be.

The Union of National Front specifically, Darrious Forouhar and Dr. Karim Sanjabi, came under sharp criticism. Tavakoli said this group now believes it cannot work with the Shah though it once thought so (Comment: In the absence of direct contact with these men we are inclined to doubt they have shifted their position so radically, particularly as the Iranian scene has been opening up. It is clear that there is considerable friction within the opposition coordinating group, between ex-National Fronters and the more militant Liberation Movement stalwarts.)

LMI ideology and their reaction to the Shah's Liberalization: In response to a direct question on the Shah's constitution day speech, Tavakoli said it contained some good sentiments but there was no reason to believe the Shah's actions would fulfill the promise of his words. He expressed surprise that the American Embassy still spoke of these things and said that one purpose of our exchange of information was to have a correct (meaning LMI) view of events reflected in American policy. I suggested that our concern with these elements occur because they are a fact of public life, that we too were watching to see if action matched words.

Tavakoli stated that the close tie between the LMI and the religious movement was necessary. Iran was becoming split by the marxists and the religious. He left no room for a middle-of-the-road philosophy supportive of the Shah. All this will pass and the true conflict for the future will be between Islam and communism. For this reason the Liberation Movement is moving to closer links with religious leaders. Since Mossadeq's time, the Liberation Movement had lost its popular base and must rebuild around Islam. (This is the most surprising statement an oppositionist has made to me in over two years. Oppositionists normally contend they represent a thwarted majority of the people who cannot speak their minds.)

Concluding Comment: Tavakoli was more relaxed at this meeting than previously. I asked him if he had any other clues as to who had learned of our earlier meetings. He did not go into names but did say that there had never been a reference to specific meetings but only to Liberation

Movement contacts. Only four LMI officials knew of these contacts. I said that this seemed to me to indicate someone had been guessing or making a general point. He agreed that this might be the case but remained somewhat suspicious.

POL:JDStempel:lab:8-22-78

1978 SEP 25 AM 12 30

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

09251

FROM	CLASSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	SECRET

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:
ACTION:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE

SECRET TEHRAN 09251

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4

TAGS: PINS, PORS, IR

SUBJECT: KHOMEINI PLACED UNDER HOUSE ARREST, LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) SEEKS FURTHER U.S. CONTACT

POL
AMB
DCM
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PM
PSIS
OR
RU
IIR
ABR
FA

SUMMARY: LMI REPRESENTATIVES INFORMED EMBOFF THAT IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS PLACED AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI UNDER HOUSE ARREST AND WILL ONLY ALLOW RELATIVES TO VISIT. KHOMEINI MAY WANT TO LEAVE IRAQ. LMI BELIEVES EITHER USSR OR US PRESSURED IRAQIS TO MAKE MOVE. EMBOFF DENIED US ROLE. LMI SUGGESTS MEETING WITH US REPRESENTATIVES TO CLARIFY ITS GOALS AND ENLIST US ASSISTANCE. IN VIEW OF INCREASING ACTIVITY BY LEFTISTS, FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS MAY BE IN STORE. END SUMMARY.

1. AT URGENT REQUEST OF LMI REPRESENTATIVE, POLOFF STEMPEL MET WITH TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF MOVEMENT SEPT 25. LMI ASKED FOR MEETING BECAUSE NEWS HAD REACHED IRAN SEPT. 24 THAT IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS PLACED SOLDIERS AROUND KHOMEINI HOUSE AND HAD ONLY ALLOWED TWO PEOPLE, BOTH RELATIVES, THROUGH

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
POL:JDStempel:lab	9-25-78		DCM:CWNaas

CLEARANCES:
POL:GBLambrakis

SECRET 25
CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 152(H)
(Formerly FS-413(H))
January 1975
Dept. of State

POLICE LINE. POLICE TOLD KHOMEINI MOVE TAKEN BECAUSE IRAQ WANTS GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAN. KHOMEINI SAID HE WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO LEAVE IRAQ. LMI REPRESENTATIVES SAID MOVEMENT CONVINCED IRAQIS WOULD NOT DO THIS ON THEIR OWN AND ACCUSED EITHER US OR USSR OF "FORCING" IRAQ TO DO THIS. LMI REPS SAID IRANIAN RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY VERY TENSE AND SOME RELIGIOUS LEADERS WERE CONSIDERING ISSUING ORDER TO KILL US AND SOVIET CITIZENS IF COMPLICITY OF EITHER IS PROVED. EMBOFF TOLD LMI PAIR IT WAS ABSURD TO THINK US HAD A HAND IN SUCH ACTION AND, WHATEVER CAUSE OF AYATOLLAH'S INCARCERATION, IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR ALL CONCERNED IF ATTACKS WERE MADE ON FOREIGNERS. LMI MEN SEEMED MOLLIFIED AND STOOD DOWN FROM HOSTILE ATTITUDE.

2. LMI PAIR THEN SKETCHED OPPOSITION VIEW OF PRESENT SITUATION: SHAH IS HATED BY "VAST MAJORITY" OF IRANIAN PEOPLE. LEFTISTS, ESPECIALLY TUDEH UNDERGROUND GROUPS, ARE BECOMING ACTIVE AND ARE ORGANIZATIONALLY BETTER ABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF MARTIAL LAW THAN OTHERS. US SHOULD STEP IN TO HELP IRAN THROUGH DIFFICULT TRANSITION.

SENIOR LMI MAN PRESENT THEN SAID MEETING WITH STEMPEL HAD BEEN REQUESTED TO ARRANGE "HIGH LEVEL" CONTACT WITH USG TO PRESENT LMI VIEWS. SUCH MEETING COULD CONSIST OF TWO OR THREE INDIVIDUALS PER SIDE AND WOULD HAVE AS ITS GOAL EXPLANATION OF LMI POLICIES AND SECURING U.S. BLESSING FOR TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD CULMINATE IN END OF PAHLAVI DYNASTY "IN BEST INTERESTS OF BOTH IRAN AND U.S." LMI WOULD ESTABLISH IT HAD GOOD RELIGIOUS CONTACTS AT SUCH A MEETING. EMBOFF REPLIED U.S. STARTS FROM PREMISE THAT SHAH HAS KEY ROLE IN FUTURE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND IDEA OF SUCH A MEETING SEEMED PREMATURE AND SOMEWHAT GRANDIOSE. HE PROMISED RESPONSE LATER. (COMMENT: DESPITE EMBOFF'S RATHER HARSH DENIALS, LMI TEAM INSISTED U.S. "COULD DO ANYTHING IT WANTED TO" WITH RESPECT TO IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. EMBOFF SAID THIS WAS RIDICULOUS.)

3. IN PROCESS OF DISCUSSION, LMI TEAM HAMMERED HEAVILY ON THEME THAT ANARCHY SERVED NO ONE AND THAT SHAH AND PRESENT GOI COULD NOT BE TRUSTED TO IMPLEMENT PROMISES. EMBOFF ASKED LMI WHAT STEPS IT WOULD BE TAKING TO ADAPT MORE OPEN SITUATION TO ITS OWN [redacted] ENDS. DESPITE LMI DENIAL THAT IT WOULD COOPERATE WITH GOI, IT WAS CLEAR SOME INTENSIVE THOUGHT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO POSSIBLE ELECTORAL STRATEGY AND LMI WAS EXTREMELY UPSET BY FACT KHOMEINI'S WINGS HAD BEEN CLIPPED. LMI SAID THERE

WOULD BE PUBLIC STRIKE, PROBABLY A "QUIET DAY," IN TWO OR THREE DAYS" TIME TO PROTEST TREATMENT OF KHOMEINI. PAIR ALSO ADDED THAT TUDEH UNDERGROUND GROUPS WERE PLANNING DEMONSTRATION FOR OCTOBER 15 WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE CONFRONTATION WITH GOI IF NOT HANDLED PROPERLY. (THIS LAST REPORT, IN SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FORM, ALSO CAME TO POL COUNS FROM DIFFERENT SOURCE.)

4. COMMENT: LMI CLEARLY OFF BALANCE BY IRAQI MOVE AND REMAINS UNSURE HOW IT SHOULD PLAY PRESENT IRANIAN LIBERALIZATION PROGRAM. REQUEST FOR MEETING WITH "POLICY LEVEL" U.S. OFFICIALS, A LONG-TERM OPPOSITION AIM, APPEARS EFFORT TO GET USG TO HELP PULL LMI CHESTNUTS OUT OF FIRE.

5. FOR BAGHDAD: WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFO YOU CAN DEVELOP ON OFFICIAL IRAQI LINE AND ACTUAL SITUATION OF KHOMEINI IN NAXXXX NAJAF OR BAGHDAD.

SULLIVAN

OPTIONAL FORM 152a(H.
(Formerly FS-413(H)a)
January 1975
Dept. of State

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Bahram Bahramian, Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI)
Mohammad Tavakoli, " " " "
John D. Stempel, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy

DATE & PLACE: Sept. 25, 1978 - Dowlat Street

SUBJECT : LMI seeks High Level U.S. Meeting

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, OR, BIO (Tavakoli), DAO, NEA/IRN
INR/RNA, INR/GIL/B

SUMMARY: LMI officials asked for an urgent meeting with Poloff Stempel to find out if the U.S. had anything to do with the Iraqi government placing Ayatollah Khomeini under house arrest. LMI officials said their movement seeks a policy-level meeting with American officials to present their case for seeking U.S. support in arranging transition from present authoritarian government in Iran to a more democratic system. LMI men suggest communist and other violent actors are beginning to play an important role in Iran. They claim popular feeling is overwhelmingly against the Shah.

KHOMEINI INCARCERATION: Accepting their request for an urgent meeting, Stempel met with Bahramian and Tavakoli and drove around northern area of Tehran while discussion took place. LMI duo were obviously agitated and informed Stempel that on September 23 Iraqi authorities had placed Ayatollah Khomeini under virtual house arrest. Only two people had been allowed into his home since, and the Iraqi police had informed Khomeini that Iraq wanted good ties with Iran and he was to stop political activities. Khomeini replied: "Down with Iran, I have been serving my country and my people and I will leave this place."

LMI pair said Movement believes either the Soviet Union or the U.S. is behind this action which is extremely dangerous. Iranian religious community was tense all day on September 24 and several Ayatollahs wanted to give the command to kill Americans and Russians. Stempel replied the Embassy in Tehran knew nothing about restrictions on Khomeini and said it was absurd to think the U.S. would have this sort of influence on Iraq. He said it would be a disaster if the religious community "began killing Americans" on such a flimsy pretext. The Iraqi government feared Soviet activity and had its own reasons for wanting to rein in Khomeini.

After several minutes of further discussion, the LMI men relaxed somewhat and were not nearly so tense during the remainder of the meeting. They did suggest the U.S. should use its influence to get Khomeini freed. Stempel replied it was ridiculous to even suggest this was a possibility.

LMI SEEKS HIGH-LEVEL MEETING: Bahramian then described the present political situation in the following terms: The communists are very active and the Tudeh underground organization has benefited substantially from Martial Law, since it can work more effectively than legal organizations. There is to be a major strike of some kind on the 15th of October which the Tudeh and other radicals are likely to attempt to convert into a violent attack against the government. There will be a lesser "public strike" in a few days to protest Khomeini's restriction, probably a stay-home day.

The LMI does not trust the Shah and does not believe he intends to create any kind of democratic system. There was considerable discussion on this point and Stempel asked point blank how the LMI planned to play its cards in the next few months. Tavakoli said the LMI needed a year or two to get organized and thought the government would have to be watched and at least verbally attacked if there was to be any progress. (COMMENT: While the LMI men talked non-cooperation with the government, it is clear that they have given intense thought to possible electoral strategy.).

Bahramian then said there should be a meeting between U.S. officers who had policy influence and the LMI. The LMI would describe its tactics for achieving the goal of democratization. Stempel asked what purpose such a meeting would serve and what result was expected. Bahramian said it would serve to convey the LMI's policies to Washington at a suitable level and the LMI hoped to achieve U.S. blessing on non-violent activities aimed at getting rid of the Pahlavi Dynasty. Stempel replied the U.S. obviously did not see the Iranian situation the way the LMI did and regarded the Shah as a force for stability and as a major factor for guiding democratic change. Stempel was then treated to an impassioned few minutes describing how the mass of Iranians disliked the Shah and wanted him gone; "But we are not asking you to get rid of him, just to agree to help us change." Tavakoli said for two years the LMI has tried to keep nationalists activities non-violent. "Now we are reaching the point where the masses are beginning to leave us for violent activities." The LMI does not seek violence or anarchy which only benefits the communists. Bahramian said it might even be possible to have the Shah attend such a meeting, but Tavakoli disagreed and said the Shah had to go.

Stempel said he would, of course, report the request to his government but such a meeting seemed a little grandiose and not merited by the State of LMI/US discussions to date, nor by the assumptions on which the LMI was operating. How did the U.S. government know that Tavakoli and his friends spoke for anything more than themselves? The LMI pair replied that

full evidence of their Bona Fides would be given at the meeting, which might well take place outside Iran with two or three people to a side. Stempel said he would respond to their request later.

OTHER EVENTS: The LMI men said the National Front was an artificial group revolving around individuals. They said the LMI was not really cooperating with the Front any more. (COMMENT: This corresponds to what two other Front members from another faction have told us.)

The recent death of Ayatollah Golpayegan's son in a traffic accident near Yazd was a major cause for religious meetings. A crowd in Yazd forced the GOI to abandon its plans to air freight the body to Qom and the body was driven by the religious faithful to Qom.

Tavakoli made the point that Ayatollah Shariatmadari has recently emphasized no negotiations with the Shah, as well as his continued support for Khomeini. Tavakoli harshly criticized Agence France Press for its "unhelpful" coverage of the opposition movement and said the AFP staffer was under pressure from the GOI because of his Soviet wife. The LMI pair added that their count of total dead in the Jaleh square episode and surrounding areas approaches 1,000. When asked where the bulk were buried, they suggested that many were buried without documentation in Meskarabad cemetary in Eastern Tehran. (COMMENT: We have heard this rumor elsewhere, but have no further evidence to substantiate it.)

LATER COMMENT: On September 27, Iranian press announced restrictions on Khomeini had been lifted. As of September 28, there has been no call for a public strike or other demonstration.

Conversations with other National Front figures suggest to us that the pressure for a "policy-level" meeting with U.S. officials has at least part of its roots in internal conflicts within the Liberation Movement and the Front.

POL:JDStempel:lab:9-28-78

TELEGRAM

1978 OCT 11 AM 11:42

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

09892

FROM	CLASSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	SECRET/NOFORN

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

SECRET TEHRAN 09892

ACTION:

NOFORN

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4
TAGS: PINS, PORS, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI): NEXT STEPS

REF: TEHRAN 9251

POL-6

SUMMARY: LMI WANTS TO RESERVE POSSIBILITY OF MEETING WITH U.S. OFFICIALS. LMI BELIEVES BRITISH ARE BACKING NAHAVANDI STUDY GROUP. GROUP EXPECTS PRESENT SITUATION WILL CHANGE IN IMPORTANT WAYS OVER NEXT TWO WEEKS. END SUMMARY.

AMB
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SHIR
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14/

1. LMI REPRESENTATIVES CONTACTED POLOFF STEMPEL MORNING OCT 11 FOR ANSWER TO THEIR REQUEST FOR POLICY-LEVEL MEETING WITH U.S. OFFICIALS (REFTEL). THEY PAINTED SCENE IN IRAN AS VERY GREY WITH SOME PEOPLE ON STRIKE BECAUSE OF/DISCONTENT WITH GOVERNMENT, AND OTHERS STRIKING BECAUSE GOI ORDERED THEM TO DO SO TO HIDE "REAL NATURE OF UNREST." LMI REPS THEN ASKED WHAT U.S. RESPONSE WAS.

2. EMBOFF THEN SKETCHED U.S. POLICY: SUPPORT FOR SHAH AS BEST MEANS OF ACHIEVING SUCCESSFUL POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION,

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY
POL:JDStempel:lab	10-11-78		DCM:CWNaas

CLEARANCES:
POL:GBLambrakis

OPTIONAL FORM 152(H)
(Formerly FS-413(H))
January 1975
Dept. of State

SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION, BUT NON-INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL IRANIAN AFFAIRS. EMBOFF SAID THIS WAS USG POLICY, AND USG COULD NOT AGREE WITH LMI ASSUMPTION THAT SHAH HAD TO GO. IT WAS TIME FOR OPPOSITION ELEMENTS TO WORK TOGETHER TO PRESERVE SYSTEM FROM CHAOS THAT WOULD BENEFIT NO ONE AND POSSIBLY LEAD TO MILITARY OR TOTALITARIAN TAKEOVER. THERE APPEARED TO US ENOUGH ELEMENTS OF COMMON INTEREST EVEN BETWEEN LMI AND GOI THAT THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL MORE ROOM FOR GENUINE POLITICAL WORK THAN THERE HAD BEEN. SHARIF-EMAMI GOVERNMENT WAS SEEKING GOALS--PRESS FREEDOM, UNIVERSITY INDEPENDENCE, FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY, AND FREE ELECTIONS--WHICH ALL SUPPORTED.

3. LMI REPS SAID THEY COULD AGREE WITH MOST OF WHAT WAS SAID EXCEPT FOR ROLE OF SHAH. THEY EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR POSSIBLE "UNFORTUNATE OUTCOME" OF ANARCHY AND SAID EVENTS IN COMING TWO WEEKS WOULD PROBABLY GIVE EVERYONE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE (COMMENT: IN MARKED CONTRAST TO ANXIETY EXPRESSED AT MEETING DESCRIBED REFTEL, LMI PAIR SEEMED CONFIDENT THAT TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCE WOULD BRING USG CLOSER TO THEIR VIEWS).

4. EMBOFF SAID LMI COULD HEAR USG POLICY EXPRESSED AT POLICY LEVEL IN WASHINGTON IF DESIRED. LMI REPS HASTENED TO REASSURE EMBOFF THAT THEY BELIEVED THEY WERE GETTING STRAIGHT U.S. LINE AND THOUGHT WASHINGTON

OPTIONAL FORM 15
(Formerly FS-41
January
Dept. of

MEETING WAS NOT NECESSARY "AT MOMENT"; THEY WISHED, HOWEVER, TO LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY AND THEREFORE RESERVED FORMAL RESPONSE TO OFFER UNTIL LATER.

5. LMI OFFICIAL THEN ASKED WHAT USG THOUGHT BRITISH ROLE WAS. EMBOFF REPLIED LMI WOULD HAVE TO ASK UK, (WHICH THEY NOT PREPARED TO DO, ACCORDING TO SOURCE). EMBOFF THOUGHT UK POSTURE TOWARD GOI WAS ESSENTIALLY SAME AS U.S., BUT LMI REPS SAID THEY HAD IMPRESSION UK WAS MUCH MORE DISPOSED TO HELP SHAH AND ROYAL FAMILY AND WERE DEFINITELY SUPPORTING MINISTER OF SCIENCE AND HIGHER EDUCATION NAHAVANDI'S NASCENT POLITICAL GROUP. U.S. AT LEAST "HAD ITS HEART IN THE RIGHT PLACE." EMBOFF CAUTIONED LMI NOT TO MISINTERPRET U.S. POLICY--WE THOUGHT SHAH'S CONTINUED PRESENCE NECESSARY FOR SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF CHANGES IRAN WAS GOING THROUGH.

6. IN RESPONSE TO EMBOFF'S QUESTION ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN NEAR FUTURE, LMI REPS SAID THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE RELIGIOUS PARADES ON OCT. 14 HOLIDAY CELEBRATING BIRTH OF IMAM REZA, AND THERE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE "GENERAL STRIKE" OF SOME KIND OCT 18 OR 19 (PAIR LEFT IMPRESSION EXACT DATE AND MODE NOT YET SET). LMI REPRESENTATIVES THEN GAVE EMBOFF LATEST STATEMENT OF MOVEMENT'S POSITION IN PERSIAN AND ASKED TO SEE ENGLISH TRANSLATION. EMBOFF SUGGESTED THEY RECONTACT HIM IN TWO OR THREE DAYS, AND PAIR AGREED TO DO SO.

SULLIVAN

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: John D. Stempel, Political Officer
Mohammad Tavakoli, Liberation Movement of Iran (

DATES& PLACE: October 19 and 31; Tehran, Iran

SUBJECT : LMI Views Toward Elections Soften

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, OR, BIO, NEA/IRN

Tavakoli had asked to met with me to get a copy of the Embassy summary translation of the most recent LMI document (Some newspapers are referring to the LMI as "the Iranian Freedom Movement", but Tavakoli says LMI is better.). After he had received the translation, we talked briefly about current events.

Tavakoli said 20 had been killed and 50 wounded during the October 15-16 demonstrations in Kerman. There had been police attacks in other cities as well. He wished to conclude that it was the government causing violence, not the demonstrators. I pointed out that no one had a monopoly on various incidents and asked if it was LMI strategy to continue demonstrating against the government rather than pushing the government on its policy of elections. Tavakoli said the LMI still didn't trust the Shah and would not want to participate in elections if they were not going to be free. I asked him what the LMI would consider as appropriate guarantees for free elections. Tavakoli said there could be none under this government and thought Sharif-Emami had to go. LMI and National Front representatives would probably not participate in elections unless there could be some sort of government under another prime minister.

In response to a question as to whether Ali Amini had not been scheduled to become PM, Tavakoli said it had been a possibility but Amini did not wish to become Prime Minister without control of SAVAK and the Army. I suggested Amini had missed the boat on his chance to become PM and had tried for the whole ball of wax instead of a partial success. Tavakoli grinned wryly and agreed perhaps this was so.

I asked Tavakoli whether he thought continued demonstrations would not bring on a military government. He said the LMI hoped not, that military government would lead to increasing violence and greater disaster. I noted that the Embassy had expressed U.S. opposition to military rule to the government. Tavakoli seemed genuinely pleased and said everyone hoped the

the situation does not deteriorate. I replied, with somewhat of a "show me" attitude that pushing the Shah toward free elections was a better strategy than offering continuing violence. Tavakoli again said the government could not be trusted. I said many moderates thought the opposition did not seriously want elections. Was the LMI really trying to "con" everybody? Did they only want political power at whatever price? If the LMI was serious about elections, why weren't they pressing for guarantees rather than demonstrating? Tavakoli was somewhat taken back at my vehemence and said the LMI was of course considering the possibility of doing something in this line. I replied that the U.S. felt now was a good time for various opposition groups to take the government's promises seriously enough to begin trying to see if they could be realized. It seemed to me that only those who sought chaos (perhaps for reasons unrelated to Iran) sought continued violence. Tavakoli acknowledged this might be so and that Tudeh activities in the universities was beginning to concern both the LMI and the National Front. He indicated he would be out of touch for a while but definitely wanted to meet with me again. We settled on October 31.

Tavakoli seemed more disposed to consider the possibility of cooperating with the government towards some form of elections. He accepted without a strong demur my posing of the inconsistencies between advocating violence and working with the system. He was clearly uneasy about LMI's work with the demonstrations but also clearly sees it as a means of keeping pressure on the government. He said nothing about the projected meeting between Eng. Bazargan and Khomeini in Paris, either because he was under instructions not to do so or because a final decision on the meeting (announced two days later) had not been made.

At our meeting October 31, Tavakoli said the only answer to stopping unrest was Khomeini. He expected Bazargan to return November 2 or 3, and would have a better idea of where the LMI stood at that time.

POL:JDStempel:lab:11-2-78

TELEGRAM

11812
1978 DEC -3 PM 12-31

LMI
Pol 12

INDICATE
COLLECT
CHARGE TO

	FROM	CLASSIFICATION
	AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	SECRET/STADIS/LIMDIS

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:
ACTION:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SECRET TEHRAN 11812
STADIS
LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: XDS-4 12-3-98 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P

TAGS: PINS, PORS, IR

SUBJECT: KHOMEINI CONTACT

REF: STATE 303337

POL-3
AMB
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1. MOHAMMAD TAVASSOLI OF REFTEL IS INDIVIDUAL KNOWN TO US AS MOHAMMAD TAVAKOLI WITH WHOM POLOFF STEMPEL HAS BEEN IN CONTACT REGULARLY SINCE MAY 1978. HE IS NOT RPT NOT A "KHOMEINI MAN" EXCEPT IN LIMITED SENSE. HE IS A SECOND-ECHELON LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) LEADER BEHIND MORE PROMINENT FIGURES SUCH AS BAZARGAN AND SAHABI WITH WHOM WE HAVE ALSO HAD CONTACTS. LMI IS, OF COURSE, MOST PRO-KHOMEINI GROUP IN OPPOSITIONIST GALAXY.

2. TAVASSOLI WAS SOMEWHAT DISCONCERTED TO HAVE DEMONSTRATED TO HIM THAT EMBASSY KNEW WHO HE REALLY WAS. THIS CONTACT IS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE FOR SEVERAL REASONS. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHETHER SOURCE GAVE US THIS NAME ON HIS

DRAFTED BY	OFFICE SYMBOL & PHONE	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY
L:JDStempel:lab	12-3-78	DCM:CWNaas

ADDITIONAL APPROVALS:
L:GBLambrakis

FORM DS-1101

OWN INITIATIVE. EMBASSY REALIZES WHOLE QUESTION OF U.S. CONTACTS WITH OPPOSITION HAS REGRETTABLY ENTERED PUBLIC AREA AT HOME, BUT HOPES DEPARTMENT CAN PROTECT SENSITIVE SOURCES SUCH AS THIS ONE AND OTHERS. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES SUCH AS NOV 28 WASHPOST OBERDORFER PIECE, WHICH WAS JUST PLAIN WRONG FOR STARTERS, CAST UNHELPFUL GLARE OF PUBLICITY WHICH IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES COULD CAUSE LMI AND OTHERS TO PULL BACK DURING PERIOD WHEN IT COULD BE VERY IMPORTANT TO KEEP SUCH DISCREET CHANNELS OPEN.

SULLIVAN

OPTIONAL FORM 152d(H)
(Formerly FS-413(H)a)
January 1975
Dept. of State

O 141416Z DEC 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2213
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12249

CHRGE: STATE 12-14-78
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:LAP
CLEAR: 1. POL:GBLAMBRAKIS
2.SRF(DRAFT)
DISTR: ~~POL~~-3 AMB DCM
ECON-2 PM OR
(10)

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 12-14-98 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, ,INT. IR
SUBJECT: LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) VIEWS OF RECENT EVENTS

SUMMARY: LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) SOURCE OFFERED LMI VIEW OF TASSUA/ASHURA DEMONSTRATIONS AND CALLED FORCEFULLY ON U.S. TO DUMP SHAH. EMBOFF RESTATED SUPPORT FOR COALITION GOVERNMENT UNDER SHAH. END SUMMARY.

1. LMI SOURCE TELEPHONED EMBOFF STEMPEL AT HOME EVENING DEC 13, PREPARED TO DISGORGE FULL LMI LINE ON RECENT NONVIOLENT TEHRAN DEMONSTRATIONS DEC 10-11 (TASSUA AND ASHURA). SOURCE SAID LMI CROWD COUNT WAS BETWEEN 1 AND 1.5 MILLION DEC 10 AND 1.7-2.0 MILLION DEC 11. EMBOFF SUGGESTED THESE WERE HIGHER THAN ESTIMATES BY PRESSMEN AND OTHERS WHO ATTENDED RALLIES, BUT SOURCE STUCK TO HIS FIGURES.

2. LMI BELIEVED DEMONSTRATIONS WERE A "WALKING REFERENDUM" AGAINST SHAH. SPIRIT OF PEOPLE WAS TREMENDOUS AND UPLIFTING. FACT THAT PARADE WENT OFF PEACEFULLY SHOWED WHAT COULD HAPPEN IF SHAH "GAVE UP POWER" OVER PART OF TEHRAN AND KEPT HIS TROOPS AND SECURITY PEOPLE OUT OF THE WAY. PARADE ALSO SHOWED NATIONAL FRONT COULD ORGANIZE GOVERNMENT. SOURCE DESCRIBED THOSE WHO MARCHED AS "TIP OF ICEBERG" AND SAID EVENT SHOWED OVERWHELMING SENTIMENT FOR GETTING RID OF SHAH. EMBOFF ASKED ABOUT PRO-SHAH EFFORTS OF PAST TWO DAYS. SOURCE REPLIED THESE WERE GOVERNMENT PROVOCATIONS--IN ISFAHAN GOI TROOPS HAD TURNED VIOLENT AND WERE "MASSACRING" PEOPLE. WHENEVER GOI GOT INVOLVED, THERE SEEMED TO BE TROUBLE. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, SOURCE SAID LMI COULD NOT REALLY GIVE ACCURATE FIGURES ON CASUALTIES, SINCE SOLDIERS "WERE HUNTING DOWN PEOPLE IN THEIR HOME, EVEN BY HELICOPTER IF NECESSARY." HE THOUGHT KILLED NUMBERED BETWEEN 50 AND 2000, HOWEVER. (NOTE; THIS SUBSTANTIALLY EXCEEDS FIGURES REPORTED BY U.S. CONSUL ISFAHAN AND APPEARS TO REPRESENT LMI/NATIONAL FRONT (INF) PROPAGANDA "PITCH.")

3. SOURCE THEN STATED EVENTS OF PAST FEW DAYS SHOWED U.S. SHOULD FORCE SHAH TO LEAVE. EMBOFF GAVE STANDARD DISCLAIMER THAT U.S. HAS THAT POWER OR WANTS TO INTERVENE IN IRAN. SOURCE REPLIED "U.S. IS ALWAYS AGAINST PEOPLE FROM VIETNAM TO IRAN." EMBOFF THEN UNLOADED SOMEWHAT SHARPLY ON SOURCE, CHALLENGING HIS PROPAGANDISTIC VIEW OF EVENTS. EMBOFF THEN REITERATED U.S. POSITION THAT COALITION GOVERNMENT REPRESENTED BETTER WAY TO ACHIEVE LMI/INF GOALS THAN CONTINUED CONFRONTATION. WHY DIDN'T INF USE

ITS NEW-FOUND CONFIDENCE TO CREATE GOVERNMENT? SOURCE REPLIED WITH FAMILIAR LITANY ON DISTRUST OF SHAH. RUFFLED FEATHERS WERE SMOOTHED OVER, AND SOURCE OFFERED TO PROVIDE SOME ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION ON ASHURA RALLIES WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS. EMBOFF ACCEPTED GLADLY.

4. COMMENT: FLAVOR OF ABOVE IS SIMILAR TO COMMENTS FROM VAST MAJORITY OF OUR OTHER INF-SUPPORTING CONTACTS. THOUGH TAVASSOLI HAS ALWAYS BEEN A HARD-LINER, PERHAPS BECAUSE HE IS "OFFICIAL" LMI CONTACT WITH EMBASSY, HIS VIEW THAT PEACEFUL NATURE OF DEMONSTRATIONS MERELY UNDERLINED NATIONAL FRONT STRENGTH AND WAS REASON TO PRESS CHALLENGE TO GOI AUTHORITY IS ALSO PROMINENT AMONG COMMITTED INF MEMBERS. IF THOUGHTS OF MORE CONCILIATORY STRATEGY ARE BEING DISCUSSED, THEY ARE NOT YET REFLECTED IN INF SUPPORTERS' PUBLIC TALK. SULLIVAN
BT
#2249

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CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 12249

THAT U.S. [illegible] SITUATION [illegible] LMI IS CRITICAL THRESHOLD OF SUCCESS. THIS POLICY THAT BENEFITS NEITHER IRAN NOR U.S.

4. "WHAT U.S. WANTS--COALITION GOVERNMENT UNDER SHAH--IS IMPOSSIBLE. ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WOULD NOT STAND FOR IT AND PEOPLE WILL THUNDEROUSLY REJECT IT. WHAT EFFORT IS U.S. PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO SOLUTION OF PROBLEM? LMI IS READY TO WORK WITH U.S., BUT MUTUAL EFFORT SHOULD BE CONCENTRATED ON "REALISTIC SOLUTION" (I.E., DEPARTURE OF SHAH). U.S. COULD MAKE MAJOR CONTRIBUTION BY HELPING CONVINCE PEOPLE THAT REGENCY COUNCIL PROPOSAL OFFER ONLY VIABLE ALTERNATIVE FOR PEACEFUL TRANSIT. IN IRAN.

5. [illegible] NOTED ABOVE AND TOLD YAZDI HE WOULD BE REPORTED. [illegible] OFFERED "OBSERVATIONS" ON U.S. [illegible] U.S. SUPPORT FOR SHAH HAS ALWAYS INCLUDED SOME STEPS TOWARDS POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION. U.S. SUPPORT FOR COALITION GOVERNMENT CONCEPT IS BASED ON [illegible] BELIEF THAT IS BETTER, MORE SECURE WAY FOR OPPOSITION TO COME INTO GOVERNMENT PROCESS. EMBOFF REVIEWED POINTS MADE PREVIOUSLY ABOUT PRESENCE OF SHAH BEING IMPORTANT FACTOR IN CONVINCING MILITARY TO ADHERE TO ANY COMPROMISE SOLUTION AND TO PRUDENT EFFORTS BY MILITARY TO OVERTURN [illegible] PROPOSAL SUPPLEMENT. EMBOFF POINTED THAT COALITION GOVERNMENT OFFERED "UMBRELLA" OF PROTECTION UNDER WHICH PEOPLE COULD BE PARTICIPATING IN GOVERNMENT, MOVE OUT RURAL AREAS, EXPAND OUR IP NEW JOBS. YAZDI LISTENED CAREFULLY AND SAID BASIC PROBLEM WAS THAT KHOMEINI WOULD NOT [illegible] TO COALITION SOLUTION; ISLAMIC MOVEMENT, [illegible] OF ARMY, COULD NOT SETTLE ON [illegible] SOLUTION [illegible] OF SHAH. EMBOFF [illegible] THAT IF [illegible] PRINCIPLE AND [illegible] IS [illegible] TO [illegible] COALITION. [illegible]

[illegible]

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2618
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 00086

E.O. 12065: XRDS 1-2-99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PORS, IR
SUBJECT: COTTAM ON KHOMEINI, LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) AND NATIONAL FRONT (INF)

SUMMARY: PROF RICHARD COTTAM REVIEWED HIS DEC 28 MEETING WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI FOR EMBASSY AND OFFERED HIS IMPRESSIONS OF OPPOSITION AFTER SHORT VISIT TO IRAN. HE BELIEVES LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) AND OTHERS WILL RELUCTANTLY ACQUIESCE IN BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT BUT HOPE FOR EVENTUAL SHIFT TO LMI-BACKED "ADVISORY" COUNCIL PLUS SHAH'S PERMANENT DEPARTURE. COTTAM DESCRIBED KHOMEINI ORGANIZATION AND SAID HE BELIEVES GROUP HAS GOOD CONTROL OF STREET MOBS. ALL OPPOSITIONISTS AGREE THAT CONTINUED DISORDER WILL OPEN WAY FOR COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS TO PLAY GREATER ROLE. END SUMMARY.

1. PROF COTTAM MET WITH EMBOFF STEMPEL JAN 1 FOR TWO-HOUR REVIEW OF PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION, INCLUDING REPORT ON HIS MEETING WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI DEC 28. COTTAM SPENT DAY WITH KHOMEINI ENTOURAGE AND BELIEVES EBRAHIM YAZDI TO BE LEADING TACTICIAN IN KHOMEINI CAMP. COTTAM FOUND KHOMEINI TO BE VERY MUCH A GENERALIST WHO DISLIKES TO GET INTO DETAIL. KHOMEINI IS THE BOUNDARY-SETTING, CHARISMATIC LEADER OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WITH YAZDI AS HIS CHIEF OF STAFF. COTTAM DESCRIBED SADEQ QOBZADEH'S MAIN CONTACTS AS WITH THE MUSA SADR GROUP IN LEBANON (COTTAM HAD NOTHING TO OFFER ON THAT PUZZLE) AND WITH BOUMEDIENNE IN ALGERIA. QOBZEDEH'S RELATIONSHIP WITH QADDAFI BLOWS HOT AND COLD, "SINCE BOTH ARE A LITTLE SCREWY."

2. KHOMEINI DID STATE THAT HE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN MULLAHS TAKING OVER GOVERNMENT AND LEFT IMPRESSION THAT PRESENT SUCCESS OF MOVEMENT WAS GOD-ORDAINED AND INEVITABLE. COTTAM WAS STRUCK BY HOW LITTLE KHOMEINI'S EGO APPEARED TO BE INVOLVED IN MOVEMENT AND BY ABSENCE OF DEFERENCE PATTERNS AMONG THOSE AROUND KHOMEINI. COTTAM NOTES THIS IS EXTREMELY UNUSUAL, AND PROBABLY REFLECTS EGALITARIAN DOMINANCE OF ISLAMIC SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY EXPOUNDED BY ALI SHARIATI, WHICH IS DOMINANT INTELLECTUAL CURRENT IN KHOMEINI MOVEMENT. ENTOURAGE AROUND KHOMEINI WAS DESCRIBED AS HALF GRADUATE STUDENTS WHO HAVE DROPPED OUT TO WORK FOR MOVEMENT AND HALF YOUNG MULLAHS LEARNING AT THE FEET OF THE MASTER.

3. COTTAM OFFERED OBSERVATION THAT BECAUSE OF ACCEPTANCE OF SHARIATI'S ISLAMIC SOCIALISM IN KHOMEINI MOVEMENT, CONSERVATIVE MULLAHS IN IRAN (READ: SHARIATMADARI GROUP) DISTRUST HIM; COTTAM HEARD ONE AYATOLLAH REFER TO KHOMEINI AS "PRACTICALLY A SUNNI." OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF COTTAM'S EDUCATED CONTACTS IN IRAN REGARD KHOMEINI AS REACTIONARY,

"LITTLE BETTER THAN A SAUDI WAHABI." THIS MISREPRESENTS KHOMEINI VIEW, WHICH COTTAM FEELS IS MUCH MORE LIBERAL. COTTAM FELT PART OF THIS FALSE PERCEPTION WAS DUE TO CONSCIOUS DECISION BY YAZDI AND KHOMEINI NOT TO EMPHASIZE LINKS WITH MOSSADEQ. PURPOSE OF THIS WAS TO SHOW WHAT "NEW" ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IS RELIGIOUS AS WELL AS POLITICAL, WITH SOLID IDEOLOGICAL BASE IN KHOMEINI'S AND SHARIATI'S WRITINGS.

4. TURNING TO KHOMEINI ORGANIZATION WITHIN IRAN, COTTAM SAID REAL ORGANIZATION LEADER IS SEYED MOHAMMAD BEHESTI, A GHOLHAK MULLAH WHO PILOTS MOVEMENT AND IS MAIN CONTACT WITH PARIS. AYATOLLAHS TALEQANI, RAFSANJANI, AND MONTAZERI ARE KEY TITULAR LEADERS, BUT THERE IS NO RPT NO DOUBTTHAT BEHESHTI AND HIS GROUP OF YOUNGER MULLAHS AND SECULAR ASSOCIATES, INCLUDING HOSSEIN NAZIEH, THE PROGRESSIVE HEAD OF BAR ASSOCIATION ARE DOING THE MAIN WORK. BAZARGAN IS IMPORTANT TITULAR LEADER BUT NOT A REAL ORGANIZER.

5. COTTAM SAID LMI WILL "TOLERATE" A BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. THIS CAME FROM LEADING LMI FRIEND OF COTTAM, BAHRAM BAHRAMIAN, AND TWO OTHER MEMBERS OF WHAT COTTOM DESCRIBED AS "INNER GROUP" OF LMI. ACQUIESCENCE IN BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT WILL NOT STOP OPPOSITION TO SHAH, AND LMI HOPES EVENTUALLY FOR "ADJUSTMENT" OF SHAH'S DEPARTURE ON VACATION TO SOMETHING ALONG LINES OF FOUR-MAN "ADVISORY COUNCIL" WHICH LMI TRIED TO SELL SHAH. INTERESTINGLY, COTTAM SAID BAHRAMIAN CLAIMS SHAH WAS ON VERGE OF BUYING THIS ARRANGEMENT IN EARLY NOVEMBER BUT DECIDED AGAINST IT AFTER "DISCUSSION WITH U.S. AMBASSADOR." (COMMENT" WE UNDERSTAND INITIATIVE FOUNDERED ON SHAH'S UNWILLINGNESS TO LEAVE COUNTRY.)

6. IN LONGER TERM, COTTAM SAYS KHOMEINI MOVEMENT DEFINITELY PLANS TO ORGANIZE A POLITICAL PARTY TO DRAW ON KHOMEINI CHARISMA. COTTAM THINKS SUCH A PARTY WOULD WIN ALL MAJLES SEATS IT CONTESTS (COMMENT: WE DON'T QUITE SEE IT THAT WAY). IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW SUCH A PARTY WOULD
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 00066

BE LINKED, IF AT ALL, WITH REST OF NATIONAL FRONT (INF).

7. COTTAM SAID KHOMEINI PEOPLE ARE VERY PROUD OF THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY TO GET THE PEOPLE OUT IN THE STREETS. THEY HAVE A SMALL PROBLEM WITH THE INF, BUT RESOLVED IT ON DEC 10-11 BY GIVING THE INF ITS OWN "SECTION" WITH ITS OWN SLOGANS. COTTAM THOUGHT LMI COULD FIND ENOUGH GOOD MEN TO GOVERN AND DISAGREED WITH VIEW THAT ONLY TWO OR THREE OF PRESENT VISIBLE LEADERSHIP IN LMI SEEMED TO HAVE EXPERIENCE AND SENSE NECESSARY TO RUN MODERN MINISTRIES. COTTAM AGREED THIS WAS KEY QUESTION. HOWEVER, AND SAID THERE REMAINS SUBSTANTIAL ROOM FOR DOUBT.

8. ALL OPPOSITIONISTS COTTAM HAS SEEN AGREED THAT PUR HER TROUBLE WOULD LEAD TO POLARIZATION BETWEEN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AND TUDEH. TUDEH WOULD BE THE MAJOR GAINER IN SUCH A POLARIZATION, SINCE ITS ORGANIZATION HAS NOT YET REALLY "GONE PUBLIC" AND MANY OF ITS FORMER LEADERS ARE ONLY JUST RECENTLY OUT OF JAIL. COTTAM NOTED THIS PUT SOME PRESSURE ON LMI TO WORK OUT A SETTLEMENT, BUT NOT ENOUGH TO OVERCOME ANY KHOMEINI HARD-LINE. SULLIVAN
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977—240-544

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POL
CHG
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ECON
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...IONARY COURT

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

...PROMINENT SOURCE [redacted] LABOR GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED ...OUT A REPORT [redacted] AS RECEIVED [redacted] 12 MEN AND ... MEMBERS OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY WERE ... CONVICTED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COURT AND SENTENCED ... . OUR SOURCE HAS FOUR NAMES OF PERSONS ALLEGEDLY ... : ISMAIL ABDALL, HAMID SHAHRAFR, MOSHA HASHEMI, ... ALI GORGZADEH. OUR SOURCE DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING ... SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY BUT SUSPECTED THAT THEY ... TROTSKYITE GROUP. COULD YOU PLEASE PROVIDE ANY ... INFORMATION YOU HAVE BEARING ON THIS REPORT.

2. WE HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED BY AN AMERICAN CITIZEN THAT ... HUSBAND, HAMID SHAHRADI, WAS ALSO EXECUTED TODAY, ... PRIMARILY A MEMBER OF THE SAME GROUP. DOES THE EMBASSY ... ANY INFORMATION ON HIM? VANCE

[redacted]

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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 09608

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3523
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 09608

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 8/29/79
APPRV: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH
DRFTD: POL:EASWIFT:GO
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA
CHRON RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/29/85 (SWIFT, E. ANN) OR-P
TAGS: SHUM, IR
SUBJECT: REPORTED CONVICTION OF IRANIAN SOCIALISTS BY REVOLUTIONARY COURT

REF: STATE 4297

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. EMBASSY HAS NO RECORD OF ANY OF PERSONS MENTIONED REFTEL HAVING BEEN EXECUTED BY PGOI.

3. PGOI HAS BEEN HOLDING TRIALS OF SOME MEMBERS OF SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY WHO ARE CHARGED WITH COUNTER-REVOLUTION AND ARMED REBELLION IN KHUZESTAN.

4. TWO FEMALE MEMBERS OF PARTY MAHSA HASHEMI AND FATEMEH FALLAHI WERE FOUND GUILTY OF "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES AND ARMED REBELLION AGAINST THE PGOI AUGUST 26" AND SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT.

5. EMBASSY HAS NO RECORD OF EXECUTION OF HAMID SHAHRADI. CAN DEPARTMENT SUPPLY MORE DETAILS?

6. SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY IS A TROTSKYITE MARXIST PARTY WHOSE LEADER, BABAK ZAHRAIE, AND MANY OF ITS MEMBERS ARE U.S. EDUCATED.

7. WE ARE STILL CHECKING FOR FURTHER INFORMATION AND WILL INFORM DEPARTMENT OF FINDINGS ASAP. TOMSETH
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SWGM
R 312100Z AUG 79
FM WARREN G MAGNUSON, U.S.S., U.S. COURT HOUSE 1010 - 5TH AVE ROOM 900 SEATTLE WA 98104
TO AMERICAN AMBASSADOR, AMERICAN EMBASSY, TEHRAN IRAN
BT
UNCLAS
MY CONSTITUENT MRS. FALLAHI WIFE OF GHOLAM ABBAS FALLAHI PRESENTLY IMPRISONED IN AHWAZ. MR. FALLAHI PERMANENT RESIDENT OF WASHINGTON STATE. APPRECIATE EVERY POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE YOU CAN PROVIDE IN URGING HIS RELEASE.
WARREN G MAGNUSON, USS
BT
#0106

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977—235-323

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 4374
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 230176

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CHG
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FOR CHARGE

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/31/85 (CLEMENT, C)

TAGS: SHUM, IR

SUBJECT: REPORTED CONVICTION OF IRANIAN SOCIALISTS BY REVOLUTIONARY COURTS

REF: (A) STATE 226426, (B) TEHRAN 9608, (B) TEHRAN 9655

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. MRS. ANN FALLAHI, AMCIT WIFE OF GHALAM "HORMOZ" FALLAHI, HAS INFORMED US THAT LETTERS HIS FAMILY HERE HAS RECEIVED FROM FRIENDS IN IRAN INDICATE A FEAR THAT FALLAHI WILL BE EXECUTED. FALLAHI IS PART OF THE TWELVE MEN AND TWO WOMEN OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY GROUP BEING TRIED IN AHVAZ. FALLAHI IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN WHO RETURNED TO IRAN ABOUT SIX MONTHS AGO TO "TAKE PART IN THE REVOLUTION." HE WAS ARRESTED IN AHVAZ ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO. HE REPORTEDLY HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH SELLING NEWSPAPERS TO OIL FIELD WORKERS AND IN FOMENTING STRIKE ACTIVITY THERE. FALLAHI IS TWENTY-THREE YEARS OLD. HIS PARENTS, TWO BROTHERS AND ONE SISTER HAVE LIVED IN THE US FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS.

3. EVEN AT THE RISK THAT FALLAHI AND OTHERS (SEE REFTELS) HAVE ALREADY BEEN EXECUTED AND THAT REPRESENTATIONS CONCERNING THEM WOULD THEREFORE BE INEFFECTUAL, WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONTACTING THE PGOI ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL (POSSIBLY MINATCHI) ON THIS MATTER. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WE RECOGNIZE THAT PEOPLE LIKE FALLAHI ARE IRANIAN CITIZENS SUBJECT TO IRANIAN LAWS: WE ARE NOT ARGUING THEIR GUILT OR INNOCENCE: AND WE ARE NOT TRYING TO INTERFERE IN INTERNAL IRANIAN AFFAIRS. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN SUCH CASES BOTH ON GROUNDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DUE PROCESS AND ON THE

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BASIS THAT THEY HAVE IMMEDIATE AMERICAN CITIZEN RELATIVES AND ARE THEMSELVES PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIENS. AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR A NUMBER OF TIMES, WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY COURT PROCEDURES AND THE EXCESSIVE SENTENCES REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIONS. MIGHT NOT JUSTICE BE TEMPERED WITH SOME MERCY AND COMPASSION, ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS? IN ADDITION TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS YOU SHOULD ALSO POINT OUT, AS A FRIEND, THE NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S PERCEPTION OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION THAT INEVITABLE NEWS ACCOUNTS WILL HAVE. THIS IN TURN CANNOT HELP BUT AFFECT THE ALREADY DIFFICULT PROCESS OF IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. VANCE
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* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977-225-323

DE RUQMHR #9819 248 **
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3643
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 09819

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 9/5/79
APPRV: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH
DRFTD: POL:EASWIFT:GO
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL2 CHG CONS
ICA ECON CHRON
RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/5/85 (SWIFT, E. ANN) OR-P
TAGS: SHUM, IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

REFS: (A) TEHRAN 3611, (B) STATE 23076

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. NEWSWEEK CORRESPONDENT TOLD POLITICAL OFFICER SEPTEMBER 5 THAT REMAINING SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY MEMBERS MAY BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL IN AHWAZ AS EARLY AS SEPTEMBER 6. CORRESPONDENT SAID THAT HEAD OF SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY IN TEHRAN, BABAK ZAHRAIE, HAS BEEN TRYING TO STIR UP INTEREST IN THE CASE.

3. EMBASSY HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT ZAHRAIE BUT HE SEEMS VERY SUSPICIOUS OF OUR INTEREST AND RELUCTANT TO TALK WITH US. WE SPECULATE HE MAY FEEL THAT CONTACT WITH THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT THIS POINT WILL NOT BE HELPFUL TO THE TRIAL IF IT BECOMES KNOWN. WE WILL KEEP TRYING.

4. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SENATOR WARREN G. MAGNUSON, FROM HIS HOME DISTRICT OFFICE (U.S. COURT HOUSE 1010 - 5TH AVENUE, ROOM 900, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, 98104). QUOTE: MY CONSTITUENT MRS. FALLAHI WIFE OF GHOLAM ABBAS FALLAHI PRESENTLY IMPRISONED IN AHWAZ. MR. FALLAHI PERMANENT RESIDENT OF WASHINGTON STATE. APPRECIATE EVERY POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE YOU CAN PROVIDE IN URGING HIS RELEASE. UNQUOTE

5. WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT CONTACTING SENATOR MAGNUSON AND BRIEFING THE SENATOR ON THE CASE. EMBASSY FEELS STRONGLY THAT DIRECT EMBASSY INTERVENTION IN THE CASE BEYOND WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY DONE WITH MINISTER MINACHI MIGHT WELL BE EXTREMELY HARMFUL TO FALLAHI'S CASE. EMBASSY COULD NOT IN ANY CASE TRY TO DO MORE THAN ATTEMPT TO ASSURE FALLAHI RECEIVED FAIR TRIAL UNDER REVOLUTIONARY IRANIAN LAW. TOMSETH
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 09905

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E.O. 12065: GDS 9/9/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: SHUM, IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN SOCIALIST WORKER PARTY

REF: TEHRAN 9819

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FARSI LANGUAGE PAPER BAMDAD SEPTEMBER 9 PUBLISHED FULL TEXT OF LETTER BY BABAK ZAHRAI,HEAD OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY TO AYATOLLAH GODUSI, IRANIAN PROSECUTOR GENERAL. LETTER APPEALS TO GODUSI TO INVESTIGATE THE CASE OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY MEMBERS IN AHWAZ AND EITHER RELEASE THEM OR BRING THEM TO PUBLIC TRIAL.

3. LETTER SAYS THAT ON MAY 31, 1979 NINE MEMBERS OF THE PARTY WERE ARRESTED IN AHWAZ FOR "SABOTAGE". ON JUNE 23 SEVEN OTHERS WHO HAD GONE TO AHWAZ FROM TEHRAN TO LOOK INTO THE CASE WERE ALSO ARRESTED. OF THE 14 ARRESTED TWO WERE SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED. ON THE NIGHT OF AUGUST 26 MAHSA HASHEMI AND FATEMEH FALAHI, TWO WOMEN IN THE GROUP WERE TRIED BEHIND CLOSED DOORS FOR LESS THAN AN HOUR AND SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT. LETTER CONTINUES THAT WORD WAS RECEIVED BY THE PARTY AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE OTHER 12 WOULD BE TRIED SOON AND EXECUTED. ONLY THE URGENT PROTESTS OF IRANIAN AND FOREIGN GROUPS SAVED THEM.

4. LETTER CHARGES THAT THE 12 HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED IN AHWAZ WITHOUT PERMISSION TO MEET THEIR FAMILIES, ATTORNEYS OR MEMBERS OF THE PARTY. PRISONERS WERE ARRESTED FOR BEING INVOLVED IN SABOTAGE (WHICH ZAHRAI DENIES) BUT ZAHRAI INDICATES THAT FULL CHARGES ARE UNCLEAR. ZAHRAI ALSO CHARGES THAT SOME OF PRISONERS HAVE BEEN TORTURED DURING THIS PERIOD.

5. BAMDAD ALSO CARRIES LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER SIGNED BY VARIOUS US CITIZENS CALLING FOR SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY MEMBERS RELEASE. A STORY ON HYDE PARK DEMONSTRATIONS BY IRANIANS ON THEIR BEHALF IS ALSO CARRIED.

6. EMBASSY HAS TRIED TO CONTACT BABAK ZAHRAI BUT HE HAS PURPOSEFULLY AVOIDED OUR CALLS (AT ONE POINT INFORMING POLOFF WHO KNEW HIS VOICE THAT HE WAS NOT AT HOME). WE WILL LEAVE ANY FURTHER CONTACT UP TO ZAHRAI. TOMSETH
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10133

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/17/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: SHUM, IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

REF: TEHRAN 9819

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. ON SEPTEMBER 16, POLOFF RECEIVED CALL FROM MINISTER OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE MINACHI CONCERNING SCHOOLING OF HIS SON IN US. DURING CALL MINACHI STATED THAT NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY COURT PROSECUTOR QODDUSI WAS LOOKING INTO THE CASE OF THE SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY(SLP) MEMBERS IN PRISON IN AHWAZ. HE SAID HE WAS TALKING WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE AND WOULD BE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS SOON (SIC) FOR POLOFF TO VISIT AHWAZ, MEET THE PRISONERS AND SEE PRISON CONDITIONS. (EMBASSY FEELS IT UNLIKELY THIS WILL BE ARRANGED.)

3. MINACHI RECOMMENDED THAT EMBASSY STUDY BAMDAD ARTICLE OF SEPTEMBER 15 WHICH PUBLISHES THE REPLY OF AHMAD JENNATI, HEAD OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COURTS OF KHUZESTAN, TO THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY CHARGES.

4. JENNATI'S REPLY IS LENGTHY: HE STATES THAT THE TWO SLP WOMEN WHO WERE CONVICTED HAD REFUSED TO UNDERGO INTERROGATION, ACCEPT THE INDICTMENTS OR ATTEND COURT HEARINGS. THE TRIAL OF THE SIX MEN IN AN OPEN COURT FIRST BEGAN WITH A FOUR-HOUR SESSION WHICH WAS FILMED FOR TV. THE SECOND SESSION IS YET TO FOLLOW. THE OTHER MEMBERS HAVE NOT REACHED TRIAL YET. JENNATI STATES SLP PRISONERS WERE DETAINED ON CHARGES OF "CONSPIRACY AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY PLOTS AFFECTING KURDESTAN, TURKOMAN SAHRA AND KHUZESTAN AND ATTEMPTING TO MAKE THE REVOLUTION DEVIATE FROM ITS TRUE COURSE AND TO EXPLOIT THE STRUGGLES OF THE IRANIAN MOSLEM PEOPLE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE ENEMIES OF ISLAM EVEN AT THE COST OF THE COUNTRY'S DISINTEGRATION OR FOREIGN DOMINATION." JENNATI THEN INCLUDES QUOTES FROM WRITINGS OF THE GROUP TO PROVE HIS POINTS.

5. THE BAMDAD ARTICLE ALSO QUOTES THE CHIEF OF PRISONS IN AHWAZ AS SAYING THAT THE SLP MEMBERS WERE NOT TORTURED AND THAT INDEED THEY HAVE WRITTEN A LETTER OF APPRECIATION TO THE PASDARAN STATING THAT THEIR CONDITIONS ARE NOT BAD. ACCORDING TO PRISON CHIEF PRISONERS WERE QUARANTINED ONE DAY WHEN THEY MADE A LOT OF NOISE BUT THEY WERE IMMEDIATELY RELEASED.

6. AS BAMDAD ARTICLE IS VERY LENGTHY WOULD APPRECIATE

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DEPARTMENT'S INFORMING US IF YOU FEEL YOU NEED ENTIRE TEXT. LAINGEN
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IRAN

A Comment on Terrorism in a Revolutionary Situation

(C/NOFORN) Now recognized as a revolution, a prolonged period of instability marked by repeated student/religious disturbances began with several days of demonstrations in the shrine city of Qom in January 1978. By autumn, harassment and physical violence directed against members of the American community in Iran had escalated; they were prompted to leave or, later, evacuated. In January 1979, the Shah of Iran left his country. Although the two major Iranian terrorist groups had contributed to the popular national attitude that nothing positive could be accomplished until the Shah and his foreign supporters were removed, they were not implicated in the anti-US actions of late 1978.

(U) They were, however, part of the revolution. The symbol and leader of the uprising, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was himself the most dramatic link between the religious opposition and the terrorists. Since 1963, he had vilified the Shah's regime from exile abroad. In 1972, he had declared that it was every good Muslim's duty to support the Iranian People's Strugglers. His incessant propaganda barrages transmitted via cassette tapes and by in-country spiritual leaders, developed the 1978 national insurrectionist climate. Since the Ayatollah's return and creation of a provisional government, the terrorist organizations have assumed different, public roles. The IPS (Mujahidin) have become "guardians of the revolution," used as a paramilitary force by the revolutionary council. The People's Sacrifice Guerrillas (Chariks or Fedayeen) openly express leftist opposition to the new government.

(U) Because of these fundamental changes and because of the diminished state of the American community in Iran, the definition of these groups as actual or potential threats to US personnel or interests must be altered. Nonetheless, because the definition was appropriate for 5 months of the reporting period, they are still included in this volume.

People's Sacrifice Guerrillas (PSG - Charika-ye-Feda'i-ye-Khalq)

Executive Summary

(S/NOFORN) A secular, Marxist group which previously advocated the overthrow of the Shah, the PSG is now openly critical of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's Islamic monopoly of the Iranian revolution.

(S/NOFORN) The PSG is well trained by Palestinian groups and has an extensive arsenal of pistols, rifles, machineguns and handgrenades of diverse sources as well as explosives manufacturing capability. Recently, the fedayeen have seized some weapons from Iranian security sources.

(S/NOFORN) Now believed to be several thousand strong, the PSG formerly operated in small, independent cells, primarily perpetrating actions against targets directly linked to the Iranian Government and honing the vehicular cutoff technique of assassination. It was, however, also implicated in several anti-US incidents, most notably the takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran in February 1979. In late 1978-early 1979, the group escalated actions against Iranian military and police forces and installations in order to drive a wedge between them and the public.

People's Sacrifice Guerrillas (PSG - Charika-ye-Feda'i-ye-Khalq)

Orientation/Goals:

(S/NOFORN) A secular, revolutionary Marxist group which advocated guerrilla warfare to overthrow the Shah, the PSG identifies more with Latin American revolutionaries than with the Soviet Union or China. It generally concentrated on Iranian targets, arguing that even though attacks on Americans demonstrated the Shah's dependence on the United States, they brought too heavy a response from the security agencies.

(C/NOFORN) In the wake of a December 1977 anti-American incident, a purported PSG document indicated a new PSG preoccupation with the US presence in Iran. It railed against exploitation of the country and called for the expulsion of all foreigners.

(U) Soon after Khomeini's return to Iran, the PSG sent him an open letter deploring his "tendency to monopolize the revolution," and complaining of acts of religious intolerance toward "anything that is not Islamic."

Estimated strength:

(U) Several thousand. (?)

Principal leaders:

(U) Information not available.

Background:

(U) Formed in 1970-71 by activist, dissident members of the Communist, Moscow-oriented Tudeh Party youth organization, the PSG first attempted rural insurgency on the northern slopes of the Alborz Mountains between Tehran and the Caspian Sea. Later, it engaged in urban actions, being most active in early 1975, and cooperated with the IPS. In 1975 and May and June 1976, the PSG suffered severe setbacks: its operational leader was killed; other members were killed, arrested or committed suicide; and some of its safehouses and supply centers were uncovered by the authorities. Although more arrests were made in February 1977 and some inadvertent shootouts with police took place, the group maintained a low profile and was presumed to be devoting its energies to reorganizing and retraining. Always considered capable of conducting terrorist acts, the PSG ended 18 months of relative inactivity in December 1977 with an anti-American operation. In 1978 and early 1979, it escalated its campaign against Iranian military and police forces.

(S) Conflicting reports concerning possible PSG-IPS coordination were received over the years. Because the groups simultaneously changed some of their tactics and the location of their bases in 1977, resumed cooperation was assumed. Throughout, however, continuing distinctions were noted. While the PSG reportedly has more expert leaders, the IPS has stronger grass roots support. Each group retains its separate leadership and membership. Retrospective analyses suggest that links deteriorated, not strengthened, since the deaths of both groups' operational leaders. Contrasting behavior in 1978, as the PSG reactivated while the IPS was courting (or being courted by) moderate oppositionists and abstaining from terrorism, seemed to render reports of coordination spurious.

(S) Some 25 percent of all PSG members arrested were women, a highly significant characteristic in a conservative Muslim country.

Tactics/Methods of operation:

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) PSG targets were almost exclusively Iranian: Iranian National Security and Intelligence Organization (SAVAK) personnel, police, military and government officials. Its mode of taking advantage of the heightened anti-Shah climate in 1978 conformed to this usual pattern of action--the PSG assaulted police and military forces.

(C/NOFORN) In January 1978, in a letter addressed to a US defense contractor, the PSG reconsidered its erstwhile position on the waste of resources involved in targeting Americans and stated a new interest in them as lucrative targets. It claimed responsibility for bombing the Iran-American Society in December 1977; but it did not claim credit for and was not implicated in any other anti-American incidents until the February 1979 takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran.

(S) Bearing arms in their everyday, nonoperational activities resulted in unintentional gunfights with the Shah's police and a concomitant loss of members.

(U) The PSG publishes People's Combat to draw attention to the life and struggles of workers and thereby to educate, agitate and mobilize them and raise class consciousness.

Organization:

(S/NOFORN) Some reports suggested that the PSG had predominantly independent cells of two to five members which exchanged little information. Military cells (or teams) carried out subversive actions, such as assassinations; political teams propagandized at universities.

Headquarters/Bases:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Known to rely on urban and suburban safehouses, in 1977 the PSG allegedly decided to break up some units based in Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz and Mashhad. PSG relocation to smaller cities in the north and south was suggested. The suggestion may have been a ruse to mislead the authorities. It was also questioned because of the difficulties terrorists were likely to encounter if they attempted to become assimilated in local communities.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In mid-February 1979, the feda'i occupied Tehran University.

Training:

(S/NOFORN) The PSG is very well trained. Instruction is received from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and other rejectionist groups, at some bases in Libya, and from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) in Oman and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). SAVAK accusations of Cuban training were never confirmed.

Weapons:

(S/NOFORN) PSG works well with explosives, notably picric acid. It is known to have manufactured explosives in large quantities but to use little; thus, a large store may exist. Only 2 kilograms of trinitrotoluene (TNT) and some kind of timing mechanism were believed to have comprised the bomb used at the Iran-American Society.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Early weapons were acquired by theft. Later, a significant portion of PSG arms were obtained from Europe. The best weapon in the PSG arsenal is the Polish M63 9-mm machine pistol. Other arms include: .38-caliber pistols, Spanish-made Astra revolvers, "Adamik" revolvers, "Port Said" submachineguns, high-powered hunting rifles with six-power field scope, Tungsten armor-piercing ammunition, and Polish-designed, AK-47 rifles with grenade launchers and fragmentation antitank grenades. The last may have originated from licensed production in Iraq. Some weapons may have been obtained from the IPS.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) In mid-1977, PSG was believed to have rearmed from abroad, overcoming losses to government security forces which had affected operations.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) By mid-February 1979, the PSG had seized Uzi machineguns, .38-caliber revolvers, and communications equipment from Iranian security forces.

Finances:

(S) Early funds were obtained by robberies, stealing from parents, [illegible] salaries. In 1976 and early 1977, large sums of US currency were found on [illegible] members and in PSG safehouses. The money allegedly was provided by [illegible] Palestinians and Libya. In 1976, Libya was accused of providing a $400,[illegible] yearly subsidy for the PSG. IPS also may have helped with funding.

International connections:

(S/NOFORN) Ties with Libya, Iraq, PDRY and Palestinians were noted above. Contacts among the Palestinians are with the Rejection Front.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Mehdi Khanaba-Tehrani, leader of the Europe-based Confederation of Iranian Students (CIS), may be the PSG head in Europe. CIS has a large membership with headquarters in West Germany and key branches there, in the United States, Belgium, Canada, England, Italy and Sweden. Probably only a small contingent is violence-oriented. CIS members have attacked Iranian diplomatic establishments in Bonn, Geneva, and Paris. CIS leaders have ties to West German terrorists, Swiss anarchists, the PFLP, the PFLO, and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

Event analysis:

(C) PSG operations were intended to drive a wedge between the police or military and the Iranian people and force security personnel to regard any member of the public as a threat.

S/NOFORN) Well planned, PSG actions mobilized a variety of arms and vehicles against select targets. Motorcycles were frequently used in tandem with automobiles in laying siege to military posts and police stations or in carrying out assassination ambushes. In the latter, vehicular cutoff assassinations, one car was used to block the road while another or motorcycle moved the hit man or men into range. The PSG claimed credit for its operations in publicly circulated leaflets.

Significant activities:

(C/NOFORN) An escalation in the number of armed assaults on security men and posts was the most dramatic trend in PSG activity in 1978. While assassinations are still perpetrated, the targets are seemingly less important than those chosen in 1974-75.

March 1974 - (S/NOFORN) Assassinated SAVAK undercover agent who had penetrated Tudeh years earlier.

December 1974 - (C) Assassinated Iranian agent assigned to the Joint Government Committee on Terrorism (in joint operation with IPS).

May 1975 - (S/NOFORN) Assassinated a former PSG member who had cooperated with the authorities.

December 1977 - (S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Bombed Iran-America Society, an academic center sponsored by the US International Communications Agency (ICA, formerly USIS).

January 1978 - (C/NOFORN) Sent letter of intent to target American interests in Iran to US defense contractor.

March 1978 - (S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) Launched an armed attack, using handgrenades, Molotov cocktails, and automatic weapons, on a police station in Tabriz.

September 1978 - (U) Wearing gendarmerie uniforms, abushed a martial law military patrol in Tabriz. During 1 hour of fighting, nine were killed and seven injured.

- (S/NOFORN) Launched a frontal assault on a police barracks in southwest Tehran.

- (C/NOFORN) Attacked another police barracks in Tehran.

October 1978 - (U) Killed a police colonel and his driver in an ambush in Mashhad.

- (C) Possibly responsible for an attack on the Iraqi Consulate in Khorramshahr in which one security guard was killed and one wounded. The building was set on fire in an action to protest Ayatollah Khomeini's expulsion from Iraq.

- (C) Possibly responsible for attacking an Imperial Iranian gendarmerie station in southwest Isfahan; one killed and several injured in a prolonged gun battle.

November 1978 - (S) Believed responsible for attempted vehicular cut-off assassination of Kerman deputy police chief; his driver was wounded.

December 1978 - (S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Four motorcyclists opened fire with automatic weapons on a police installation in Tehran; one policeman was killed, one wounded.

January 1979 - (U) Claimed credit for attacking three military posts in Tehran.

- (S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Attacked an armed forces bus near Tehran University.

- (C/NOFORN) Attacked a police station in Tehran.

- (U) Two motorcyclists attacked the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie Headquarters in Tehran. Several troops were killed, others wounded.

- (C/NOFORN) Probably responsible for murder of a police official in Tabriz.

- (U) Took over the US Embassy in Tehran and held a number of hostages there until forced to leave by provisional government loyalists.

- (U) Assaulted the National Iranian Radio and Television Center.

Iranian People's Strugglers (IPS - Mujahidin-e-Khalq)

Executive Summary

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The vanguard of the religious opposition to the Shah, the Mujahidin opposed the antireligious aspects of his modernization program and attacked United States and Western support of his regime. Now in the mainstream of the revolutionary movement, the IPS has several thousand members and is still growing.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Trained primarily in Arab countries and with Palestinians, the IPS is well organized in compartmentalized, functional support wings. Its extensive arsenal includes picrate explosives, armor-piercing ammunition, sophisticated communications equipment, and a variety of guns. Libya is an important supplier.

(S/NOFORN) Until 1977, the IPS targeted Iranian security personnel, institutions with Western (including US) ties, and US military and civilian personnel--all in Iran. In recent years, it has eschewed terrorism and deferred to organized political oppositionists who achieved the Mujahidin's goal.

Iranian People's Strugglers (IPS - Mujahidin-e-Khalq)

Orientation/Goals:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Fanatic religious conservatives, the Mujahidin opposed the Shah's regime because of the antireligious aspects of its modernization program, especially those which diminished religious leaders' power and were blamed on Western influence. Intensely xenophobic, the IPS attacked the United States for supporting the Shah. Called Islamic-Marxists, the group's Marxism denotes political activism more than philosophy while its religious component highlights opposition to societal inequities.

(U) The IPS emblem comprises several symbols denoting the character of the group. They include a verse from the Koran which expresses Islamic doctrine; the morning star, indicating hope brought by the first light of day; the sickle and anvil, symbols of the hardworking farmers and laborers; the gun, representing armed struggle; the olive branch, illustrating a desire for peace; a map of Iran and a globe, showing the fight to overcome oppression in Iran and elsewhere in the world.

Estimated strength:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Having grown dramatically in recent months, the IPS may now claim several thousand members or adherents.

Principle leader:

(S) Muhammad Taqi Shahram.

(S/NOFORN) A Marxist ideologue who reportedly assumed the leadership in the fall of 1976, Shahram was said to be emphasizing ties between the IPS and the People's Sacrifice Guerrillas (PSG).

Background:

(S) Founded in 1961, the IPS underwent several reincarnations in the next decade. It adopted the Mujahidin name in late 1971. In 1972, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the senior Shi'a religious figure, declared that it was the duty of all good Muslims to support the IPS and overthrow the Shah. This edict gave the IPS legitimacy and enabled it to garner more widespread mass roots support. Ultraconservative bazaar merchants responded most favorably.

(S) After a period of action against Iranian and Western targets, there was a period of decline in the summer of 1973, resulting from security force countereffforts brought on by the first anti-American assassination.

(S/NOFORN) In May 1975, a split appeared to develop between the more doctrinaire Marxists and the religious fanatics in the IPS. The Marxists cooperated and operated with the PSG. This period of action in 1975-76 led to government suppression and, in turn, IPS operational quiescence starting in August 1976. In the fall of 1976, the Mujahidin operational leader was killed, other members were arrested, killed or committed suicide with cyanide capsules. The group, however, was not considered severely affected by these losses.

(S/NOFORN) In retrospect, 1976 did mark the end of a dramatic period of IPS terrorism. In 1977, the IPS and PSG simultaneously changed some of their tactics and the location of their bases--developments cited as evidence of a revitalized alliance. Yet, each group retained its separate leaders and members. Contrasting indications linked the IPS to the National Front, a then-outlawed coalition of Iranian dissident groups of a moderate political orientation. The IPS seemed to avoid violence deliberately while courting (or being courted by) the National Front to give the coalition a chance to further its standard democratic political goals.

(S/NOFORN) No concrete evidence linked the IPS to the 1978 student/religious unrest until October 1978. At that time, the Mujahidin staged an open parade at Aryamehr University in Tehran and were greeted as folk heroes. Throughout, Khomeini and other Muslim ayatollahs had contacts with the IPS and through them ties between the religious opposition and the terrorists were probably sustained.

Tactics/Methods of operation:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The Mujahidin initially operated against targets directly linked to the Iranian Government, such as police stations and government buildings. Gradually, institutions with Western ties--cultural centers, businesses and embassies, for example--were targeted. The IPS honed the vehicular cutoff technique of assassination against SAVAK officials and US military and civilian personnel in Iran. In 1975, the Mujahidin infiltrated the US Embassy and Armish-MAAG motor pool by using Iranian national employees. It collected information on various segments of the official US community, especially those affiliated in some way with the Embassy. The IPS believed attacks on US targets had greater impact than Iranian ones: they attracted media attention, discredited the Shah and contributed toward forcing the exodus of US technicians and, thereby, slowed down the modernization program.

(S) The IPS has the capability to monitor SAVAK communications.

Organization:

(S/NOFORN) Governed by a committee, the IPS is divided into military/political groups which are trained as assassination squads and support

wings. Support wings have a myriad of functions: intelligence and surveillance (of prospective assassin targets), propaganda (to write and produce pamphlets and leave them in public places), logistics (to select, acquire and transport supplies--including weapons smuggling), overseas contact teams (to maintain ties with members and sympathizers in Europe and the United States), medical teams (including physicians), an internal discipline team and a financial team. All are highly compartmentalized and virtually independnet in their activities.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) The Organization of Islamic Groups is believed to be an IPS subelement.

Headquarters/Bases:

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Known to rely on urban safehouses, in 1977 the IPS reportedly decided (along with PSG) to break up some units based in Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz and Mashhad. IPS relocation to smaller cities in the north and south was suggested. The suggestion may have been a ruse to mislead the authorities. It was also questioned because of the difficulties terrorists were likely to encounter if they attempted to become assimilated in local communities.

(S/NOFORN) An IPS cell may exist in Paris.

Training:

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Instruction is received in Lebanon, Libya, and Syria from the Palestine Liberation Organization, Al Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and other rejectionist groups.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) claimed to have trained the 1976 assassins of US civilians.

(U) SAVAK claims of Mujahidin training in Cuba were never confirmed.

Weapons:

(S/NOFORN) In its terrorist days, the IPS preferred weapons self-sufficiency and manufactured ammunition, including armor-piercing rounds for M63 machine pistols and high quality picrate explosives for use in improved bomb technology. IPS was known to have manufactured explosives in large quantities but used little; thus, a large store may exist.

(S/NOFORN) The IPS arsenal includes .38-caliber revolvers, other revolvers, semiautomatic pistols, silencers, AK-47 rifles, M63 9-mm Polish machine pistols, Browning 9-mm automatic pistols, Spanish Astra pistols and relevant ammunition. Equipment includes radios and handitalkies as well as electronic

devices such as oscilloscopes, transformers, condensers, relays and integrated circuits.

(C/NOFORN) Libya provided weapons and ammunition via Kuwait and Bahrain.

Finances:

(S/NOFORN) After Ayatollah Khomeini's call to the faithful to support the Mujahidin in 1972, bazaar merchants and religiously inclined individuals opposed to secularization channeled funds to Khomeini via students and pilgrims to Iraqi holy sites. (Until October 1978, Khomeini was based in Najaf, Iraq.) He siphoned off a portion and gave the rest to the IPS.

(S/NOFORN) More direct contributions by the same kinds of Khomeini adherents may have been given to the IPS.

(S/NOFORN) Libya provided financial assistance to both Khomeini and the IPS. The Libyan Embassy in Beirut allegedly forwarded $100,000 to the Mujahidin every 3 months.

(S/NOFORN) IPS occasionally robbed banks.

International connections:

(S/NOFORN) Iraqi, Libyan, PDRY, Syrian and Palestinian training and aid were noted above.

Event analysis:

(C) Almost all IPS assassinations were of the vehicular-cutoff variety. The victims had been carefully surveilled and their schedules and routes of going to work fully comprehended by the terrorists. One to four perp [illegible] were involved and, almost invariably, escaped.

Significant activities:

May 1972 - (S/NOFORN) Attempted a bombing assassination of a US Air Force brigadier general.

June 1973 - (S) Assassinated a US Army lieutenant colonel, member of the US Army Mission and Military Assistance Advisory Group, who was serving as a financial adviser to the Iranian Ministry of War. Two gunmen carried out the operation which was believed to have been in retaliation for the execution of convicted guerrillas.

December 1974 - (C) Assassinated Iranian agent assigned to the Joint Government Committee on Terrorism (in joint operation with PSG).

March 1975 - (C) Assassinated Brig General Reza Zandipur, Chief of the Joint Government Committee on Terrorism (in joint operation with PSG).

May 1975 - (U) Assassinated two US Air Force officers. The assault took place in the early morning as the two Americans were being driven by an Iranian military chauffeur from their homes in northern Tehran to offices at the Iranian Armed Forces headquarters compound where they worked in the Military Assistance Advisory Group. An Iranian car blocked the route as a van rammed the officers' vehicle from behind. Three assassins leaped from the car and van and ordered the unarmed Iranian driver to duck. Then, firing several round at close range, they killed the officers and fled in a third car.

June 1975 - (C) Bombed Iran-America Society in Mashhad.

July 1975 - (C) Bombed British Consulate in Mashhad.

- (C) Assassinated an Iranian employee of the US Embassy (actual target was a US consular official).

August 1976 - (U) Assassinated three US civilian employees of a US defense contractor in a vehicular cutoff homicide operation similar to that of May 1975, only this time four terrorists were involved.

May - (C) Surveilled Jewish Emigration Center, associated with Israeli legation in Iran.

[illegible]

[illegible] 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2177
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN [illegible]

DEPT PASS AS DESIRED

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/4/85 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PI, [illegible], PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: THE IRANIAN LEFT: MARXIST, NOT ISLAMIC, AND [illegible]

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN (PF), [illegible] OF LEFTIST OPPOSITION TO ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, APPEARS [illegible] BUT STILL SUFFERS LEADERSHIP WEAKNESS. SEEKS [illegible] PLANS TO BE ORGANIZATION. SMALLER COMMUNIST GROUPS [illegible] WITH EACH OTHER. ANTI-AMERICANISM IS POPULAR. INCREASE IN IDEOLOGY, CLOSELY FOLLOWED BY CALL FOR "PURGE" [illegible] [illegible] PF DOES NOT FORESEE BY SOME WILL CONTINUE TO [illegible] MOSTLY ISLAMIC GS, BUT PF WILL KEEP [illegible]

3. [illegible] IN SPECIAL [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : THE FILES DATE: 18 August 1979

FROM : Michael J. Metrinko

SUBJECT: The Cherik-E-Fedayan

I had dinner last night with a retired General who retains close contacts with active military and police personnel. He claimed that the "Cherik-E-Fedayan" were slowly leaving Tehran and beginning to concentrate their weapons and other resources in the Siakhal area of the Caspian. The Cherik-E-Fedayan, according to the General, believe that for the time being they cannot accomplish much publicly, and are going underground once again. "Truck loads" of weaponry and other armaments were being sent to a hidden depot near Siakhal for this reason.

cc: Charge
POL
OR
DATT
SY
ARMISH/MAAG

Drafted:MJMetrinko:jk

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTER:GBLamb

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 471

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 3/20/1989 (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: Mujahiddin Structure and Allegiances

1. C - entire text.

2. During conversation March 19, Ambassador asked Prime Minister Bazargan for his assessment of Mujahiddin structure and loyalties. Bazargan launched into a complicated explanation in French, which was difficult for Ambassador and Pol Counselor to follow, but appeared to say that there had been a split in the Mujahiddin movement three or four years ago, with some of them following strict Marxist line.

3. There was a further split of the main Islamic party later on, which can best be described as hardliners and softliners. These people are distinct from the Fedayeen but generally represent extremist views and have not always sypported Bazargan's [redacted] movement. At the moment, both the Mujahiddin and the Fedayeen say they are supporting the movement but Bazargan indicated he did not put much faith in that.

4. Bazargan noted in passing that the original Fedayeen, who had been involved in the Siakhalh uprising, were practically wiped out. Others took up their name and tradition later just as the Mujahiddin picked up

glorious names from Iran's past.

5. Comment: Unlike Yazdi, Taleghani and some others it would appear Bazargan does not consider the Mujahiddin as an integral part of his movement. Nevertheless, Mujahiddin forces are involved in protection of the Embassy, among other tasks, and Bazargan's reaction reinforces a question in our minds as to the exact role and allegiances of Deputy Prime Minister Yazdi. As a bridge between the government and the committees, Yazdi is clearly very powerful in his own right and appears able to influence [redacted] AND EVEN [redacted] give orders to the Mujahiddin movement.

SULLIVAN

VV

DE [illegible] #3923/01 2230911
ZNP [illegible] ZYN
R 170615Z AUG 79
FM USINFO WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02

USINFO

EO 12065 N/A

USICA FOR PAO: (FOLLOWING FOR MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
HEREWITH, EXCERPTED AUGUST 16 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR ARTICLE
BY TONY ALLAWAY TITLED "IRAN GUERRILLA HEADQUARTERS EYED BY
RIVAL HESBOLLAHI"
(BEGIN EXCERPTED MATERIAL)
THE BIGGEST ATTRACTION OF TEHRAN FOR SIGHTSEERS CURRENTLY IS
THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE RADICAL ISLAMIC MUJAHIDEEN KHALQ
GUERRILLAS.
IT IS THE LAST MAJOR "PROGRESSIVE" STRONGHOLD NOT CAPTURED
BY MUSLIM EXTREMISTS OF THE HESBOLLAHI (PARTY OF GOD).
THE MUJAHIDEEN, EVER EAGER TO GAIN CREDENCE AND NEW RE-
[illegible], ARE MAKING AS MUCH PUBLICITY MILEAGE OUT OF THE FACT
[illegible] CAN, BUT WHILE THE GUERRILLAS MAKE NO EFFORT TO DRA-
[illegible] SITUATION, IT IS A PLAIN FACT THAT THE HESBOLLAHI
[illegible] TO GET THEIR HANDS ON THE PLACE, AND MAY YET TRY.
[illegible] RELIGIOUS HOLIDAY ON AUG. 19 COMMEMORATING THE DEATH
[illegible], THE MOST REVERED OF FIGURES AMONG IRAN'S SHIA
[illegible], APPEARED TO HAVE RESIDED [illegible] IN ORDER TO THE A-
[illegible] ATTACK AND ON HALF DAY [illegible] LEFTIST-MUSLIM VIC-

[illegible] WARNINGS BY THE [illegible] AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED
[illegible] APPEARED, TEMPORARILY AT LEAST, TO HAVE PER-
[illegible] AND LEFTISTS TO LEAVE THE STREETS.
OUTSIDE THE MUJAHIDEEN HEADQUARTERS, FORMERLY THE
A PRIVATE FOUNDATION RUN BY THE SHAH IN CENTRAL
[illegible] OF STUDENT SYMPATHIZERS SAT ON THE PAVEMENT,
[illegible] WALL AGAINST ANY POSSIBLE ATTACK.
[illegible] BY SPECIAL MUJAHIDEEN MARSHALS WITH GUN AMMUNITION,
[illegible] THERE ALL NIGHT TO PROTECT THE BUILDING. TWO
[illegible] STOOD READY FOR TROUBLE NEARBY WHILE, ON A NEARBY
[illegible] CORNER, A BLACK-SHIRTED MUJAHIDEEN LECTURED A SMALL
[illegible] ON THE MEANING OF FREEDOM IN IRAN.
[illegible] SMALL PICKUP VANS WITH MEN FROM THE POOR AREAS OF SOUTH
[illegible], THE HEART OF HESBOLLAHI COUNTRY, DROVE PAST THE MILI-
[illegible], POSSIBLY SIZING UP THE SITUATION. INSIDE, PROTECTED BY
[illegible] METAL FENCE AND A FURTHER HIGH WALL OF SANDBAGS, THE
[illegible]-ARMED GUERRILLAS WAITED PATIENTLY FOR AN ATTACK.
"[illegible] ARE IN A STATE OF SIEGE," SAID ONE OFFICIAL MELO-
[illegible]. "WE WILL FIGHT IF NECESSARY. THE PARTY OF GOD
[illegible] TO CATCH US OFF GUARD. BUT WE ARE DETERMINED TO
[illegible]... THIS IS NOT JUST A BATTLE OVER A BUILDING BUT A STRUG-
[illegible] FOR REAL FREEDOM, AND WE ARE PREPARED TO DIE FOR THIS."
[illegible] REMAINS TO BE SEEN. BUT IT COULD WELL BE THAT THEIR
[illegible] STRENGTH WILL DETER THE HESBOLLAHIS FROM ATTACKING.
[illegible] ALSO SIGNS THAT THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF IS GETTING A
LITTLE TIRED OF THE THUGGERY OF THE MUSLIM EXTREMISTS.
THEIR TAKEOVER OF LEFIST EMPLACEMENTS AUG. 15 MIGHT WELL
HAVE SERVED A PURPOSE FOR THE GOVERNMENT, OR AT LEAST THE
FIERCELY ANTI-COMMUNIST THEOCRATS AT THE TOP OF IRAN'S POWER
ST
#3923

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RR RUQMFR
DE RUEHFO #3023/02 2230611
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FM USINFO WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02

USINFO

AD 12765 N/A

FREE. BUT IN DOING SO, THE CLUB-WIELDING, BAYONET-FLASHING, FANATICAL HESBOLLAHIS HAVE GIVEN THE LEFTIST-PROGRESSIVE FROAT SOME VALUABLE PUBLICITY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE MUSLIM GROUP.

NOW, TO ATTACK A GROUP THAT ITSELF ESPOUSES ISLAM, ALBEIT WITH A RADICAL INTERPRETATION, AND SUPPORTS REVOLUTIONARY IRANIAN'S LEADER AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI, SOMETIMES AT A COST TO ITS CREDIBILITY, WOULD ONLY ADD TO OFFICIAL EMBARRASSMENT.

THAT MUCH WAS INDICATED AUG. 14 BY GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN SADEQ TALAITAI, WHO, FOR A CHANGE, SWITCHED FROM BLAMING LEFTISTS FOR ALL THE TROUBLE TO ATTACKING THE HESBOLLAHIS THEMSELVES.

THEY WERE, HE SAID, BEING GUIDED IN A COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY PLOT BY AGENTS OF THE SHAH AND "INTERNATIONS ZIONISM" TO BRING ISLAM INTO DISREPUTE.

"IT IS HEARD THAT SOME MUSLIM CLUB WIELDERS HAVE FALLEN UPON THE PEOPLE AND ARE BEATING THEM," HE SAID, BY WAY OF OFFICIAL UNDERSTATEMENT. "THEY ARE THE SAME CLUB WIELDERS WHO HAVE ENTERED THE ARENA IN THE NAME OF DEFENDING ISLAM, BUT WHO IN FACT ARE DESTROYING ISLAM...
(END EXCERPTED MATERIAL)
(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
ITEM
ET
#3023

EXPLANATION TO DOCUMENT NO 3

THE REVOLUTIONARY ZEAL THAT AROSE AMONG THE NOBLE IRANIAN PEOPLE AFTER THE OCCUPATION OF THE NEST OF ESPIONAGE AND THE REVELATION OF THE MOVEMENTS OF THE GREAT SATAN, WHILE THE PAWNS THAT FAWNED UPON THE AMERICANS CAUSED THAT EVERYWHERE PEOPLE FILLED WITH DEVOTION FOR THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION ARISE TO CUT OFF THE ROOTS OF AGENTS OF AMERICA AND REVEAL THEIR TRUE NATURE. THUS THEY DISCOVERED AND COLLECTED DOCUMENTS AND HANDED THEM TO THE OCCUPIED NEST OF ESPIONAGE.

AMONG THESE DOCUMENTS IS THE ONE SENT TO THE OCCUPIED NEST OF ESPIONAGE BY THE FAITHFUL AND SELF-SACRIFICING FOLLOWERS OF ISLAM AT THE FIRST AND SEVENTH BASES OF TRANSPORTATION.

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF A PLAQUE OF APPRECIATION DELIVERED BY THE U.S. MILITARY ADVISORES ON IRAN TO BEHZAD MOEZZI ON THE OCCASION OF THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE HATEFUL PAHLAVI DYNASTY.

MOEZZI , AS THE COMMANDER OF THE SQUADRON AT THE FIRST WING OF TRANSPORTATION, HAD DEMONSTRATED THE UTMOST OF HIS QUALIFICATIONS WITH THE RISING OF THE TIDE OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF IMAM KHOMEINI MOEZZI PROVED HIS DUTIFULNESS AS THE PERSONAL PILOT OF THE CRIMINAL SHAH, AND CARRIED HIM AWAY FROM THE GRIP OF OUR NOBLE PEOPLE TO THE SANCTUARY OF HIS INTRANSIGENT MASTERS.

MOEZZI, IN ORDER TO COMPLETE HIS SERVICES AND PROVE HIS FULL SERVITUDE, CARRIED AWAY TWO OTHER OF THE AGENTS OF THE AMERICA.

AT ANY RATE, THIS DOCUMENT SPEARS OF THE STRUGGLING RECORDS OF THIS " STRUGGLER FOR THE CAUSE OF THE PEOPLE" (MEMBER OF THE MUJAHEDEEN-E-KHALGH ORGANIZATION).

IN THE NAME OF THE ALMIGHTY GOD CRUSHER OF THE OPPRESSORS AND HELPER OF THE DEPRIVED.

1- THIS PLAQUE IS A DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE FAITHFUL MUSLIM PERSONNEL OF THE FIRST AND SEVENTH TRANSPORT BASESE, FOLLOWERS OF THE IMAM'S COURSE OF ACTION TO THE MUSLIM STUDENTS, FOLLOWING THE COURSE OF IMAM, TO DIVULGE THE TRUE NATURE OF WING- COMMANDER BEHZAD MOEZZI. MOEZZI WAS CONFIRMED BY SAVAK, AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE OF THE ARMY AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF THE U.S.A. AND MOSSAD OF ISRAEL. FOR THIS VERY REASON HE WAS PRIVATE PILOT TO THE SHAH. THIS DOCUMENT REVEALS THE ATTACHMENT OF THE WING-COMMANDER BEHZAD MOEZZI TO U.S. IMPERIALISM AND THE HATEFUL PAHLAVI DYNSTY . HE IS AT PRESENT THE COMMANDER OF THE SEVENTH TRANSDORTATION BASE AT SHIRAZ.

2- THIS PLAQUE IS AN APPRECIATION OF WING-COMMANDER BEHZAD MOEZZI'S SERVISE BY THE U.S. IMPERIALISM ON THE OCCASION OF THE 50th ANNIVERSARY OF THE REIGN OF THE CORRUPT PAHLAVI DYNASTY.
WE CALL THIS PLAQUE DOUMENT NO.] OF THE DENUNCEMENT OF THE MUSLIM PERSONNEL FOLLOWERS OF IMAM'S COURSE AT THE FIRST AND SEVENTH TRANS-PORT BASES.

THIS IS WHAT THE PERSONNEL OF FIRST AND SEVENTH BASES OF TRANSPOR - TATION HAD EXPRESSED WHEN PRESENTING THIS DOCUMENT.

WHEN THIS DOCUMENT WAS DELIVERED TO THE OCCUPIED NEST OF ESPIONAGE, WING COMMANDER BEHZAD MOEZZI WAS EMPLOYED AS COMMANDER OF THE TRANSPORTATION BASES.





The neucleus of the Tudeh Party

In the early parts of 1920 turmoil and confusion reigned in the north of Iran. A group of 700 Communists from Baku attacked Resht with two planes and they intended to form the Socialist Republic of Gilan. At that time Moshir-Dowleh who was a patriot was at the helm of affairs. He assigned Sardar Fakher Hekmat to Resht to re-establish the Government control there. Sardar Fakher succeeded in wining over Mirza Kuchek Khan, a Communist Revolutionary who later fought against Ehsanollah Khan and other Communists. It was Ehsanollah Khan who formed the Committee of the Communist Iranian Youth.

On September 7, 1920, the first Communist Congress of Eastern Nationas was held in Baku under the chairmanship of Zinonoff. The Iranian Communists were represented by Haidar Khan Amu Oqli who endorsed the decisions of the Congress regarding the fomentation of revolution in Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, India and Arabia against the British.

Near the end of 1920 a force of 2,000 communists who were mostly Georgians and Armenians attacked the north of Iran under the Command of Kazhanoff. They looted a number of rich people and returned to Baku with their booty. Such raids were repeated every now and again until 1921.

Coup d'Etat

On February 21, 1921, Sardar Sepah (the late Reza Shah) came into power as commander in chief in Seyed Zia's Government.

During the three months rule of Sayed Zia Tabatabai, in return for the recognition of the Soviet Government by Iran, the Russians discontinued their support of the Iranian Communists. Slowly but surely Government forces vanquished the Communists [illegible]

some of whom crossed the frontier into Russia. Since that time Irano-Soviet relations entered upon a new phaze. The Soviets were given certain concessions by Sardar Sepah and they withdrew their support of the Iranian Communists.

Until 1928 there were no Communist activities in Iran. Then a certain Soviet national was sent to Iran on a "scientific expedition". According to official documents, he was sent to Iran to reorganize the dormant Communist party in this country. He succeeded in forming the "Union of Iranian Workers" which was later called the "Communist Party".

In the early part of 1929, the Congress of Iranian and Turkish Communists was held secretly in Rezaieh. Hosseinoff was appointed by the Congress to represent Iran in the 9th International Congress in Moscow.

The Iranian police had well infiltrated the young Communist organization in Iran, but there was now law to deal with the Communists speedily and effectively.

In May 1932 a 7-article Law was approved by the Majlis, which condemned persons belonging to any anti-monarchy or Communist group from three to ten years imprisonment.

The band of 53 Men

Dr. Erani having completed the medical course in Iran had left for Germany where he made a deep study of Marxist and Communist doctrines. He returned to Iran in 1930 and in 1934 he published the Magazine "DUNYA" (the World) in which Communist, Marxist and the views of Angels were discussed. The magazine maintained such a high standard that it took the Iranian Police quite some time to detect its orientation.

Dr. Erani along with the 52 other persons were arrested and sentended to terms of imprisonment varying from three to ten years. On Bahman 14, 1318 (February 1939) Dr. Erani was put to death by the administration of an air ampule and the other 52 were later released.

Thanks to the vigilance of the secret police and the ruthless manner in which Reza Shah dealt with people who were even suspected of being Communists, there was no Communist movement in Iran worth the name, during the reign of Reza Shah. Such Communists as there were, spent their time behind the iron bars.

The Tudeh Party

In 1941, British and Soviet troops occupied Iran and Reza Shah abdicated in favor of his son, the present Shah. The Soviet authorities pressed the then Prime Minister, the late Mr. Froughi to pardon the political prisoners.

The 52 communists along with 40 other persons formed the nucleus of the Tudeh Party of Iran in September 1941.

The only important person among them was a Qajar Prine by the name of Soleiman Mirza Mohsen Eskandari. In a short time the Tudeh Party established workers, peasants, women and youth organizations and in pursuance of the Communist "United Front" extended its activities by collaborating with other groups and parties, such as the anti-Facist Party of Mustafa Fateh who wanted to take control of the Tudeh Party. "MARDOM" which was the organ of Mostafa Fateh's Party later became that of the Tudeh Party. Some time later the Party formed a newspaper union known as the "Freedom Front" which controlled 70% of the papers at the time.

In 1942 the Tudeh Party had 8 seats in the Majlis.

Azarbayjan Democrat Party

While the Tudeh Party was a country wide party which advocated Communist ideas, the Soviets deemed it necessary to try and set up a puppet regime in the Iranian Azarbaijan. Mr. Jafar Pishaveri whose credentials had been rejected by the 14th Majlis and who was leading the leftist "KAVEH" group was chosen for the purpose.

Pishaveri had already been to Baku along with Shabastari and had met the high officials of the Caucasian Republic. With the help of the Soviet Consul Qulioff and other Soviet officials in Tabriz he laid the foundation of the Azarbayjan Democrat Party. The Party advocated the autonomy of Azarbayjan and the recognition of Turkish as the official language in the Province.

On September 12, 1949, the Democrat Party formed a Constituent Assembly. Pishaveri was the head of the autonomous state with Shabastari as second in command.

At this juncture the Central United Council of the Tudeh Party declared its affiliation with the Democrat Party.

On December 13, 1944, the Democrats seized the Tabriz and other garrisons. Pishaveri formed his Cabinet of nine Ministers then he presented to the Constituent Assembly.

In January 1946 Qavam took office as Prime Minister. By this time the Central Government had no authority in Azarbayjan. The Soviet Army in Gilan and Mazenderan was helping similar movements. The Tudeh Party now was at the height of its power, particularly in the north. It controlled the "Mihan" Party as well as the Tabarestan group formed by Ehsan Tabari. It was under such circumstances that Qavam travelled to Moscow.

On his return to Tehran on March 1946, he gave a free hand to the leftist elements and movements. He concluded an agreement with the Soviets which included a passage about settling the "Azarbayjan problem which was a domestic matter".

Qavam included three Communists in his cabinet, Dr. Keshavarz, Dr. Yazdi and Iraj Eskandari who held the posts of Ministers of Education, Health and Arts & Industry, so that "the necessary reforms may be carried out".

In a reception given by the Tudeh Party in their club attended by the Prime Minister, Ministers and the Speaker of the Majlis, Mr. Iraj Eskandari, in course of a speech declared, "We have one million members and three Cabinet Ministers. Next year, we shall have ten million members and the entire cabinet."

A man who was particularly effective in helping Qavam handle the affairs was Mozafar Firuz whose convictions as a "good communist" are to be strongly questioned.

Tudeh Party

In December 1946, the late Gen. Razmara planned the attack of the Government forces on the insurgents who were commanded by Ghulam Yahya, the Commander-in-Chief of the Azerbayjan state. Within 10 days the insurgents were shattered and the Democrat Group went to pieces.

In the Tehran and in all the southern and northern towns, people attacked and looted the clubs of the Tudeh Party and set them on fire. Two successive declarations by the Party at this time indicated a dissension that had occured within the Party.

A number of Tudeh members led by Ehsan Tabari were of the opinion that the Party should concentrate on the educated classes, while others maintained that it should concentrate on the workers.

Al-Ahmad, Engineer Nasehi, Maleki, Anvar Khamai, Firuz Shohabpoo Engineer Zanjani were trying to overthrow the "ruling class" of the Party.

In May 1947 the Baku and Moscow Radio attacked the deviationists whom they accused of being in the pay of the British.

On 15th Bahman 1327 (February 1948) an attempt was made on the life of the Shah, by an alleged Tudeh member and the Party was outlawed by the Government. A large number of Tudeh leaders were either arrested or imprisoned. (The most important ones managed escape during Razmara's Premiership).

Since April 1949, the Party began its clandestine activities. The Party organ "Mardom" appears on Saturdays and 10,000 copies of it are circulated throughout the country. The Party is believed to have 20,000 members in Tehran.

The Tudeh Party has a considerable numbers of sympathizers and official members in the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Justi Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Interior.

A considerable number of Tudeh members are in the Hygiene Department of the Ministry of Health who are sent to the provinces for anti-malaria and similar activities. They use such assignments in favor of the Party and carry on Communist propaganda among the peasants. This is also true in case of the Forestry Department. A very large number of the locomotive drivers and brakesmen of the State Railway are members of the Central United Council. The Party has greatt influence in the Silo, Vanak and Tobacco Monopoly factories where a large section of the workers are Tudeh members.

Classification of Members

The members of the Tudeh Party are generally divided into the following groups:

a) Industrial Workers
b) Industrial and Miscellaneous Workers
c) Artisans
d) Peasants
e) Enlightened (intellectual) classes

Some of the organizations known to be attached to the Tudeh Party:

1) Tehran University Students Organization
2) Tehran Schools Students Organization
3) Society to Combat Illiteracy
4) Society of the Partisans of Peace
5) Womens' Organization
6) Society to Combat Imperialism Oil Companies
7) Democratic Lawyers Association
" Newspapermen's Association
8) Peasant's Organization
9) Circle of Democratic Youth
10) Society to aid Peasants

11) United Central Council

12) Club of Democratic Sportsmen

13) Azarbaijan Society

14) Society of the Graduates of Danish Saraye ali

University Students Organization

This is a very well-organized organization which is particularly influential in the faculties of medecine and law. By advocating free university education for the poor students and by demanding various other reforms, the organization has attracted a few hundred University students, apart from those who were already members of the Schools Students Organization. As University students, some of them at any rate are likely to hold in future positions of responsibility and render considerable service to the Party.

Society to Combat Illiteracy

Adult classes are conducted by the Society in various parts of Tehran and in the villages and in provinces. Along with teaching the students how to read and write, appropriate propaganda is meted out to them by "teachers" who have been trained in the Cadre Classes of the Party for the purpose. Since illiteracy is recognized by any Government that may be in power, the Society enjoys a certain degree of "immunity" and can conduct its activities rather freely.

Society to Combat Imperialistic Oil Companies

This society was founded in 1950 so that the Tudeh Party could have its fair share of the "National Oil Movement" led by the National Front. According to available information it has about 6,000 members.

Women Organization

This organization has been particularly successful because it has been fully exploiting the grievances of the educated women

those part

in Iran. It has been advocating equal rights for women in all walks of life and particularly the right to vote. A large number of girls and women working in Government offices and teaching in schools belong to the Organization.

The Democratic Lawyers Association

This association includes a number of well-known judicial personalities who can be useful to the Party, whenever Party members are involved judicially.

The Democratic Newspapermen Association

This association is helpful in press and propaganda work.

The Society of the Partisans of Peace

This society has been collecting signatures for Peace and in support of the conclusion of a peace treaty among the Big Five. It has staged anti-war demonstrations condemning the Americans and British war-mongers and presenting the U.S.S.R. as the Champion of World Peace. It has received and sent representatives from and to other Peace Societies elsewhere.

Peace Caravans are also sent to various parts for propaganda work.

Peasants Organization

Trained Tudeh members are sent to various villages and make a thorough study of relations between the peasants and the landlords. The grievances of the peasants are then carefully turned to account and new members are recruited from among the peasants who are trained to form the nucleus of peasant cells.

The Tudeh peasants of the village of Rubat Karim, made it "hot" for the American Mobile Cinema people who were forced to leave the place. The principle of "catch" them young is strictly observed by this Society.

The Azerbayjan Society formed in Tehran has now 2,500 members and Ali Azari, the editor of the "Paik Emruz" is their candidate from Tabriz. The Society intends to establish a branch in Tabriz very soon. The Society is a substitute of the Azerbayjan Democrat Party.

Society of the Graduates of Danish-Sarayi Ali

This society has its own paper "MEHREGAN".

One of the main factors that has contributed to the success of the Tudeh Party in wining over new adherents, has been the principle of choosing the right man for the right job. An intellectual member of the Party deals with other prospective intellectual members. Trained members of the Party who have been working men themselves (like Ali Omid) deal with the working classes whose language they understand. There is no political "snobery" in the leading ranks of the Tudeh Party.

Some future Plans of the Tudeh Party

The Tehran University Students Organization will shortly incorporate the University students from Tabriz, and Shiraz and Meshed and will form the Congress of Iranian University Students.

The Youth Organization of the Tudeh Party will develop into the "Movement for the defense of the rights of Youth" so that young people of all classes and groups may be rallied under one organization

In conclusion it must be added that the Soviets have paid special attention to the Kurds through their agent Mulla Mustafa Barzani who is at present in Russia. The Kurds have been promised autonomy for their cooperation.

TUDEH Par.

Tudeh Organizations that come under the Central Committee of the Youth Organization

1. The Armenian Educational Organization of Iran
2. The Assyrian " " " "
3. The Kurdish " " " "

Organizations that come under the Organizational Committee of Tehran and suburbs which is subordinate to the Central Committee

1. Society of Freedom of Iran
2. Union of Mountaineers
3. Union of Actors and Actresses
4. Association of National Combatting newspapers
5. Azerbayjan Society

Workers Organization attached to the Party:

1. Union of Cinema Workers
2. Independent Union of Plumbers
3. Union of "Construction" Workers
4. Union of Bakers of Tehran
5. Independent Union of Tailors
6. Union of Painters
7. " " Chintz Factory Workers
8. " " Vanak Factory No.5 Workers
9. " " Tobacco Monopoly Workers
10. " " Printing Workers
11. " " Tea Store of the Plan Organization
12. " " Dry cleaners and Dyers of Tehran
13. " " Silc Factory, Tehran
14. " " Mechanics
15. " " Switchmen (Railways) and train officials

All the above come under the organization known as "Coalition [illegible] Workers Unions"

Other Tudeh Unions

1. Union of Nurses
2. Society to aid Children
3. Union of Government Employees
4. Union of Iran Telegraphists
5. Union of Health (Hygiene Dept.)

International Organizations with which the Tudeh is connected.

1. Association (International) of Democratic Lawyers, Paris
2. Commission of the Declaration of Human Rights, Paris
3. Secretariat of the Federation of World Unions, Vienna

SECRET

Iranians were Tudeh

Tudeh Party Leaders — RFT-395

June 1950

Iran, Tehran — 24 June 1950

C-3 — 13 July 1950

Iranian with close contacts among students at the University of Tehran.

I. Tudeh Organization in Azerbaijan.

A. Leaders. Two of the underground leaders at present are identified as follows:

1. Ali SHAMS. Owner of a spinning mill in Tabriz.

2. GHAFFARI. (Station Note: There are several hundred members of the GHAFFARI family in Iran. Accordingly, the individual here described as GHAFFARI as such remains unidentified).

B. Party members meet in a house located next to the Soviet Information Office, Kuche Dan off Pahlevi Avenue, Tabriz.

C. Size of membership cannot be determined. According to Azerbaijani Democrat propaganda the Tudeh Party in Azerbaijan numbers several thousand card-bearing members. In the opinion of source, however, actual membership does not exceed 2,000.

D. Rumors are circulating in Tabriz and in Tehran to the effect that the Azerbaijani Democrats now in Soviet Russia are planning to capture the northern parts of Iranian Azerbaijan with the help of Azerbaijani Tudeh Party members sometime in the course of this fall.

II. Organization of the Tudeh Party in Tehran.

A. Leadership.

1. Dr. Taghi RAZAVI. He is one of the important leaders of the underground Tudeh and has been handling Party affairs in such a way as not to attract the suspicions of the Tehran political police. Subject at one time was doctor at Imperial Court and later was medical adviser to an Iranian insurance company. He was discharged from this job because of his radical opinions. He has been a member of the Tudeh Party for a period of many years. He is now running a private clinic in Tehran.

SECRET

2. Doctor ALAVI. An outstanding leader of the underground Tudeh who keeps in close touch with non-Tudeh political groups in the country.

3. Mrs. Mariam FIRUZ. A wealthy woman who contributes heavily to support financially party activities. She is, however, in a difficult position because she is under police surveillance. She maintains, however, a contact with Tudeh leaders and arranges for secret meetings in her own home. She sometimes is used as a courier between party members and often carries party documents in her handbag.

4. Sadegh HEDAYAT. A well-known Persian author. Also participates indirectly in Tudeh activities and sometimes attends its meetings.

B. Party Meeting Places in Tehran.

1. Headquarters of the party are located on Kuche Far'i off Khiaban Hoshmat Dowleh Khaki, Avenue Sinetri.

2. Exactly opposite Kuche Far'i mentioned above is another small passage. In one of the houses located on this passage there is a small house where secret meetings are held. This is the home of Mrs. Mariam FIRUZ.

3. Home of Dr. RAZAVI mentioned above on Avenue Kakh near Seraho Shah.

4. There is also a meeting place location unknown, in Shimran.

C. The organization owns a private automobile, license plate 2004, black sedan. This car is often seen driving to Yasd and it is believed that it is used by party couriers who maintain contact with party members exiled there.

D. Party meetings take place at night and never involve at any one time more than three or four individuals.

The Tehran headquarters of the underground Tudeh maintains close contact with the Tabriz organization, which in turn is in contact with Soviet authorities through the Soviet Information Center in Tabriz.

Note that the Tudeh Party in Azerbaijan is identical with the Azerbaijani Democratic Party.

IRAN Communist Party

Iran Communist Party
(Armenian Section)

Prior to 6 Dec 1950

Tehran, Iran — 6 Dec 1950

C-3 — 15 Dec 1950

Tehran business man with good connections in Armenian circles.

1. When the Party went underground its organization became decentralized and the cadres regrouped. Large cells inconvenient for illegal work and easily penetrated by informers were replaced by "Groups of 5". Groups, as well as their leaders, are ignorant of each other, thus ensuring a certain measure of security. Ten "Groups of 5" are, through their leaders, subordinate to a "Leader of 10". Five "Groups of 10" are subordinate to a "Leader of 5". Four "Groups of 5" in turn are subordinate to a "Regional Leader" who thus represents 1,000 members and is responsible to the Central Committee of the ICP. In the Central Committee all national sections are represented. The Armenian section in Tehran is about 200 strong. The Central Committee receives its orders from the Soviet Union, either directly or through a specially assigned man in the Soviet Embassy.

2. Activities of "groups" remain essentially the same as when the Party was legal, i.e., meetings with lectures on the Party's program, history, propaganda aiming at keeping awake the class-consciousness, and political directives as to the Party line on the various questions of the day. The cadres are not subjected to unnecessary risks and are kept as an organized force to provide, when necessary, leaders for the masses.

3. Intelligence and liaison work is independent of Party organization and is performed by special men connected with different members of the Soviet Embassy. The following persons are suspected to act as such agents for the Soviet Embassy:

Dr. N. PATKANIAN) Tehran
Ir. Kaspar LAKOPIAN)
Ir. S. [illegible] - Isfahan

By virtue of their profession they are easily accessible and can also visit anybody without inviting special attention. Their contacts with members of the Soviet Embassy take place in the Soviet Hospital. In this category of agents may be also included:

[illegible] who directs a ballet school.
[illegible] family - who have a kindergarten "Bardukhan Aluit" (children's palace)

IRANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

SECRET

DADIAN - owner of a bookshop.
Founders of Cooperative "Anahil" - members of which have no idea about exact nature of this institution.

4. For propaganda and counter-propaganda purposes the following are engaged in active work:

N. KARAKASH - with his newspaper "Veradznund." He possibly serves more than one master.
"Hashakmit" - youth organization.
"Shoumtai Lavid" - Tough organization for physical culture.

The "Peace Petition" offensive in Tehran among the Armenians was carried out by the above-mentioned.

CONFIDENTIAL

August 11, 1959

TO: CONSULAR SECTION

FROM: OR SECTION

RE: TAGHIZADEH aka TAGHIZADEHH MOTTAGHI, Freydoon

1. We have the following information regarding one MOTTAGHI, fnu; who may or may not be identical with your subj:

Subj present at meeting of Utdeh Party leaders called by officials of Russian Emb March 1948. Subj a member of TP Advisory Committee. (DOI 12 Aug 1950)

Member of Tudeh Provincial Comm. of Tehran. (DOI) 6 Feb 55

Member Tudeh Youth Org. (TYO) Central Comm. (DOI)10 Apr 55)

Spokesman for Irano-Sov Fisheries. highly interested in politics and a convinced supporter of Mullah BHEBEHANI. Friench of GRANMAYEH (qv). (DOI 25 Jun 52)

Rumored that Subj took over leadership of Central United Council of Trade Unions (CUCTU) after activities went underground in '49. (DOI 22 Mar '55)

Subj possibly inde with Taqi MOTAQI (qv)
Alias PARHIZKAR, Counseller of the Central Comm. and translator of foreign news for Mardom. (DOI 12 Apr 55)
Reported member of Prop Commission.
According to G-2 Review TP, is member of Exec. Brd. (DOI 26 Sept '55).

. Info on one MOTAQI, Ali: May or may not be iden with Subj's father.-

Cooperated with Police and Security Organization causing expulsion from Tudeh Party Mar '58. (DOI Apr 9, 1959)

Replacement on 3-man Board of Secys of Tudeh Tehran Prov Comm. (DOI Late '55)

Subj 1 of 3 leaders of TP July 9 '57. Acting Secretary-General. (DOI July 11, 1957)

CONFIDENTIAL

15 AUG 1959

CONFIDENTIAL

CLEARANCE REQUEST-TAGHIZADEH aka TAGHIZADEYE MOTTAGHI, Freydoon cc

Subj in contact with responsibles of East. and West. areas of Tehe TP Provincial Comm. (16 Jan 57)

Subj active member of former T. Prov. Comm in Tehe. (13 Oct 56)

Subj currently member of Executive Board of TP. (24 Nov 56)

Subj signed Resolution by Central Organization of T Youths against formation of new T group. (9 Jan 48)

Information on MOTAQI (fnu) (Possibly Ali Motaqi)
Subj took over leadership of TYO (27 Aug 55)

Subj. head of one faction of District Committee No. 11. Rumored subj. may leave Iran due to propaganda campaign launched against him. (6 Sept 57)

Subj. broken contact with Azerbaijani group. (24 Oct. 57)

Subj. TP leader, wrote to exiled TP leader that requested quick decision on his future work. (5 Oct 57)

Subj. member of Central Organization of Takesh and responsible for Tudeh Affairs in Khorasam, Fars, and Mazandaran. (7 June 56)

Subj. co-manager of Party Affairs until return of leader from abroad. (24 May 56)

Subj. attempting to reorganize TP. (5 Sept 56)

TAGHIZADEH, Freydoon

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE

Office of the Political Counselor

Date Feb 25

Counselor for Consular Affairs

Chris,

As you requested, here are some suggestions from POL.

Hawk

CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE

	Action	INFO	STAFF
CON			
IMM			
NIV			
P			

RECEIVED
RECEIVED
AT CONSULAR
26 FEB 9/6
SECTION AMERICAN
EMBASSY
TEHRAN

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: February 25,

TO : POL - Mr. Mills
THRU : POL - Mr. Bolster
FROM : POL - J. Stempel

SUBJECT: Removal of ex-Tudeh Members from Visa Lookout List

While the Consular Section has its own manila folder files on important figures for whom we have had to seek visa waivers because of former membership in the Tudeh Party, here are the names we have turned up from memory who might be significant:

Manuchehr Taslimi, Minister of Commerce

Hadi Hedayati, Minister of State

Fereidoun Mahdavi, Minister of Party Affairs

Jahangir Behrouz, Editor, Echo publications

Morteza Sarmad, Supreme Court Justice

SHAHIN
Agayan ~~(listed in your original memo but I cannot identif~~
~~a first name).~~

As I understand it, Mr. Christensen will be trying to get these people eliminated from the visa lookout system. You might discuss with him a fallback position which would be a request for a blanket waiver of people who fall in the category of ex-Tudeh members who have "gone straight."

POL:JDStempel:mjl

CONFIDENTIAL
102

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

TELEGRAM

1978 SEP -7 AM 11: 32

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

POL 12

08559

FROM	CLASSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:
ACTION:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO: AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KABUL

POL
AMB
MIN
ECON-2
P/M
PCA
OR
ADMIN
PRU
AIR
ABR
DEF

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 08559

E.O. 11652: GDS
~~XGDS~~TAGS: PINT, IR

SUBJ: NATIONAL FRONT (INF) REJECTION OF REPORTED TUDEH PARTY DEMARCHE

BEGIN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

1. INF REJECTED SEPT 6 A REPORTED TUDEH PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE OFFER TO JOIN FORCES IN OUSTING IRANIAN REGIME. INCIDENT BEGAN WITH AFP REPORT FROM PARIS SEPT 5 THAT TUDEH PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAD ISSUED APPEAL TO ALL OPPOSITION FORCES TO UNITE AND TOPPLE GOI. TUDEH DECLARATION GAVE AS PROGRAM OF THE RESULTING "GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY" PUNISHMENT OF WRONGDOERS, NULLIFICATION OF LAWS CONTRARY TO CONSTITUTION AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, DISSOLUTION OF MAJLES AND SENATE, ABOLISHMENT OF POLITICAL POLICE, CONVENING OF A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, NATIONALIZATION OF PETROLEUM INDUSTRIES, DISMISSAL OF U.S. MILITARY

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY
POL:JDStempel	8/7/78		DCM:CWNaas

OFFICES:

103
CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM

ADVISORS, ABROGATION OF U.S.-IRAN MILITARY AGREEMENT, WITHDRAWAL FROM CENTO, EXPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE FORTUNES, AND REJECTION OF OPEN DOOR ECONOMIC POLICY.

2. FRONT LEADER KARIM SANJABI SAID THAT GIVEN THE "TRAGIC EXPERIENCE" OF INF RELATIONS WITH TUDEH IN EARLY 1950S, ANY FORM OF POLITICAL ALLIANCE NOW WOULD BE "INCONCEIVABLE." HIS EARLIER STATEMENT ADVOCATING LEGALIZATION OF TUDEH PARTY SHOULD NOT BE MISCONTRUED AS NATIONAL FRONT WILLINGNESS TO COLLABORATE WITH TUDEH, A PARTY WHICH IS AN APPENDAGE OF A FOREIGN POWER, BUT SIMPLY A REFLECTION OF DEGREE TO WHICH GOI SHOULD LIBERALIZE.

END LIMITED OFFICIAL USE - BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL

3. COMMENT: STORY HAS A PECULIAR ASPECT. IT IS UNUSUAL FOR A TUDEH DECLARATION TO BE ISSUED IN PARIS, BECAUSE PARTY HEADQUARTERS ARE IN EAST BERLIN. PERHAPS GDR DID DID NOT WANT TO EMBARRASS SHAH ON EVE OF HIS VISIT THERE, AND TUDEH SIMPLY USED ITS TIES TO ACTIVE IRANIAN STUDENT GROUPS IN PARIS TO ADVANTAGE. POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE DISMISSED THAT TUDEH MANIFESTO WAS A SAVAK PLOY DESIGNED TO EMBARRASS NATIONAL FRONT AND OTHER OPPOSITION GROUPS. WHATEVER CAUSE, PRINCIPAL SIGNIFICANT RESULT HAS BEEN TO GET INF ON RECORD AGAINST A TUDEH ALLIANCE.

SULLIVAN

OPTIONAL FORM 152a(H)
(Formerly FS-413(H)a)
January 1975

ACTION

105

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION

VRNNVV ESA6[illegible]791
PP RUQMHR
DE RUEHMO #7992/01 3201452
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161449Z NOV 78
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9167
INFO RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 0914
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 6787
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 27992

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, IR, UR

SUBJEKT: TUDEH LEADER PRAISES IRANIAN RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION TO SHAH

REF: MOSCOW 27110

BEGIN SUMMARY: IN A DATED, BUT STILL SIGNIFICANT INTERVIEW, IRANIAN TUDEH LEADER ESKANDARI PRAISES THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE SHIITE CLERGY - INCLUDING AYATOLLAH KHOUMENI - IN THE ANTI-SHAH MOVEMENT IN IRAN. IN SURPRISING TERMS, HE DENIES THAT THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS SEEK A RETURN TO THE PAST, ADMITS THE DEEP ROOTS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF IN IRAN, AND COMES OUT FOR A UNION OFSALL "DEMOCRATIC" FORCES IN IRAN INCLUDING RELIGIOUS ONES. HIS REMARKS ARE SIGNIFICANT IN THEMSELVES, BUT PERHAPS OF MORE INTEREST IS THE SOVIET IMPRIMATUR ON HIS REMARKS PROVIDEDSBY THEIR PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL "PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM." END SUMMARY.

1. IRANIAN AMBASSADOR HAS CALLED TO OUR ATTENTION AN EXTREMELY INTERESTING, IF DATED, "INTERVIEW" GIVEN BY TUDEH LEADER ESKANDARI TO COMMUNIST JOURNAL "PROBLEMS OFSPEACE AND SOCIALISM"ON MID-SEPTEMBER. INTERVIEW APPEARED IN ISSUE NO. 11 SIGNED TO PRESS OCTOBER 5.

2. BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED. IN BRIEF, ESKANDARI:

-- PRAISED AT LENGTH THE RELIGIOUS SIDE OF IRANIAN ANTI-SHAH MOVEMENT, DENIED THAT SHIITE CLERGY REPRESENTED REGRESSIVE FORCE AND SPECIFICALLY APPROVED ANTI-SHAH STANCE OF AYATOLLAH KHOUMENI.

16 Nov 78

0166

ACTION
POL 3
R INFO
AMB
DCM
ECON 2
PM
OR
ICA
ADM
CRU 2
9 GA

---CLAIMED THAT TUDEH HAD ALWAYS RESPECTEDSRELIGIOUS BELIEFS "WHICH HAVE FIRM ROOTS AMONG OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF IRANIAN POPULATION" AND SAID THAT TUDEH WAS FOR UNION WITH ALL DEMOCRATIC FORCES INCLUDING RELIGIOUS ONES. WE DON'T AGREE WITH RELIGIOUS LEADERS ON EVERYTHING, SAID ESKANDARI, BUT WE "MUST BE REALISTIC."

-- SPOKE FAVORABLY OF NATIONAL FRONT PARTICULARLY DUE TO ITS INFLUENCE AMONG INTELLIGENTSIA AND STUDENTS.

-- NOTED THAT SOLE SUPPORT FOR REGIME WAS ARMY AD POLICE "LED BY U.S. ADVISERS," BUT CLAIMED THAT THERE WERE SIGNS (I.E., INDIVIDUAW OFFUCERS AND SOLDIERS REFUSING TO FIRE ON DEMONSTRATORS) THAT ARMY SUPPORT MIGHT NOT BE ETERNAL.

-- DESCRIBED U.S. IMPERIALISM AS MAIN EXTERNAL BUTRESS OF REGIME.

-- KRITICIZED PRC POLICY IN IRAN, NOTING ANTI-SOVIET INSINUATIONS MADE BY CHINESE IN TEHRAN AND CHARGING THAT HUA KUO-FENG VISIT DEMONSTRATED EXISTENCE OF U.S.-PRC "DEAL" IN SUPPORT OF UNPOPULAR REGIMES AROUND THE WORLD. END UNCLASSIFIED.

3. COMMENT: WHILE DATED, ESKANDARI'S POSITIVE COMMENTS ON THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENTSSOF THE CURRENT IRANIAN SCENE ARE SOMETHPNG ENTIRELY NEW AND OF CONSIDERABLE SIGNIFICANCE. WE SEE THIS SIGNIFICANCE IN TWO ASPECTS. FIRST, WITH REGARD TO INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN IRAN, ESKANDARI'S REMARKS INDICATE NOT ONLY AN UNUSUAL ADMISSION OF THE GREAT STRENGTH AD DEPTH OF THE RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION TO THE SHAH, BUT ALSO AN IMPLICIT SELF-ADMISSION OF THE RELATIVE WEAKNESS OF TUDEH. WE LEAVE TO OTHERS MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT INTERNAL IRANIAN EVENTSSTHE QUESTION OF ESKANDARI'S EXPRESSED INTEREST IN JOINING WITH THE CLERGY IN SOME SORT OF POPULAR FRONT OPPOSITION TO THE SYAH, BUT IT APPEARS TO US THAT THIS MAY BE DESIGNED MORE TO WIN FAVOR WITH SOME OF THE INDIVIDUAL RELIGIOUS LEADERS THAN TO FORM ANY SORT OF ACTUAL POLITICAL COALITION.

4. SECOND, AND PERHAPS OF MORE INTEREST IS THE SOVIET IMPRIMATUR ON ESKANDARI'S INTERVIEW. CLEARLY, "PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM," THE INFLUENTIAL POLITICAL JOURNAL OF THE "COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES" PUBLISHED IN PRAGUE DOES NOT DOT AN "I" ORHCROSS A "T" WITHOUT THESAPPROVAL OF MOSCOW.
BT
#7992

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 3
16649

NNNNVV ESA642BRA806
PP RUQMHR
DE RUEHMO #7992/02 3201500
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161449Z NOV 78
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9168
INFO RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 0915
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 6788
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 27992

THUS BY PUBLICLY - IF STILL INDIRECTLY - IDENTIFYING ITSELF WITH ESKANDARI'S LENGTHY, ANTI-SHAH COMMENTS ON THE IRANIAN INTERNAL SCENE, MOSCOW HAS GONE FURTHER THAN BEFORE IN REVEALING ITS OWN INTEREST IN THE ANTI-SHAH MOVEMENT - AND IN A RATHER UNEXPECTED FASHION.

5. IN PARTICULAR WE NOTE ESKANDARI'S FAVORABLE REFERENCE TO AYATOLLAH KHOUMENI. THIS IS A RARE SOVIET (OR AT LEAST SOVIET-APPROVED) REFERENCE TO THE AYATOLLAH. ON NOVEMBER 12, FOR EXAMPLE, PRAVDA COMMENTED ON THE RECENT AFP STORY WHICH HAD AROUSED A MINOR FUSS IN TEHRAN (REFTEL) WITHOUT HOWEVER MENTIONING THE CAUSE OF THE FUSS - I.E., THE ALLEGATION THAT PRAVDA'S TEHRAN CORRESPONDENT HAD CRITICIZED THE AYATOLLAH.

6. SOVIET MEDUA HAVE NOT YET PROVIDED SIGNIFICANT COMMENTARY ON THE ACTIONS OF THE IRANIAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT/ WITH IMPLICIT CRITICISM, HOWEVER, THEY HAVE BRIEFLY NOTED THE REPRESSIVE MEASURES OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT, THE RISE IN MANIFESTATIONS OF ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IN THE COUNTRY AND RECENT EXPRESSIONS OF OFFICIAL U.S. SUPPORT. TOON
BT
#7992

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Iraj ESKANDARI
(Phonetic: eskandaREE)

IRAN

First Secretary of the Central Committee, Tudeh (Communist) Party of Iran (since February 1971)

OFFICE OF
CENTRAL REFERENCE

One of the founders of the Tudeh Party of Iran and a member of its Central Committee since 1941, Iraj Eskandari has been the leader of the now outlawed (since 1949) party since his appointment to his present position. Involved in the international Communist movement in Europe and Iran since his student days in France in 1925, he is one of those responsible for the party's pro-Soviet orientation. Eskandari has lived in Europe in exile since 1949, first in Paris (1949-51) and Vienna (1951-54) and more recently in various cities of Eastern Europe and the USSR--currently, he is in Moscow.

One of the party's leading propagandists, Eskandari is a good speaker and a capable writer. During his residence in Eastern Europe, his overt activities have apparently been limited to attending Communist-sponsored conferences and delivering speeches criticizing the Shah and advancing pro-Soviet ideas in the name of the Tudeh Party. His March 1976 meeting with Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro during the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union prompted the Iranian Government to break diplomatic relations with Cuba. In September 1978, in a speech about the civil disturbances going on in Iran, Eskandari called for the inclusion of the Tudeh Party in a national coalition front of opposition groups aimed at abolishing the monarchy and setting up a coalition government. As of November 1978, there was no evidence that he had made any headway with either the religious conservatives or the National Front leaders. In early November 1978, underground Tudeh Party elements surfaced at virtually all the universities in Iran. The extent to which Eskandari was involved in this occurrence or the 1978 civil disturbances is not known.

Classified by 004250
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
Exemption category 58 (1)(2)(3)
Declassification date impossible to determine

Early Life and Career

Iraj Eskandari was born on 7 February 1907 in Sari, Mazanderan Province. He is a member of the Qajar dynasty, which ruled Iran until its overthrow by the father of the present Shah in 1921. Eskandari studied law in Grenoble, France, in 1925 and became involved in Communist activities at that time. He spent the next 10 years in France, propagandizing among Iranians and engaging in other Communist activities. In 1935 he returned to Iran to set up a private law practice and to take up a position in the Ministry of Justice. Arrested during a roundup of Communists in 1937, he helped a close relative, Soleyman Eskandari, form the Tudeh Party immediately after his release in 1941, He became a member of the Central Committee at that time. Eskandari served in the Majles (lower house of Parliament) for a short time in 1944.

In 1945 Eskandari went to Paris as a representative of the Tudeh-sponsored Central United Council of Trade Unions to attend meetings of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). He returned to Iran to serve as Minister of Commerce and Industry for three months in 1946. He went to France again in 1947 and may have enrolled in the law school of the University of Paris. During that period he was involved in Tudeh Party activities in cooperation with French Communists and was active in spreading propaganda within France's Iranian community. In 1949 he and other Tudeh leaders were sentenced to death, *in absentia*, after an unsuccessful assassination attempt on the Shah by a Communist. Eskandari joined the staff of the WFTU in 1950 and left France for Vienna when the WFTU was expelled from France in 1951. He remained in the employ of the WFTU in Vienna until 1954.

Personal Data

Eskandari has traveled frequently to represent the Tudeh Party at Communist-sponsored conferences and has held memberships in organizations such as the World Peace Council and the International Association of Democratic Jurists. In 1952 and 1954 he tried unsuccessfully to secure a US

visa to represent the WFTU before the UN Economic and Social Council. He attended the funeral of Iosif Stalin in 1953.

Eskandari has had at least two wives, Homayun Kavusian and Zahra Bayat. They have also been involved in Tudeh Party activities. Eskandari speaks French.

17 November 1978

TELEGRAM

1978 NOV 20 AM 1'

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM: AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:
ACTION:

ACTION: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, IR

SUJBECT: ESKANDARI STATEMENT

REF: MOSCOW 27992

POL-2

EMBASSY TEHRAN REQUESTS ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF FULL TEXT OF ESKANDARI STATEMENT (REFTEL). SUMMARY PROVIDED BY REFTEL WAS GIVEN ~~ORALLY~~ TO IRANIANS, XXX HIGHEST LEVELS CONCERNED THAT ESKANDARI STATEMENT MAY MARK CHANGE IN SOVIET POSTURE TO MORE ACTIVE MEDDLING IN CURRENT IRANIAN TROUBLES.

AMB
DCM
ECON2
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USICA
OR
CRU

SHIR
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14 gam

SULLIVAN

DRAFTED BY	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY
POL:JDStempel:lab	11-20-78		DCM:CWNaas

CLEARANCES:
POL:GBLambrakis

50152 101

TELEGRAM

1978 NOV 30 PM 1355

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO
11757

FROM: AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:
ACTION:

ACTION: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
SECSTATE WASHDC 11757

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, IR, UR

SUBJECT: IRANIAN TUDEH LEADER INTERVIEWED

REF: FBIS LONDON DTG LD 291421Y

1. (REFTEL) FBIS LONDON/REPORTS INTERVIEW WITH IRAN TUDEH LEADER ESKANDARI UNDER HEADLINE, "IRAN TUDEH LEADER REGRETS NO RESPONSE TO CALL FOR UNITED FRONT."

2. LOOKS TO US LIKE THIS MIGHT BE SOVIET EFFORT TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM ACCUSATIONS OF SOLIDARITY WITH KHOMEINI. WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S AND EMBASSY MOSCOW'S VIEWS.

SULLIVAN

BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
JDStempel:lab	11-20-78		DCM:CWNaas

ES:
GBLambrakis

OPTIONAL FORM 1
(Formerly FS 4
January 19
Dept. of State

ACTION

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
SECSTATE WASHDC
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 325
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 330

C O N F I D E N T I A L

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 07/27/89 (LEGERE, LAURENCE) OR-P
TAGS: NATO, UR, IR
SUBJECT: (C) POLADS DISCUSSION OF IRAN

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. AT JULY 26 POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING, BELGIAN REP SAID BELGIAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAD REPORT THAT IRANIAN EMBASSY THERE HAD FORWARDED A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO BREZHNEV BUT HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO LEARN SUBSTANCE OF REPORTED MESSAGE. HE ASKED IF ALLIES HAD INFORMATION TO CONFIRM THIS REPORT.

3. ADDITIONALLY, FRG REP CIRCULATED FOLLOWING PAPER ON SOVIET VIEWS ON IRAN.

4. ACTION REQUESTED: ANY INFORMATION WASHINGTON OR MOSCOW MAY HAVE ON REPORTED KHOMEINI-BREZHNEV MESSAGE.

5. BEGIN TEXT OF FRG PAPER:

A. AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE SOVIET POSITION ON IRAN IS CONTRADICTORY AND, ON THE WHOLE, ANYTHING BUT CLEAR. THUS, IT REFLECTS THE UNCERTAIN PERSPECTIVE OF IRAN'S FUTURE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND - DEPENDENT ON THIS - HER FOREIGN-POLICY ORIENTATION. THE INITIALLY - AS IT SEEMED - UNRESERVED SOVIET SYMPATHY FOR THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION IS INCREASINGLY GIVING WAY TO GREATER CONCERN AT THE FACT THAT THE PRESENT HETEROGENEOUS IRANIAN 'LEADERSHIP' IS NOT OPENING HERSELF TO MOSCOW'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC WOOING TO THE EXTENT WHICH THE SOVIETS HAD HOPED FOR.

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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271653Z JUL 79
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1384
INFO RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 7164
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 0794
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9525
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6405
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 6633
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0009
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 05423

B. THUS, IT IS EMERGING MORE AND MORE CLEARLY THAT ALMOST THE ONLY DETERMINING ELEMENT OF A POSITIVE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION IS THE FACT THAT IT HAS CAUSED THE LOSS OF WESTERN POSITIONS IN IRAN AND IN THE REGION. HOWEVER, THIS IS COUNTERBALANCED BY THE SOVIET CONCERN AT THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN AND THE RESULTING DANGERS TO SOVIET REGIONAL INTERESTS (E.G., AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ).

C. THE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED SOVIET INSISTENCE ON THE NON-INTERFERENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN INTERNAL IRANIAN AFFAIRS PROBABLY ENDS WHERE HER OWN INTERESTS BEGIN. UNDER THIS ASPECT IT MAY BE OF INTEREST TO NOTE THE OPINION OF SOME SOVIET OFFICIALS THAT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN ARE AT PRESENT A SOURCE OF CONCERN BOTH TO WESTERN AND TO SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND THAT KHOMEINI'S WISH TO CREATE AN ISLAMIC COUNTRY WITH THE HELP OF AN ISLAMIC UNITY PARTY REPRESENTS, HISTORICALLY SPEAKING, A STEP BACKWARDS.

D. THIS OPINION ALREADY GOES BEYOND WHAT CAN BE QUALIFIED - BASED ON OFFICIAL SOVIET STATEMENTS - AS THE CAUTIOUS BEGINNING OF A SOVIET DISENCHANTMENT WITH THE PRESENT IRANIAN 'LEADERSHIP'. A NUMBER OF REMARKS BY THE IRANIAN MULLAHS AND GOVERNMENT ARE GIVEN MORE AND MORE COVERAGE IN THE SOVIET MEDIA AND ARE USED AS A BASIS FOR INCREASINGLY OPEN CRITICISM OF GROUPS CLOSE TO THE PRESENT IRANIAN LEADERSHIP. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET MEDIA MAKE AN EFFORT TO PLACE POSITIVE COMMENTS ON CERTAIN EVENTS IN IRAN - SUCH AS DECISIONS TO NATIONALIZE CERTAIN INDUSTRIES - AS PROOF OF THE CONTINUING SOVIET SYMPATHY FOR THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.

E. WHILE KHOMEINI IS NOT YET BEING OPENLY CRITICIZED OR ATTACKED IN SOVIET MEDIA, HE IS HARDLY EVER MENTIONED OR QUOTED IN A SENSE POSITIVE FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THE CRITICISM IS DIRECTED AGAINST HIS ADVISERS, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT REASON FOR DIRECT CRITICISM OF KHOMEINI. THIS SOVIET SELF-RESTRAINT IS OF A TACTICAL NATURE AND NOT A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS LITTLE - AND IDEOLOGICALLY NOTHING - IN COMMON WITH KHOMEINI AND HIS ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. IN SOVIET EYES, HE FULFILLED HIS 'PROGRESSIVE' ROLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION WHEN HE CONTRIBUTED TO ELIMINATING THE WESTERN INFLUENCE IN IRAN. KHOMEINI WILL BE OFFICIALLY DROPPED BY THE SOVIET UNION WHEN THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION BEGINS TO THREATEN VITAL SOVIET INTERESTS. THIS IS ILLUSTRATED BY REPEATED SOVIET CRITICISM OF ALLEGED IRANIAN INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFGHAN AFFAIRS. END TEXT.

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TEHRAN 8828/1

RUFNPS
DE RUQMHR #8828/01 219 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 0709482 AUG 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 0006
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3103
RUFNBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0020
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 0142
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0307
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0228.
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0265
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CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 8/6/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:VLTOMSETH:GO
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 08828

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 8/6/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P
TAGS: NATO, IR, UR
SUBJECT: POLADS DISCUSSION AND SOVIET RELATIONS WITH IRAN

REF: USNATO 5423

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THE MESSAGE REFERRED TO BY THE BELGIAN REP PRESUMABLY WAS THE ONE CARRIED BY IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW MOHAMMAD MOKRI WHEN HE RECENTLY RETURNED TO THE USSR. THE TEXT READS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE IN HIS EXALTED NAME, JUNE 23, 1979, YOUR EXCELLENCY LEONID BREZHNEV, CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET PRESIDIUM. I THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE AND THE KIND INTEREST YOU HAVE EXPRESS TOWARDS THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN. I PRAY TO ALMIGHTY GOD FOR THE PROSPERITY AND DELIVERANCE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE USSR, AND I HOPE THAT OUR ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, WHICH IS BASED ON THE UNITY OF EXPRESSION AND ON THE BASIS OF THE FORTHY ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND THE ABOLUTION OF THE SATANIC REGIME, WILL PLAY A WORTHWHILE ROLE IN THE UNITY AND ALLIANCE OF THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD WILL TRY TO ACHIEVE PEACE AND PROSPERITY, AS IT IS THE WISH OF OUR NATION AND ISLAM. ROUHOLLAH MOUSAVI KHOMEINI. END QUOTE.

3. WE FOUND THE FRG PAPER PRESENTED AT THE JULY 26 MEETING QUITE GOOD. WE, TOO, TEND TO SEE THE SOVIETS CAUGHT ON THE HORNS OF A DILEMMA IN IRAN. WE THINK THERE WERE SEVERAL POSSIBLE FACTORS THAT LED THEM TO CUT THEIR TIES WITH THE SHAH AND SEEK AN EQUALLY UNHOLY ALLIANCE WITH KHOMEINI AND HIS ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. THESE INCLUDE:

- --THE LACK OF ALTERNATIVES. LAST WINTER KHOMEINI SEEMED TO HOLD ALL THE CARDS. THE PRO-MOSCOW TUDEH (COMMUNIST) PARTY WAS WEAK AND HAD BEEN LARGELY DISCREDITED IN IRAN ITSELF. THERE WERE NO OTHER "PROGRESSIVE" POLITICAL GROUPINGS EITHER STRONG ENOUGH TO CHALLENGE KHOMEINI OR PREPARED TO WORK WITH THE SOVIETS AGAINST HIM.

- --THE HOPE OF PROFITTING AT OUR EXPENSE. WE WERE CLEARLY THE NUMBER ONE FOREIGN ENEMY FOR THE ANTI-SHAH FORCES BY VIRTUE OF OUR SUPPORT FOR AND LONG ASSOCIATION

WITH HIM. THE SOVIETS WERE SOMEWHAT VULNERABLE ON THAT SCORE AS WELL, BUT RELATIVELY MUCH LESS THAN WE. THE PROSPECT OF CONSIDERABLE DIMINUTION OF OUR INFLUENCE IN IRAN COULD NOT BUT BE WELCOMED BY THE SOVIETS, EVEN IF THEIR OWN PROSPECTS FOR GAINING INFLUENCE WERE PROBLEMATIC.

- --THE FEAR OF INSTABILITY ON THE USSR'S SOUTHERN FLANK. FROM OUR PROSPECTIVE IT APPEARS THAT, WHILE ALWAYS ALERT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF TURMOIL, MOSCOW DOES NOT SEEK TURMOIL FOR TURMOIL'S SAKE. WITH THE DEPARTURE OF THE SHAH, KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC MOVEMENT SEEMED TO OFFER THE ONLY POSSIBILITY OF A RAPID REIMPOSITION OF STRONG CENTRAL AUTHORITY.

- --THE DESIRE TO PROTECT ITS ECONOMIC STAKE IN IRAN. WHILE NOT LARGE BY COMPARISON WITH SOME OF THE WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS, THE USSR HAD DONE A GROWING VOLUME OF BUSINESS WITH IRAN IN RECENT YEARS. GAS PROVIDED THROUGH IGAT-I, THE SUBSTANTIAL SHARE OF CONSTRUCTION OF IGAT-II RESERVED FOR THE SOVIETS, AND THE PROFITS THEY STOOD TO MAKE FROM TRILATERAL TRADE IN GAS THROUGH IT WERE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO MOSCOW.

4. THERE STILL IS NO IMMEDIATE ALTERNATIVE TO KHOMEINI, A FACT WE ARE INCLINED TO VIEW AS THE MAIN REASON THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET REJECTED HIM AND HIS MOVEMENT. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, AMPLE REASONS WHY THEY MIGHT AT LEAST CONSIDER TURNING AGAINST HIM. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE THE NEW AUTHORITIES IN IRAN HAVE DEALT WITH US AND THE SOVIETS IN A MORE EVEN-HANDED MANNER THAN WAS TRUE UNDER THE SHAH, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY FIND RELATIVELY LITTLE CONSOLATION IN THAT SINCE BOTH PARTIES ARE FREQUENTLY SINGLED OUT FOR CRITICISM BY THE ISLAMIC CROWD. MOREOVER, THE REALITIES OF IRAN'S SITUATION ARE BEGINNING TO HAVE AN EFFECT ON AT LEAST THE PGOI'S PERCEPTION OF WHERE ITS INTERESTS LIE AND THIS PERCEPTION DOES NOT GENERALLY FAVOR THE SOVIET POSITION IN IRAN. A CASE IN POINT IS THE CONTINUING UNREST IN KURDESTAN WHERE THE POSSIBILITY OF ETHNIC INSURGENCY HAS BROUGHT HOME THE NEED FOR A MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH IT. THIS IN TURN HAS SPARKED INTEREST IN RENEWING A MILITARY SUPPLY RELATION-
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 070948Z AUG 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 0007
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3104
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0021
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 0143
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0308
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RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0266
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CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE S/S/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LELAING
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DISTR: POL2 CHG ECON ICA DAO RF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 08828

SHIP WITH THE U.S.

FURTHER, SIX MONTHS AFTER THE REVOLUTION, THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAN REMAINS IN A STATE OF FLUX. THE PGOI HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ASSERT ITS PRIMACY IN MATTERS OF GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE INFORMAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE, THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES AND THEIR ADJUNCTS, WHICH OFTEN EXERCISE REAL POLITICAL POWER, SEEMS INCAPABLE IN TECHNICAL TERMS OF ADMINISTERING IRAN'S AFFAIRS ON A NATIONAL BASIS. THE SOVIETS MUST VIEW THE UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN IRAN, PARTICULARLY WHEN INSTABILITY HERE THREATENS SOVIET INTERESTS IN SUCH PLACES AS AFGHANISTAN, WITH SOME CONCERN.

6. FINALLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE FARED NO BETTER THAN ANYONE ELSE IN DOING BUSINESS IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. GAS SHIPMENTS THROUGH IGAT-I STILL HAVE NOT ATTAINED THE LEVEL OF VOLUME WHICH PERTAINED PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION. MOREOVER, THE IRANIANS HAVE ASKED THAT THE PRICE THE SOVIETS SAY FOR THE GAS THEY ARE GETTING BE RENEGOTIATED UPWARDS, AND THEY APPARENTLY INTEND NOT TO BUILD IGAT-II AT ALL.

7. WE AGREE WITH THE FRG PAPER THAT "KHOMEINI WILL BE OFFICIALLY DROPPED BY THE SOVIET UNION WHEN THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION BEGINS TO THREATEN VITAL SOVIET INTERESTS." HOWEVER, THAT DEMARCATION IS NOT A FINE LINE EASILY DISTINGUISHED. WE SENSE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE BEGUN THE PROCESS OF RE-EXAMINING THEIR POLICY TOWARDS KHOMEINI, BUT AS YET HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE THAT IT IS TIME TO CHANGE COURSE. THE RESULT IS A CERTAIN AMBIVALENCE TOWARD IRAN AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION THAT MAY PERSIST SO LONG AS THE SITUATION HERE REMAINS AS MUDDLED AS IT HAS FOR THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS. LAINGEN
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

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CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: August 7, 1979

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Victor L. Tomseth - POL

SUBJECT: Iranian Political Parties

TO: The Charge - Mr. L. B. Laingen

While more than 150 political organizations of one sort or another have declared themselves to the public in the six months since the Revolution, very few of these can be considered political parties in the classical sense of the word. Most would more accurately be described in Persian terms as Doreh, circles of individuals coming together for a common purpose under the personal sponsorship of a leading member. As such, they tend to be small and subject to great vicissitudes. Further, while these political organizations are in principle based upon an ideology, the exigencies of the moment often make for rather odd alliances. Witness the Tudeh Party's current support for the Islamic Republic.

What follows, then, is at best a rough outline of the most significant of Iran's political organizations. These have been divided into several broad categories on the basis of ideological orientation, but these categories suggest nothing at all of relationships among groups within a particular category or possible relationships from one category to another.

Islamic Organizations:

The Islamic Republican Party - Headed by Khomeini confidant and reputed member of the Revolutionary Council Dr. Mohammad Beheshti, the Islamic Republican Party currently enjoys the broadest popular support of any political organization operating in Iran. However, it is not clear that it possesses an organizational structure in anything more than theory. Only time will tell whether it is a mere reflection of Khomeini's current popularity or an institution capable of surviving him. The Party's platform, to the extent one exists, favors a rigidly theocratic form of government.

The Muslim People's Republican Party - Little is known about the party's Secretary General, a man named Alizadeh, but it is widely perceived that the party itself is the political vehicle of Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari. While favoring a strong Islamic content in government, the party's platform is less rigidly theocratic than that of the Islamic republican party. Further, it has an important ethnic orientation, enjoying particular support among Azari Turks.

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The Mojahedin-E-Khalq - The Mojahedin began as a para-military movement in opposition to the Pahlavi regime, then became an umbrella organization for a wide variety of groups vaguely identified with Islam, and more recently still has begun to fragment into a number of component elements which are frequently in conflict with one another. The most openly political element is headed by Masoud Rajavi, a young man who often identifies more closely with radical political groups of the left than with conservative Islamic organizations.

Forghan - Forghan is a small group dedicated to Islam without the Ulema. It has chosen terrorism as its preferred means of political expression.

Right Wing and National Parties:

Pan Iranist Party - Headed by former Majlles member Mohsen Pezeshkpour, the Pan Iranist Party has been around since the 1950's. Dedicated to the principle of a greater Iran (including the recapture of Bahrain and lands lost to Czarist Russia), the Pan Iranists have not been above resorting to political expediency to stay in business. In 1975 the Pan Iranist Party accepted bloc status in the Rastakhiz Party, Iran's single legal party between that year and 1978.

The Iranian People's Party - Led by Minister of Labor Darioush Forouhar, the Iranian People's Party was until about two months ago a component of the National Front.

Secular, Non-Marxist Organizations:

The National Front - The National Front is not really a party but rather a collection of parties. With the departure of Forouhar, the disembowelment of the Iran Party following Shapur Bakhtiar's acceptance of the Premiership in January, and growing independence of the Liberation Movement of Iran since Mehdi Bazargan has been Prime Minister, however, the collection is at present quite diminished. The creation of the National Democratic Front under Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari also had the effect of drawing away much potential support from secular oriented Iranians under fifty. The result has been to leave the National Front as an organization with a lot of aging chiefs (e.g., Karim Sanjabi) but very few Indians of any age.

The National Democratic Front - The National Democratic Front is less a front than a party although by its own admission little has been done to create an organizational structure. The Front is clearly searching for a niche. It often vacillates between staking out a position as the non-Marxist secular opposition to the Islamic crowd and joining Muslin know-nothings in attacks on imperialism of East and West.

The Liberation Movement of Iran - Ostensibly led by Prime Minister Bazargan, the Liberation Movement of Iran has occupied a rather anamolous position for the last six months. Its leading members, as part of the PGOI, have not participated, at least openly, in party activities. Nonetheless, some of their prestige as key members of the PGOI has redounded to the party's advantage. For example, it fielded a separate slate of candidates for the assembly of experts elections, a degree of independence other so-called components of the National Front did not have.

The Radical Movement - Headed by Rahmatollah Moghadam-Maragheie, the Radical Movement is also a sometimes associate of the National Front. It does not have a particularly large following, but is important because of its links to such organizations as the Lawyers Association and its base among the Azari Turks. Moghadam-Maragheie himself was elected to the Assembly of experts from East Azarbaijan. He was sponsored by both his own party and the Muslim People's Republican Party.

Marxist Organizations:

The Tudeh Party - The Tudeh, presently led by Nourollah Kianouri, has been around as long as almost any other Iranian political organization and, while having a limited following, is structured along the lines of a true political party. For the moment, the Tudeh is pursuing a policy of a United Front with the Islamic Movement.

The Fedayan-E-Khalq-E-Iran - The Fedayan, like the Mojahedin, began as a Para-Military Organization in opposition to the Pahlavi Regime. It continues to regard itself primarily in those terms, although in recent months it has behaved more and more like a political organization. The Fedayan fielded a small slate of candidates for the Assembly of experts elections and campaigned hard during the brief period allotted for such activities. It also publishes a newspaper, Kar, which is heavily political in content.

The Socialist Workers Party - Led by a young American educated radical, Babak Zahraie, the Socialist Workers Party appears to have a miniscule following. Its primary significance is the attention it has received from the Revolutionary Committee structure. An unusually high proportion of party members appear to have been singled out by the Islamic Movement for harassment.

Ethnic Parties:

The Kurdish Democratic Party - led by Abdol Rahim Ghasemlou, the Kurdish Democratic Party seems to have a vaguely leftist orientation but in actuality is based primarily on its ethnic identification. The party itself was initially just one of several contenders for support among the Kurdish population, but in recent weeks Sheikh Ezzedin Hosseini, the singular most

popular religious figure in Kurdestan, has made a number of statements which seem to favor the Kurdish Demorcratic Party over other Kurdish political organizations. Ghasemlou was elected to the Assembly of experts from West Azarbaijan.

The Muslim Arabs political organization - This organization seems to be a quite recent political phenomenon. Little is known about it except for its platform of demanding more rights for Iranian Arabs in Khuzestan Province. It boycotted the Assembly of experts elections, a telling comment on its political strength, even among ethnic Arabs.

Draftor: VLTomseth:go

cc: ICA
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ADMIN

THREAT ANALYSIS GROUP
DEPARTMENT OF STATE • OFFICE OF SECURITY

SECRET

THREAT ASSESSMENT: IRAN

Prepared by:
Stefanie C. Stauffer
632-1864

Approved by:
Bowman H. Miller
Sid T. Telford
632-2412

June 14, 1979

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SECRET
RDS-1,2,4 5/29/2009 (Multiple Sources)

THREAT ASSESSMENT

Threat Statement

(LOU) Iran is a country of contrasts, constraints, and uncertainties. What exists in Iran today may not exist tomorrow. The country is in a continual state of flux and the security situation can, at this point in time, be described only as tenuous at best. There is widespread civil disorder in the countryside, particularly in areas inhabited by Iranian Kurds and, most recently, in Khorramshahr. Security of the U.S. compound in Tehran is improving; however, this should not be construed to mean that one is necessarily safe when on the compound.

Religious and Political Complexities

(U) The roots of the current unrest go back several centuries. The Shi'ite Moslem Sect, to which most Iranian Moslems belong, has traditionally opposed any kind of secular government. The Shi'ites have no religious hierarchy as do Western religions. Individual mullahs (clergymen) acquire followings of their own.

Through education, spiritualism, and leadership, a mullah may reach the prestigious level of mujtahid and then command a much larger following which would include other mullahs and their followings. Prior to and following the demise of the Peacock throne, the most influential mujtahid has been Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a long-time outspoken opponent of the government and of Iran's ties with the United States. There are three major facets of the clergy's dissatisfaction. The Shi'ite clergy in 1906 succeeded in forcing the government to include in the new constitution a clause setting up a Supreme Religious Council, which in effect had veto power over all legislation considered to conflict with the teachings of the Koran. The Council was dissolved shortly after the Shah Reza Pahlavi took over in 1921. The clergy has demanded reinstatement of this Council with the same powers. The recently departed Shah's land reform program and the emancipation of women are the other primary areas of clergy discontent. In 1963 when the Shah enacted a land reform program, the holdings of the mosques--which are considerable--were confiscated

and, along with privately owned estates, were redistributed to the peasants. Stripped of this wealth and to a certain extent of their power, the Moslem leaders have been working for the return of their land. The clergy also opposed the Shah's emancipation of women.

(U) Khomeini's defenders argue that his campaign over the years to oust the Shah from the Peacock throne was in keeping with the Shi'ite tradition. In contrast to religious leaders in such countries as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, Iranian mullahs have traditionally adopted a critical stance toward the ruling establishment, operating in effect as a theological opposition. Persian Shi'ite mullahs were engaged in power struggles with emperors in the 17th and 19th centuries. In 1892, for example, religious leaders directed a massive sit-in protest against the reigning monarch's allocation to the British of the Iranian tobacco monopoly. They also weighed heavily in the drawing up of Iran's 1906 constitution which was based in its secular details on that of Belgium and which the Shah and his autocratic

father repeatedly violated by suppressing political rights.

(C) Ayatollah Khomeini seems increasingly frustrated over opposition to his Islamic republic and continued terrorist attacks on his close associates. Both moderate and leftist secularists view Khomeini's strident criticism of them as evidence of a growing clerical fascism and dictatorship. Secularists are reportedly disturbed by unpublicized portions of Khomeini's message to Prime Minister Bazargan on May 26, 1979, calling for a referendum on the constitution to be held soon. The message indicated that representatives will not be elected but "called" to join. This is being interpreted to mean that Khomeini intends that the constitutional process be controlled by the Islamic movement to minimize dissent. Recent anti-American demonstrations and Khomeini's statement indirectly blaming the United States for the attempted assassination of Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani have added to the concern among many secularists over the future course of Khomeini's xenophobia. More and more secular Iranians view

Khomeini's political and social attitudes as neither practical nor feasible. It is uncertain whether the Ayatollah's recent conduct will generate cooperation between leftist and moderate secularists or provoke them into action, but groups across the political spectrum are increasingly critical of the aims of the revolution. (RDS-1--5/29/2009)

(C) With the collapse of the Pahlavi system a pronounced proclivity for political fractionalization rapidly reasserted itself. This fractionalization is not simply vertical, i.e., an ideological division between the Marxist Left and the Islamic Right but multidirectional. This accounts both for odd alliances, such as that between some members of the Islamic Mujahidin-E-Khalq and the Marxist Fedayee (formerly the Charikha-ye-Fedai-ye-Khalq), and for the apparent anomaly of the Provisional Government's slow progress in asserting its authority in the wake of the revolution's lighting victory over the old regime. These divisions have manifested themselves in some five different ways: ideological, generational, sociological, ethnic, and administrative.

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The most significant political groups are the secular Marxists and the proponents of a government based on a fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic tenets. Also evident earlier was the coalescence of "modernist" political sentiment into a significant political force. With the rapid fall of the former regime, this political middle group fell into total disarray. However, now it appears to be regrouping and adding its voices to the many others. The differences in outlook range in terms of age from Khomeini and his religious peers in their seventies to the teen-aged guerrilla fighters. Under the best of circumstances, it is difficult for the generations to communicate with one another. In this instance, there are signs of growing resentment between the youthful street fighters and the older generation. The young generation views itself as having made the revolution a success, and were prepared to give up their lives for the movement. As a consequence and reward, they want a greater voice in consolidating the revolution's gains than they believe they now are being given. Sociologically, one sees modernist versus traditionalist

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sentiments, a split within economic classes. Ethnically, the most immediately evident division is in the demands for autonomy emanating from Kurdestan. There are a variety of distinct groups, whether based on linguistic differences (the Turkic speakers of Azerbaijan and the Arabic speakers of Khuzestan) and/or confessional differences (the Sunni Kurds and the Baluchis), which have traditionally viewed themselves as apart from the mainstream of Persian culture. Administratively, one must deal with the dual systems of the Provisional Government and those of the revolutionary "komitehs." (GDS--2/27/85)

Potential for Violence

(U) Terrorism is a fact of life in Iran and has been throughout its history. In the past the two most significant terrorist organizations were the Mujahidin-E-Khalq (Peoples' Strugglers) and the Charikha-ye-Fedai-ye-Khalq (Peoples' Sacrifice Guerrillas or "Chariks"). A heretofore relatively unknown group, Forqan, has taken credit for the most recent and most violent attacks which have been irected against Khomeini's associates. (See later detailed explanation of Forqan.)

(S) The fractionalization of the Islamic movement and the many political groups competing for public favor may once again find the U.S. an attractive target for propaganda and aggression. This could further the growingly vocal anti-U.S. sentiment. Moreover, any political decisions which Iranians in general consider disadvantageous to them could trigger anti-U.S. demonstrations. The street response to the May 17 Senate resolution is the most recent example. A threat can also stem from nearly anyone among the left-wing or right-wing political factions. On the Left there is the Tudeh Party (Communist and connected with the Czech, Soviet, and East German parties) and the Fedayee (Marxist). On the Right there is the Fedeyen-E-Islam, the Mujahidin-E-Khalq, and the Arujahiddin-E-Khalq as well as other unidentified fragmented groups. There is also a PLO training detachment in Iran, ostensibly to train elements of the Islamic Internal Defense Force. Reports concerning the size of the group vary but an Embassy political officer has credible information indicating a force of approximately 250. Although this force

has been engaged in training activities, it could also act as a spearhead for an assault on the Embassy or U.S. personnel off the compound. Such a force, trained and disciplined, would pose a more serious threat than the elements that attacked the Embassy on February 14. (GDS--5/2/85)

(U) The Chariks and the Mujahidin operated clandestinely until the demise of the Peacock throne. Both groups continue to be viable terrorist groups; however, both have, to some extent, changed their directions of interest in recent months.

(LOU) On February 14, 1979 the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was attacked and overrun by the Chariks, an organization which had previously not focused on American targets because they felt such incidents would bring too strong a response from the Iranian security agencies. However, with the Iranian government in internal chaos, they struck and were quite successful, taking control of the Embassy compound and nearly one hundred Americans including then Ambassador Sullivan. To add an even more disconcerting note, the forces that came to the aid of the Americans and were at the time acting as the

Provisional police, were members of the Mujahidin. The Mujahidin since 1972 have assassinated six Americans (three military personnel and three Rockwell International employees). They also attempted the bombing assassination of a U.S. Air Force brigadier general, the kidnapping of the American Ambassador, and mistakenly assassinated an Iranian employee of the U.S. Embassy (the actual target was a U.S. consular official). At the present time, an element of the Mujahidin protects the Embassy compound (see section titled "Security of the Compound" for a more detailed explanation).

(U) Among the gravest problems for the Khomeini government is the capability of restive tribes and regional groups demanding autonomy to harass the beleaguered central authorities. The government is trying to rebuild the armed forces to a capability similar to that which they attained under the Shah. Iran's guerrilla groups are resisting this, trying instead to create a "people's army" run by soldier committees and elected officers. Several government attempts to dissolve these groups and seize their arsenals of weapons have failed. The guerrillas'

concept of soldier committees and elected officers would give the guerrillas the opportunity to take control of the armed forces gradually. So far, the Islamic Mujahidin-E-Khalq and the Marxist Fedayee have recruited enough members within the military to block the government's efforts. The two guerrilla groups are competing for control of the army's lower ranks. The larger of the two, the Mujahidin, basically follows the tenets of Khomeini. It is an independent group, however, and has a more socialist revolutionary vision of Islamic society than does Khomeini or his Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan. The Fedayee, on the other hand, seeks a proletarian revolution leading to a communist state.

The Mujahidin

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) Fanatic religious conservatives, the Mujahidin opposed the Shah's Iranian government because of the anti-religious aspects of its modernization program, especially those which diminished religious leaders' powers and were blamed on Western influence. Called Islamic-Marxists, the group's Marxism denotes political activism more than philosophy while its Islamic component highlights opposition to societal inequities.

The leadership is more Marxist, the rank and file more religious. Founded in 1961, the Mujahidin underwent several reincarnations in the next decade. It adopted its present name in 1971. In 1972 Khomeini declared that it was the duty of all good Muslims to support the Mujahidin and overthrow the Shah. This edict gave the group legitimacy and enabled it to garner more widespread support. Its first anti-American action occurred in May 1972 when the group attempted a bombing assassination of a U.S. Air Force brigadier general. Its last significant anti-American act was the August 1976 assassination of the three Rockwell employees. An Iranian governmental group, the Joint Committee on Terrorism (JCT) then began an active campaign to eradicate both the Mujahidin and Chariks in late 1976-1977, and the last reported Mujahidin incident was the May 1977 surveillance of the Jewish Emigration Center in Tehran, an organization associated with the Israeli legation in Iran. The JCT's encounter with the Mujahidin in this instance occurred shortly before the arrival of Secretary of State Vance on his first trip to Iran. (RDS-2--8/15/98)

The Chariks

(S/NOFORN) A secular, revolutionary Marxist group, the Chariks advocated guerrilla warfare to overthrow the Shah. The Chariks identify more with Latin American revolutionaries than with the Soviet Union or People's Republic of China. Formed in 1970-71 by activist, dissident members of the communist, Moscow-oriented Tudeh Party youth organization, the Chariks first attempted rural insurgency on the northern slopes of the Alborz Mountains between Tehran and the Caspian Sea. Later it engaged in urban actions, having been most active in early 1975. Prior to December 1977, Charik targets were almost exclusively Iranian: Iranian National Security and Intelligence Organization (SAVAK) personnel, police, military and government officials. It first targeted Americans in December 1977 when it claimed responsibility for bombing the Iran-American Society. In January 1978, in a letter addressed to a U.S. defense contractor, the Chariks reconsidered its earlier position--that it was a waste of resources to target Americans--and stated a new interest in them as lucrative targets. (RDS-2--8/15/98)

Forqan - The Incidents

(C/NOFORN) Forqan first "reared its ugly head" when it claimed credit for the April 23, 1979 assassination of the Provisional Government's former Chief of Staff, General Mohammed Vali Gharani, who was forced to resign under criticism for the Army's handling of the Kurdish autonomists. On May 1, 1979 Ayatollah Morteza Motahari was assassinated as he was leaving the home of Yadollah Shahabi, Minister of State for Revolutionary Projects. Motahari was a member of the Revolutionary Council. He was reported to be head of the Revolutionary Council and to have had very tight personal security. He died from three shots in the head. In calls to all international news agencies the evening of May 6, 1979, a caller, claiming to be from Forqan, stated that the assassination of Motahari was carried out to further their ideals (NFI). The caller stated that next on Forqan's list were Ibrahim Yazdi, Mehdi Hadavi (Chief Public Prosecutor), Sadeq Ghotbazadeh, Abbas Amir-Entezam and the entire membership of the Revolutionary Council. The caller claimed to have names and pictures of every council member. (GDS--5/6/85)

(C/NOFORN) On May 25, 1979 Forqan attempted to assassinate Kojatolleslam Hashemi Rafsanjani, 45, a hardline anti-Communist religious leader. He was seriously wounded in a struggle with two gunmen who made their way into his Tehran home while he was at prayers. Rafsanjani was a close Khomeini aide and was reported to be a member of the Revolutionary Council. Khomeini and Iranian ayatollahs immediately blamed the United States and "made-in-America" Iranian leftists for the assassination attempt. Khomeini stated, "America an the other super powers must know. . .that they cannot assassinate our revolution with these foolish efforts." In a message to the nation on May 28, 1979, Tehran's Islamic Revolutionary Court charged that Forqan was established by the CIA's former director Richard Helms who later served as U.S. Ambassador to Iran. On May 29 1979, Forqan announced its intention to make another attempt to assassinate Rafsanjani. Khomeini reportedly has tightened security for himself and other leaders in light of Forqan's death list. He has ordered the centr military police to take over security from the unoffici militia. (GDS--5/29/85)

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(C) Information received June 11, 1979 indicates that Forqan may have identified its next target, Brigadier General Noureddin Most Ahedi, Director General of the Army Medical Services. This is the first time a specific target has been identified. (GDS--6/11/85)

Forqan - Background

(U) Forqan reportedly was established some four years ago as a small purist religious group with no previous history of violence. It took its name from a Koranic term meaning "Holy Book" or "the difference between truth and falsehood." It is believed to be politically leftist. Its main direction of interest currently is its opposition to the clergy's role in the new Iranian government.

(U) Gharani was assassinated because he had been "sentenced to a revolutionary execution for his treason" during the Shah's regime and for his hard-line role in crushing the Kurdish revolt in Sanandaj in March. Following the assassination of Motahari, Forqan cited the "dictatorship of the mullahs" or Islamic prayer leaders, and alleged suppression of Iranian Kurds among a list of reasons for the act.

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Security of Americans

(U) Prior to the evacuation of the majority of Americans from Tehran, harassing activities were experienced by hundreds of American military and civilian personnel. Telephone calls threatening death to the recipients if they did not leave the country were almost daily occurrences prior to the major evacuation of Americans from Iran. Threatening warnings were delivered to residences, affixed to cars, or left in work areas. A number of these warnings were reproduced in quantity and disseminated en masse in both Isfahan and Tehran. American firms and schools with U.S. students were victimized by bomb threats. Another somewhat successful tactic was the promulgation of unsettling rumors, such as warnings that large numbers of Americans would be killed on particular days. Sporadically, local shopkeepers refused to sell to Americans; taxicab drivers declined to accept U.S. citizens as fares; and propane dealers opted not to sell Americans the gas needed to operate stoves and other household appliances. There were also attacks on the personal property of or places frequented by

Americans. Private vehicles were set on fire, firebombs tossed through private residence windows, and a number of restaurants in Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz which catered to foreigners were attacked, bombed, and set afire.

(S) Anti-U.S. feelings, which appeared to have abated several months ago following the evacuation of most America are on the increase. The fractionalization of the Islamic movement and the many political groups competing for public favor may once again find the U.S. an attractive target for propaganda and aggression. Recent demonstrations protestin Senator Jacob Javits' resolution on Iran point out the fact that any political decision which Iranians in general consider disadvantageous to them could trigger anti-U.S. demonstrations and/or incidents. In this regard, a decisio to allow the deposed Shah and or family members to visit or settle in the United States could have serious consequences. The Iranian reaction would probably be immediate and possibly violent. Such a decision would probably be the one cohesive and unifying factor in the entire Iranian political spectrum. (GDS--5/2/85)

Security of the Compound

(S) At present the compound is protected by an element of the Mujahidin led by Mashallah Kashani who

claims to hold credentials directly from Khomeini. His forces, which supposedly number approximately 40 with a reserve located in two mosques in the area, are untrained, lack discipline, and are armed with a variety of weapons (some stolen from the U.S. Embassy) as well as radio equipment removed from the Chancery on February 14, 1979. Foreign Service personnel report that only five to ten of these guards are on the compound during daylight hours. During evening hours the forces increase to fifteen or twenty. Periodic checks at night usually find most, if not all, the troops asleep. (GDS--5/2/85)

(S) Of definite concern is the Embassy's lack of control over the after-hour activities of Mashallah and his troops. He has used the Embassy compound to run his own revolutionary and intelligence operations. He has brought SAVAK agents on the compound and used the motorpool office for interrogation purposes. Upon learning o the possibility that Mashallah may have tortured a prisoner on the compound, the Charge ordered these activitie stopped. It is believed that this activity ceased; however, Mashallah has found other ways to amuse himself.

He has run an operation against the Soviets and also some Iranians from the compound. An Embassy vehicle was used in the seizure of three Soviets, and the safehouse was located off the rear of the compound. Indiscriminate shooting at each other and at unknown persons firing at the compound during darkness is another inherent problem with Mashallah and his Mujahidin. Lastly, Mashallah and his forces control access to the compound. They threaten, abuse, and generally obstruct normal access to the compound. Attempts are being made for police forces to gradually take over some of the security responsibilities of the Mujahidin. (GDS--5/2/85)

Tribal Unrest in the Provinces

(C) Nationalist groups, who were active underground until the downfall of the Shah, are now openly demanding full autonomy for their ethnic groups. This includes the Kurds in the west, the Baluchis in the southwest, and the Azeris in the northwest. The most recent open expression of hostility occurred in Khorramshar on May 30, 1979 following an incident in which a revolutionary guardsman killed two Arabs in the course of a labor dispute at the port. The Arab community attacked the port and public

خرمشهر اتفاق افتاد. بدنبال حادثه‌ای که در آن یک گارد انقلابی دو عرب را بخاطر مشاجرهٔ کارگری در بندر کشت. جامعهٔ عرب به بندر و ساختمانهای عمومی حمله کردند. درگیری مسلحانه شدت یافت و چند صد نفر تلفات بدنبال داشت. حملات ناگهانی اخیر بوسیلهٔ نیروی هوائی عراق در حطوط مرزی روی استحکامات کردستان، مخصوصا" سازمان جلال طالبانی خشم بیشتر کردها رانسبت به دولت موقت ایران باعث شده است. شاه توافقنامه‌ای با عراق داشت که به کردها اجازه داد که اساسا" در صلح بدون ترس از انتقامهای عراق زندگی کنند و این توافقنامه حالا توسط عراقیها شکسته شده است.

buildings. Large-scale arson and gun battles ensued with reportedly several hundred casualties. (XDS-4--5/39/99)

(U) Recent incursions by the Iraqi Air Force in cross-border attacks on Kurdish strongholds, particularly those of Jalal Talabani's organization, have caused much Kurdish resentment towards the Provisional Government of Iran. The Shah had an agreement with Iraq which allowed the Kurds to basically live in peace without fear of Iraqi reprisals. This agreement now appears to have been invalidated by the Iraqis.